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Robert W. Hartman — Congress and Budget-Making

Michael Lienesch — Christian Conservatism as a Political Movement

Frank J. Thompson — Bureaucratic Discretion and the National Health Service Corps

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Political Science Quarterly

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ROBERT W. HARTMAN analyzes the evolving federal budget process as it faces very stiff tests. He also discusses proposed reforms including modifications of budget reconciliation and a balanced budget amendment.

MICHAEL LIENESCH examines the rise of the contemporary religious right as a political movement. He concludes that social scientists have misinterpreted the Christian conservative movement and underestimate its long-term potential.

FRANK J. THOMPSON draws on the experience of the National Health Service Corps to show how vague laws and limited oversight can at times foster the benign evolution of public programs. He specifies some conditions under which greater bureaucratic discretion can yield positive program developments.

PETER S. ONUF investigates state sovereignty in the American revolutionary era. He suggests that a crucial redefinition of statehood preceded and facilitated the creation of a more powerful union under the Federal Constitution.

NAOMI CHAZAN examines the politicization of ethnicity, the uses of ethnicity in political conflicts, and the conversion of ethnicity into power in Ghana. She concludes that the manifestations of ethnicity are an outgrowth of the manipulation and uses of state power.

CHARLES V. HAMILTON's review essay of *America in Search of Itself* reflects on Theodore White's evaluation of political trends over the past decades and questions whether it will be possible for the Reagan administration to return the national government to a reduced role in economic affairs.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Congress and Budget-Making

ROBERT W. HARTMAN

Federal budget decisions not only reflect views about fiscal and social policy, but also are substantially shaped by electoral politics and by the processes of government. Breaking a budget stalemate appears to require that a compromise between quite divergent views be worked out by the president and the two houses of Congress in this election year using a still-evolving budget process. It will not be easy. Moreover, in the past year such actions as reconciliation and closing the government for a day have left the public more confused than ever at a time when calm judgment is needed to deal with the serious substantive issues raised by this year's budget.

This article tries to provide a background for understanding some of the procedural developments of the past and alternatives for the future. It first discusses legislative developments through President Reagan's first year in office, then examines prospects for avoiding a stalemate, and concludes with a look at alternative future budgetary procedures, ranging from relatively weak budget controls to a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.

Evolution of Budget Reform

"The president proposes and the Congress disposes" is shorthand for the American system of handling federal laws, including the budget. While budgetary procedures of the executive branch changed little in the 1970s, those of the Congress underwent significant change.

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The Executive Branch

The preparation of the president's budget proposal each January has been more or less the same for the last twenty-five years. In the spring preceding the budget's submission, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) conducts a spring preview, a series of meetings and presentations involving OMB and agency officials, in an attempt to identify the issues likely to have a major impact on the upcoming budget. These reviews may lead to further study, to directives to agencies to prepare specific proposals, and to the development of planning ceilings for the agencies. By the fall, the OMB's attention turns more directly to the budget. Ordinarily the OMB director holds meetings to review all parts of the budget. Decisions are made on the administration's economic assumptions and overall fiscal policy. These are translated into firm budget guidance to each government agency. As the calendar year draws to a close, there is a series of exchanges of budget submissions between the OMB and the agencies, culminating in final negotiations between the White House and the agency heads. Various presidents have involved themselves in the process in greater or lesser detail, but the president is always the final arbiter.

When a new president comes to office, the transition imposes a need for supplementing procedures in the executive branch. At the start of both the Carter and Reagan presidencies in 1977 and 1981, budget amendments were hurriedly put together for delivery to the Congress by March to meet the congressional budget calendar. Obviously, the telescoped amending process cannot involve as much agency consultation or give-and-take as there is in the ordinary budget deliberations. In 1981 there was almost none, in part because OMB Director David Stockman was knowledgeable and had a comprehensive program and in part because in early 1981 there was little expert opposition either in the White House or in the agencies. Thus President Reagan's first-stage budget proposal in 1981 was conceived and born in the OMB. The fiscal 1983 budget, which had a full year to develop, was not an all-OMB product. Stockman's power had been eroded by his candid observations in a magazine article,[1] and several forceful cabinet officials had developed power and influence with the president. Thus the 1983 budget was more a joint product of the agencies and the OMB.

The OMB's main role usually ends with the submission of the president's budget to Congress. Although the OMB monitors the budget's progress and clears officials' testimony, the brunt of the responsibility for defending the president's proposals falls to agency chiefs. While the appearance of unswerving loyalty to the president is always maintained by agency officials who want to keep their jobs, deals that depart from the president's proposals are often cut between agency heads, who may be acting on behalf of outside interest groups, and committee chairmen. There was little evidence that this "iron triangle" of interest group, agency, and congressional committee exerted influence in 1981,

[1] See William Greider, "The Education of David Stockman," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1981, pp. 27–54.

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in part because the OMB took a much stronger interest than customary in the budget's progress through Congress. Indeed, because most of the key budget legislation was encompassed in a single bill, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the iron triangle would have had to have been designed by a computer. Stockman was able to exert full control over President Reagan's spending plans because the OMB played a large part in drafting the "bipartisan" Gramm–Latta proposals that later became law.[2] The interdependence of the parts of the fiscal 1983 presidential budget proposal or a possible compromise package makes it likely that the OMB will continue to play a central role in negotiations with Congress.

Congressional Budgetary Procedures

Before 1974 the Congress did not deal with the president's budget submission in a systematic or well-coordinated manner. The legislative proposals in the president's budget were simply parceled out to the various committees in each house.[3] Proposed *appropriations* (which set dollar limits, usually called *budget authority*, on the commitment of funds for any particular government activity) were sent to the appropriations committee in each house, which then allocated the requests to its subcommittees. Proposed *authorizations*, which establish the legal basis for the federal government to engage in an activity, such as the Vocational Education Act, and set an upper limit on appropriations for that activity, usually over several years, were sent to the pertinent authorizing committee (for example, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee) for consideration. Tax change proposals went to the House Ways and Means Committee and later to the Senate Finance Committee. Each committee worked at its own pace, and after each piece of legislation cleared both houses and a conference committee to reconcile differences, it was sent to the president for signature. The "budget" that emerged was the uncoordinated sum of the spending consequences of all these laws.[4]

No committee of Congress was in charge of the budget as a whole. Although the Ways and Means and Finance Committees were in command of the laws governing taxes, they acted independently, and often in ignorance, of actions taken by the spending committees. The appropriations committees did give some overall guidance to their subcommittees and usually cut spending below the president's request. Authorizing committees were totally uncoordinated and often circumvented the appropriations committees by establishing and liberalizing *entitlements*. Entitlements are authorizing laws that establish a beneficiary's

[2] Dale Tate, "Reconciliation's Long Term Consequences in Question as Reagan Signs Massive Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (15 August 1981): 1463–66.

[3] The budget document itself is not a proposed law. It is accompanied by proposed laws that are very specific. There is no single law that can be called "the budget." See the discussion in the text of budget resolutions.

[4] And of laws passed earlier which established "permanent appropriations" (such as for interest on the national debt) that do not require annual legislation.

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claim to a government payment (for example, food stamps), thereby making the subsequent appropriation an *uncontrollable* item in the sense that the appropriations committees have no discretion over it. Aside from the lack of coordination and of a central accountable entity, this congressional process lacked timeliness. Some appropriations became law before the start of the fiscal year; others did not. When a regular appropriation had not been passed, an agency would be financed under a *continuing resolution*, a stopgap measure that left much to be desired.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974

Most of these procedures remain intact today, but the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 made several important changes in budgetary procedures while building on the existing structure of legislative activity. The act created a Committee on the Budget in each house to coordinate budget policy and a Congressional Budget Office to provide staff expertise. The coordinating role of the Budget Committees can best be understood through the procedural calendar also established by the 1974 act. Under the new procedures, the proposed laws implementing the president's budget are still parceled out to the authorization, appropriation, and tax committees, but action on the floor of Congress is not permitted until certain milestones are passed. The cycle begins in mid-March, when each committee sends a report to the Budget Committee containing its recommendations for budgetary action in its domain of expertise.

The Budget Committees draft and report out by April 15 a *first concurrent resolution on the budget*. This resolution specifies aggregate targets for budget authority, outlays, revenues, and deficits, as well as for the cumulative debt subject to statutory limit.[5] The resolution also sets forth targets for budget authority and outlays in each function (national defense, health, and so forth). Budget Committee staff translate them into targets for each committee that has jurisdiction over some part of the budget. Once a common first concurrent resolution has passed each house, scheduled for May 15, the authorizing and appropriating committees, acting under the guidance of the first resolution, may bring bills to the floor.[6] All the while, the Congressional Budget Office keeps track of

[5] The debt subject to statutory limit includes virtually all Treasury debt whether owned by the public or by federal agencies. The unified budget deficit ("the deficit" in everyday parlance), on the other hand, nets out the annual surplus of federal trust funds (almost always held in the form of Treasury securities), and it does not include the deficit of off-budget entities, which are financed by the issue of Treasury debt. Thus the annual increase in the debt subject to statutory limit (except for small adjustments relating to cash accounts) equals the unified budget deficit plus the trust fund surplus plus the deficit of off-budget entities. The debt subject to statutory limit will rise even if the budget, as conventionally defined, is balanced; it will cease rising only if there is a surplus on nontrust fund accounts ("federal funds") equal to or greater than the deficit of off-budget entities. See *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1983, Special Analysis E: Borrowing and Debt* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).

[6] The 1974 act required that authorizing legislation be reported by committees no later than May 15, but numerous waivers of procedure have weakened this constraint.

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the progress of legislation and aids the budget committees in informing members if the targets in the resolution are likely to be breached. Thus during the summer, when most spending legislation is being enacted, the committees of Congress are under only one (nonbinding) constraint—the target for spending or taxing allocated to them as a result of the first concurrent resolution.

The congressional budgetary process culminates in September, just before the start of the fiscal year, which was shifted to October by the 1974 act. The act requires Congress to pass a *second concurrent resolution* in September and, if necessary, to revise the limits contained in the first resolution. The estimates for spending and taxing in the second resolution are "binding" in this sense: once the resolution has been passed, any member can kill legislation that raises the outlays and budget authority above their ceiling or reduces revenues below the revenue floor by objecting to its consideration. Before any such legislation can be passed, a *third concurrent resolution* is required to change the limits. Thus the final binding budget under the new procedures constrains only *legislative action*; it does not limit the budgetary outcomes themselves. Indeed, the budget resolutions are only a set of rules for Congress; they are not signed by the president and have no status as laws. Also, if at the time the second concurrent resolution is adopted the previous actions of any committee are found to be inconsistent with the dollar limits of the second resolution, the situation would be rectified by the *reconciliation process.* In the second resolution itself, committees would receive reconciliation instructions that directed them to amend or to rescind appropriations or other spending legislation or to change the tax laws. The legislation drafted by the committees given these directives would be packaged (without change) by the budget committees into a single *budget reconciliation act*. The budget reconciliation act must clear Congress by September 25, to give the president time to sign it before the fiscal year begins.[7]

How the Reformed Process Worked

These procedures operated pretty much as the legislation intended between 1976 when the new procedures were first fully implemented, and 1978—covering the budgets for fiscal years 1977–79. As shown in Table 1, the budget calendar was adhered to in that period, and the first resolution outlay targets were not breached by either committee legislative activity or subsequent events. Revenues were slightly overestimated in fiscal 1977 but underestimated in 1978 and 1979, and the actual budget deficit came in well under initial estimates.

This propitious start for a new procedure was facilitated by the state of the economy and the reaction to it in Congress. In 1977 and 1978, recovery from the recession of the mid-1970s was the central economic preoccupation of the country. President Carter's first budgetary actions, amending the 1978 budget, were explicitly designed to stimulate the economy. The substantive committees of

[7] See Allen Schick, *Reconciliation and the Congressional Budget Process* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981).

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TABLE 1

Outlays and Revenues under Congressional Budget Resolutions and Actual Outcomes, Fiscal Years 1977–82

Item	Date of conference agreement	Outlays[a]	Revenues[a]	Deficit
Fiscal 1977				
First resolution	5/13/76	413.3	362.5	50.8
Second resolution	9/16/76	413.1	362.5	50.6
Actual	. . .	401.9	356.9	45.0
Overrun or shortfall[b] (–)	. . .	– 11.4	– 5.6	– 5.8
Fiscal 1978				
First resolution	5/17/77	461.0	396.3	64.7
Second resolution	9/15/77	458.3	397.0	61.3
Actual	. . .	449.9	401.1	48.8
Overrun or shortfall[b] (–)	. . .	– 11.1	4.8	– 15.9
Fiscal 1979				
First resolution	5/17/78	498.8	447.9	50.9
Second resolution	9/23/78	487.5	448.7	38.8
Actual	. . .	493.7	465.9	27.7
Overrun or shortfall[b] (–)	. . .	– 5.1	18.0	– 23.2
Fiscal 1980				
First resolution	5/24/79	532.0	509.0	23.0
Second resolution	11/28/79	547.6	517.8	29.8
Actual	. . .	579.6	520.0	59.6
Overrun or shortfall[b] (–)	. . .	47.6	11.0	36.6
Fiscal 1981				
First resolution	6/12/80	613.6	613.8	0.2[c]
Second resolution	11/20/80	632.4	605.0	27.4
Actual	. . .	657.2	599.3	57.9
Overrun or shortfall[b] (–)	. . .	43.6	– 14.5	58.1
Fiscal 1982				
First resolution	5/21/81	695.5	657.8	37.7
Second resolution	11/19/81	695.5	657.8	37.7
Actual[d]	. . .	725.3	626.8	98.6

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

a. Actual outlays and revenues in each year use the definitions in force at the time. In fiscal 1982 the actual reflects new definitions adopted after the budget resolutions for that year were voted.

b. From first resolution.

c. Surplus.

d. Estimated in *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1983*, pp. 2–14.

Congress supported him, and the budget committees made little challenge, thus establishing their place in the legislature without disturbing continuing power relationships.

Fiscal 1979 represented a transition for the economy and for budget policy. When Carter first proposed his budget for that year in January 1978, the centerpiece was a tax cut intended to maintain the growth of the economy. As time

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passed, however, it became clear that the economy was improving significantly and that inflation was worsening. The president narrowed the proposed tax cut, and these lower limits were incorporated in the second concurrent resolution passed in September. In October, when the tax bill reached the floor of the Senate, several proposals to deepen the tax cut beyond the limits of the second resolution were defeated when Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Budget Committee chairman, objected and was upheld by the Senate.

Beginning with the 1980 budget, attention turned to fighting inflation, and budgetary difficulties began to develop. The 1980 budget proposed by President Carter in January 1979 was billed as an austerity budget. It included what seemed then to be unusually large spending cuts, and the deficit was limited to under $30 billion, a figure Carter had promised in the fall of 1978. For the first time, the new budgetary procedures had to deal with unpleasant choices, and the results were not encouraging. Because President Carter had proposed a $30 billion deficit and because inflation was raging in early 1979, the Budget Committees felt obliged to issue a first concurrent resolution with a deficit no larger than the president had proposed. The first resolution therefore assumed that certain savings, amounting to about $5.6 billion, would be made by authorizing committees. These were referred to in the conference report on the first resolution but not in the resolution itself. As the summer wore on these legislative savings failed to materialize in committee actions, and a deep division developed between the two houses.[8] For the second concurrent resolution, the Senate Budget Committee decided to carry out the reconciliation procedures and called for $4 billion in mandatory savings, and the full Senate agreed. The House Budget Committee could not agree to implement reconciliation, and after a protracted delay in conference the second budget resolution passed in late November 1979 with no reconciliation. This resolution still projected a fiscal 1980 deficit of under $30 billion, even though all indications were that such a level could not be reached without further deficit-reducing legislation. The failure to implement reconciliation meant that such legislation would not be enacted. The Budget Committees were becoming convinced that the weak mechanism for enforcing legislative savings assumed in the first concurrent resolution needed strengthening.

The Budget Prelude of Fiscal 1981

The procedural developments in the 1981 budgetary process were a turning point. In January 1980, President Carter sent Congress his budget proposal, tailored to election-year politics. It dropped the austerity theme and tried to offend no important constituency. Perhaps because of the public's awareness that the second budget resolution for fiscal 1980 was phony in the sense that its assumptions were not likely to be realized, a sharp eye was cast on Carter's Janu-

[8] The legislative savings were supported by the Carter administration, but its influence with Congress was low in mid-1979, the period in which the president went on a solitary retreat and then fired several members of the cabinet.

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ary proposal. The reaction was skepticism, and this contributed to plummeting financial markets early in 1980. Interest rates on three-month Treasury bills rose from 12 to 15.5 percent between January and March. Bond and stock prices fell precipitously.

President Carter withdrew his budget seven weeks after it was submitted and began an extensive series of conferences with members of Congress on an acceptable alternative. The chairmen and members of the Budget Committees played a major role along with the leadership of Congress in these negotiations. After Carter submitted his revised budget in March, the Budget Committees took advantage of this enhanced role and supported a first concurrent resolution that included reconciliation instructions directing eight House and ten Senate authorizing committees to report legislation reducing outlays by over $6 billion in 1981. Tax committtees were instructed to raise more than $4 billion in revenues. These actions were only a small part of those needed to balance the budget as promised in the resolution.[9] The committees were instructed to report legislation within a few weeks of the first resolution, which passed in June 1980.

The move to cut spending stalled in the middle of 1980. The recession coupled with an election led to a stalemate. The Senate passed a reconciliation bill in July, and the House passed its quite different bill in September. The conference committee, which numbered over one hundred, repeatedly deadlocked and did not pass the reconciliation act until early December after the long-delayed second budget resolution was voted.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980 was a disappointing piece of legislation. Since the reconciliation instructions included in the first concurrent resolution specified savings targets for fiscal 1981 only, a number of committees "complied" by drafting changes in law that shifted expenditures from 1981 to future years. Other committees included legislation that actually raised spending in some programs in part to offset cuts made. A reduction in cost-of-living adjustments for federal civilian and military retirees that passed the Senate was dropped by the conference. In all, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act provided $4.6 billion in outlay reductions and $3.6 billion in new taxes, for a total deficit-reduction package of about $8 billion, well under the action needed to balance the budget as originally intended.

Two additional innovations in the fiscal 1981 congressional budgetary process are worth noting. First, both houses of Congress made a start on multiyear budgeting. The budget resolutions incorporated budget targets for the out-years fiscal 1982 and 1983 as well as for the budget year 1981, but each house set different targets for future years. Second, for the first time, levels of federal credit activity were specified. This "credit budget" attempted to curb the total volume of both new direct loans and guaranteed loan commitments of federal agencies by requesting that appropriation limitations be extended to all federal credit ac-

[9] Further savings were assumed to be made on appropriations. As a safeguard, the first resolution called for delaying the transmittal to the president of appropriations bills that exceeded the resolution targets until a second resolution had been approved.

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tivity. Such actions were intended to increase control since many federal credit activities are subject to weak limits imposed by authorizing legislation that sets the terms of loans by executive discretion, or even by market demand. As in the early years of the new budgetary process, however, these "credit limits" were revised during fiscal 1981 to conform to what was happening to federal credit, rather than the other way around.

The Reagan Revolution in the Budget Process

In many ways the stage had been set for President Reagan's entrance. Over time, the Budget Committees had increasingly extended their roles in and influence over budgeting outcomes. A major procedural breakthrough had been made in 1980 when reconciliation instructions were incorporated in the first concurrent resolution. Yet the Stockman-directed progress of President Reagan's budgetary legislation through the summer of 1981 is regarded by many as a revolution because of the size and scope of the changes made and the threat they pose to hallowed congressional procedures.

Within about seven weeks of taking office, President Reagan sent Congress a full-blown set of budget revisions for fiscal 1982 and beyond. The most controversial proposals were an increase in spending for national defense, a reduction in business and personal taxes, and a huge cut in federal non-defense spending. The administration, with the support of the Republican-controlled Senate Budget Committee, sought to carry out as much of the spending reduction program as possible in the form of reconciliation action. The Senate in late March—just a few days after the president's budget revisions were submitted—passed a resolution instructing its committees to make major budget cuts.

These instructions were incorporated in the Senate's first concurrent resolution, which passed in May. The House proceeded along a more conventional track. The budget committee reported a first concurrent resolution that included reconciliation instructions. This resolution, bearing the stamp of Chairman James R. Jones, was challenged on the floor of the House by a substitute resolution cosponsored by Delbert L. Latta, the ranking Republican on the House Budget Committee, and Phil Gramm, a Democratic member of the committee and a leader of a group of conservative Democrats called "Boll Weevils." Gramm-Latta I, as the budget resolution became known, passed the House in late May, after an apparently effective presidential television plea for it. The Senate passed an equivalent resolution the next day.

Gramm-Latta was monumental in a number of respects. First, it contained instructions for budget reductions addressed to fifteen House committees and fourteen Senate committees. The instructions specified amounts to be saved for fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. This multiyear focus was designed to avoid the temporary cosmetic cuts of the previous year's legislation and to complement the administration's multiyear tax-cutting plan. Second, the outlay reductions totaled $36 billion, $47 billion, and $56 billion for the three fiscal years, over eight percent of non-defense, non-interest outlays. These sums were several

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times larger than previous reconciliation actions. Third, the reconciliation savings were to be made in two types of authorizing legislation: entitlements and discretionary programs. For entitlement spending, a reconciliation directive to the authorizing committee is recognized as the only way to impose restraint since subsequent appropriations are perfunctory. But spending for other programs—for example, grants to states for education programs—can be limited either by proposing limits on annual appropriations or by the much stronger measure of directing the committee that authorized the program to lower the authorization ceiling over several years. The latter arrangement was a feature of Gramm-Latta and was not part of the Jones proposal that was defeated.

The congressional committees responded to the reconciliation instructions by submitting legislation affecting 250 different federal programs.[10] Arguing that some of the changes proposed in the House showed a "clear danger of Congressional backsliding and a return to spending as usual,"[11] the administration quickly fashioned an alternative reconciliation bill, called Gramm-Latta II, to replace the work of several committees. Gramm-Latta II, like its predecessor, narrowly passed the House, after gaining support from the Boll Weevils and a group of moderate Republicans called "Gypsy Moths" who demanded and received certain concessions from the administration. After an efficiently run conference, the president in August signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, an inch-thick compendium of twenty separate titles covering a range from Agriculture and Forestry to Health Professions. The law changed entitlement program eligibility rules (for example, for food stamps), limited the amounts authorized in scores of programs for 1982–84, rewrote major parts of substantive law having little effect on the budget (for example, for radio and TV broadcasting), and probably did a few other things that have not been discovered yet.

This extraordinary law was debated on the floor of the House for two days. There were no hearings at all on some sections of the law. The possibility of amending the bill was strictly limited, and it was voted on in a single vote, not section by section.

The reconciliation act's companion legislation, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, was meanwhile wending its way through the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. The first concurrent resolution had set targets for tax cuts for 1982–84. A period of negotiation between the White House and the Democratic chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, had produced no agreement, especially on the size and phasing-in of a personal income tax. Accordingly, the ad-

[10] One committee, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, could not agree on a response. Its chairman forwarded Democratic proposals to the House Budget Committee. It is not clear what sanctions can be taken against a committee that refuses to comply—other than the Budget Committee writing its own legislation.

[11] Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference of June 16, 1981," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17 (22 June 1981), p. 632.

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ministration decided to attract enough Boll Weevil votes to its side to command a majority in the House by offering to include tax changes that would appeal to them. Rostenkowski countered with additional lures to keep the Boll Weevils in the fold. OMB Director Stockman characterized the resulting scramble as: "The hogs were really feeding. The greed level, the level of opportunism, just got out of control."[12] Despite this, the Economic Recovery Tax Act complied with the revenue reduction limits in the first concurrent resolution, although the act's tax cut for 1985, which was deepened by adding indexation of the individual income tax in that year, probably went beyond what the supporters of the concurrent resolution had envisioned.

Aftermath

Congress adjourned in August. The members heard from constituents about high interest rates, and they had time to think about what had transpired in the first half year of budget policy under President Reagan. Congress prides itself on being a deliberative body. The helter-skelter of enacting reconciliation and the tax bill was the opposite of a careful legislative process. The modus operandi of the Congress had for a long time been that the work is done by committees that share power. In 1981 the Senate had ceded full control to the Budget Committee, and in the House the committee proposals for reconciliation had been thrown out. The main function of Appropriations Committee members had been as watchdog on the Treasury. But the reconciliation process had given the play to the Budget Committees and the authorizing committees, leaving Appropriations a cipher. Members of Congress like to show their expertise and independence by sponsoring amendments and the like, but the whole legislative show in 1981 had boiled down to two votes for or against President Reagan's entire program. These concerns, as well as uneasiness about the economy, presaged trouble ahead.

The president's initial budget plan had contemplated program cuts to be made in areas not covered by reconciliation. So had the first concurrent resolution on the 1982 budget. The exact size of these cuts was a matter of confusion, in part because the president's cuts were measured from a baseline different from that used in reconciliation. Moreover, some of the members of Congress who had been lured into the administration's camp for the reconciliation thought they had been promised some relenting in the pursuit of further cuts.

Against this backdrop came the Reagan administration's fall offensive. A new package of budget cuts encompassing entitlement reductions, appropriations reductions, and even some "revenue enhancement" was announced by the administration on September 24—incidentally making it absolutely impossible to meet the deadlines set by the 1974 act. The program was not well received by Congress. The entitlement package was never even formally introduced and the tax enhancers were withdrawn. The administration decided, however, to make

[12] As quoted in Greider, "Education of David Stockman," p. 51.

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yet another fight over its proposed across-the-board (with some exceptions) reductions in appropriations.

When the fiscal year began on October 1, no appropriations bills had been signed into law.[13] As a result, the entire government was being funded under a continuing appropriation law. The first continuing appropriation resolution, signed into law on September 30, is a relatively short document setting limits on the commitment of funds for the first part of the year. Instead of specifying appropriations on a line-by-line basis as in ordinary appropriations laws, the resolution sets spending limits by mechanical rules. Thus the limit on spending for each program is as follows: If both houses have passed an appropriation for that program, it may operate at the lesser of the two appropriated amounts; if only one house has passed an appropriation, spending may continue at the lesser of the appropriated amount or the "current rate." The current rate generally means the rate of the previous fiscal year.[14] The first continuing appropriation set an expiration date of 20 November 1981, in the expectation that regular appropriations laws, which supersede continuing appropriations, would be on the books by that time.

As it turned out, very few appropriations—and none of the major ones—had been passed by Friday, November 20, because of the continuing controversy over the administration's fall-offensive cuts, and a second continuing appropriation was needed. The Congress agreed on such a bill at the final hour and sent it to President Reagan. Over the weekend of November 21–22, President Reagan decided to veto the continuing resolution and did so on Monday, November 23. As a result, federal offices throughout the country closed that day, nonessential workers were sent home, and President Reagan and members of Congress (who stayed on the job—their appropriation had passed) got together that same day on a compromise extension of the continuing resolution until December 15. On December 15, with few appropriations yet enacted, still another continuing appropriation was passed until 15 February 1982.

By the end of December 1981, most appropriations laws—though not the biggest non-defense one, for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education—had been signed into law. As indicated in Table 2, the administration was forced to accept some increases over its fall proposals in the appropriations that passed. In defense and foreign aid, appropriations were below the administration's request; but the Agriculture, Interior, and combined Housing and Urban Development, Veterans Administration, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration appropriations exceeded the administration's request. While it is probably true that these appropriations would have been even higher if the administration had not waged a fall offensive, it is clear

[13] The legislative branch appropriation was incorporated into the first continuing appropriation resolution.

[14] Even so, "current rate" is an ambiguous term because "the" rate of the previous fiscal year may be quite different rates for each quarter (which is generally the period over which the OMB apportions appropriations to agencies) and the final quarter of the fiscal year may not reflect what the Appropriations Committee intends as the limit for the next period.

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TABLE 2
Status of Fiscal Year 1982 Appropriations, as of 15 March 1982
Budget Authority in Billions of Dollars

Title of appropriation	*Date enacted*	*September administration request*	*House bill*	*Senate bill*	*Final action*	*Difference between final action and administration request*
Agriculture and related agencies	12/23/81	22.3	22.7	22.9	22.6	+0.3
Defense Department	12/29/81	200.9	197.4	203.7	199.9	−1.0
District of Columbia	12/4/81	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	*
Energy and Water Development	12/4/81	12.1	13.2	12.8	12.5	+0.4
Foreign Aid	12/29/81	7.8	7.4	7.3	7.5	−0.3
HUD, Veterans, NASA	12/23/81	58.7	62.6	60.5	60.4	+1.7
Interior and related agencies	12/23/81	6.4	11.1	7.4	7.2	+0.8
Legislative Branch	10/1/81	1.4	1.1[a]	0.9[a]	1.3	−0.1
Military Construction	12/23/81	7.3	6.9	7.3	7.1	−0.2
Transportation and related agencies	12/23/81	9.8	11.1	10.4	10.1	+0.3
Subtotal		327.3	334.0	333.8	329.2	+1.9
Labor, HHS, Education	. . .	82.5	85.2	84.8[b]	. . .	. . .
State, Justice, Commerce, Judiciary	. . .	8.2	8.7	8.6[b]	. . .	. . .
Treasury, Postal Service, General Government	. . .	9.1	9.7	9.4[b]	. . .	. . .

Sources: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (16 January 1982), p. 103; and *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17, nos. 43–53 (26 October 1981–4 January 1982).

* Less than $100 million.

a. House bill excludes cost of Senate operation and vice versa.

b. Committee approved amount.

that President Reagan's total mastery over budgeting began to erode in the appropriations process. It is also evident that the patent disregard for the Appropriations Committees' prerogatives in the reconciliation process stiffened these committees' resistance to further cuts.

It is universally agreed that operating a large part of the government under continuing appropriations is a most unsatisfactory way of doing the public's business. First, because the continuing resolution is simply a set of general rules to limit spending, it tends to perpetuate spending patterns that conform to no one's preferences, and it can lead to unintended consequences. For example, if one house of Congress passes a low appropriation for a particular program, quite conceivably as a result of a vendetta by one member of the Appropriations Committee, that low appropriation governs the program no matter how high the other house sets it. On a regular appropriation, matters such as this as well as simple mistakes are taken care of in conference before a final bill is approved.

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Second, continuing appropriations lead to even greater managerial inefficiency than is customary in government activities. When an agency manager does not know what level of funds will be available for the whole fiscal year, the inevitable tendency is to be cautious in committing funds. Contracts are not let early in the year, to ensure that funds will be available later in the year. Then when the full appropriation is finally voted, there is frantic activity to commit funds before they expire. On some accounts, particularly those pertaining to salaries and expenses of employees, the tendency is to be optimistic: don't fire anybody until it is absolutely necessary. If the optimism proves to have been false when the full appropriation becomes law, the agency may have to fire too many people or furlough (put on unpaid leave) an entire staff. There is ample evidence that this kind of behavior was developing as fiscal 1982 unfolded.

The legislative history of the 1982 budget ended on a sour note. In November, in the midst of the dispute over the administration's reductions in appropriations and well after it had become evident that economic events had transformed the projected budget outcomes of the first concurrent resolution, both houses passed a second concurrent resolution. Instead of acknowledging the sharply changed economic circumstances and reaching some decision on appropriations still outstanding, the second concurrent resolution simply rubberstamped the outdated first resolution. In effect, Congress decided to put over into calendar 1982 any further decisions on the budget.

Prospects for Peaceful Reform

The six years that the new congressional budget has been in effect cover a rough period in the nation's economic history, encompassing a recovery from the worst recession since the 1930s, the onset of high and highly variable inflation and interest rates, and the beginning of a period of retrenchment in federal spending. The congressional budgetary process has emerged from this period with some scars, but with the solid achievement of having proved resilient to changing needs. Stimulating the economy called for accommodative Budget Committees, but as the economic and political trend moved toward spending restraint, the control mechanism was strengthened. When a president needed support in making a credible budget, the budgetary process provided an opportunity for joint action with the Congress, but it also provided room for a confrontation when the parties differed sharply. Such resilience could be interpreted as a lack of discipline, a process with no firm direction. But a more accurate lesson to be learned is that economic and political circumstances do change, and a flexible procedure is needed to allow changes in direction.

The budgetary history of the last few years raises two kinds of questions for the future. First, how will budget procedures affect the decisions to be made in the coming year? Second, what modifications in budgetary processes should be made in the longer term?

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Stalemate and Its Alternatives, 1983

Congressional final action on President Reagan's 1983 budget is uncommonly difficult to forecast. The public and Congress seem to agree that the projected deficits—especially if adjusted to more realistic economic assumptions than those of the administration—are too high, but there is little evidence of a consensus on how to lower them. The major disagreements are over whether to raise revenues or lower outlays and which types of spending and taxing should bear the brunt of the burden. The prospects for a repeat performance by President Reagan in securing substantially complete acceptance of his budget seem remote. On the other hand, expecting Congress to fashion a budget entirely on its own is unrealistic. Any group in Congress that takes the lead on formulating a package—which would necessarily involve both higher taxes and major program cuts—would face the attendant political danger of being blamed (possibly by the president) for being the enemy of the elderly or the taxpayer, among others. It is hard to imagine that many congressmen would relish that role, and it is nearly inconceivable that the Democratic chairmen of the House Budget Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, who lost out to President Reagan in 1981, would voluntarily take that chance again.

Another possibility is that the president and Congress will agree to compromise. A bipartisan coalition in the Congress and the president would concur on a set of budgetary actions perceived as being built on the president's plan but with significant modifications. The agreed-upon package would almost certainly require a single vote since the individual parts of it could not pass in an election year; accordingly, such a package would probably take the form either of firm reconciliation instructions or even of specific legislation attached to some other bill, such as an impending act to raise the limit on the public debt. These shortcuts would further erode the conventional way of doing business in Congress; thus, opposition should be expected not only on substantive and partisan political grounds but also on procedural ones. This is a substantial number of hurdles to get over.

If an agreement is not reached, a stalemate is possible. Unlike other legislative action, a budgetary stalemate does not mean that nothing happens. In this case it would probably mean passing a first concurrent resolution on the budget that did not contain mandatory instructions to authorizing committees to come up with budget-saving legislation, and it might mean passing some appropriations that would greatly exceed the president's proposals, which would then be vetoed. Or the appropriations committees could fail to act at all. By October 1, a continuing resolution covering spending for most of the agencies and extending through the November election would be needed. Essentially, stalemate means that the difficult budget decisions of early 1982 would be pushed ahead to a post-election session of Congress, where a clearer consensus might emerge. This scenario appears to be fraught with great risks to the economy as uncertainty about the budget stretches out over months, and it greatly increases the possibil-

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ity of a radical reaction to what will be perceived as an intractable budget mess. One such radical solution—a constitutional amendment to balance the budget—is discussed below.

It is important to end this account with the reminder that, if there were a solution to the budgetary impasse that commanded strong popular support, the budgetary process in the Congress would not stand in its way. Even with presidential opposition, one can imagine the congressional leadership riding the crest of a popular wave to beat back whatever fragmentary congressional opposition to a popular outcome developed. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act is proof that Congress, acting alone, can undertake changes that roil customary legislative relationships. Only when an attempt is made to preempt traditional legislative procedures with legislation that does not enjoy wide popular support does the system seem to fail. Should stalemate ensue in 1982, the blame should rest more on the failure to reach a consensus than on a shortcoming of the budgetary process. Indeed, the only hope of a better outcome lies in the budgetary process forcing all parties to attempt to reach such an agreement.

Longer-Run Reforms

When the current budget crisis subsides, attention will turn to reexamination of the procedures by which Congress tackles the budget. Many members of Congress object to the steps taken in recent years as being an effort to make the Budget Committees all-powerful, thereby challenging the shared-power tradition and even raising questions about the role of party leadership in Congress. These members would like to curb the Budget Committees and make them responsive to the views and actions of other committees.

Such a reversion to past procedures makes the most sense if future Congresses are uninterested in budgetary control but are mainly concerned with retuning priorities in a growing budget. In that case, enhancing the power of specialized committees would build on their strength in conducting full reviews of existing and proposed programs, considering legislative alternatives in detail, ascertaining the views of interest groups, and building constituent coalitions for government programs. These are functions that a budget committee, no matter how hard-working, cannot accomplish as effectively. The Budget Committees' role in this more traditional congressional arrangement would be to set fiscal policy and dollar limits on broad priorities. This primary function of coordination probably implies some revision of the congressional calendar to allow time for a sensible debate on priorities, some consideration of the process of setting economic assumptions so that the fiscal plans of each Budget Committee and the president's proposal are not being measured differently, and some better system for reducing each committee's incentives to get as much of the budget pie as it can. These changes would be marginal; the budgetary process could revert to what it was in 1976–79.

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Procedural changes directed toward strengthening budget control, on the other hand, make the most sense if one envisions the environment of the future as one of heightened attention to slowing expenditure growth and cutting deficits. The crucial procedural innovation of the last few years—reconciliation early in the budget decision process—seems essential to any move to strengthen control. Because the predominant message for the congressional committees in this austerity scenario is that spending be cut and taxes raised, it is unrealistic to expect such measures to be put into effect unless committees are forced to act. This is the primary function of reconciliation: it allows Congress as a whole to order its committees to take actions.

Early reconciliation does not have to follow the pattern set by Stockman in 1981. The coverage of reconciliation instructions, in particular, may have gone overboard in that year. To control entitlement programs, there is general agreement that early reconciliation is a must. Authorizing committees are the only agents that can effect restraint by rewriting the laws, and they need external direction and adequate time. For the parts of federal spending that are not governed by entitlements, the most direct avenue of control is appropriations, not underlying laws, as in the 1981 reconciliation. Efforts to control appropriations by reconciling them in the second concurrent budget resolution at the end of a budget cycle are futile. Effective control of appropriations would mean that mandatory limits would have to be moved up to the first concurrent resolution. Since current budgetary procedures already contain a mechanism for providing dollar guidance to the Appropriations Committees,[15] all that would have to be done is to make such guidance mandatory, probably by moving the dollar limits into the budget resolution and stating them as instructions rather than as guidance. Naturally, this procedural reform would not solve the problem of the Appropriations Committees' shifting funds out of one budget year into the next; the simplest solution would be to move toward two-year appropriation bills and two-year mandatory instructions in the first budget resolution in pertinent parts of the budget.

Early reconciliation and early mandatory limits on appropriations would strengthen budgetary procedures, but they might create new problems that require further adjustments in the process. One of these is the timing of the first budget resolution. If the first resolution is to be the vehicle for mandatory spending cuts and tax increases, a case can be made for pushing the deadline for the resolution beyond May to give the budget committees time to digest the views of the president and of the committees. A case can also be made that the resolution should be issued before May to give working committees time to hold hearings, consult experts, and deliberate before writing the laws. No one wants to repeat the haste of legislation in 1981. Since the length of a year is immutable,

[15] The mechanism is the allocation of dollar limits by committee under section 302 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.

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both of these timing changes cannot be made.[16] One school of thought holds that the solution is a biennial budget. The first year would be devoted to events leading up to a first concurrent resolution and the second to carrying out that resolution by issuing two-year appropriations. This idea has some obvious problems relating to economic forecasts (see footnote 16) and to the timing of elections and presidential transitions.[17]

Another aspect of budget reform intended to strengthen existing procedures relates to the coverage of the budget and the scope of its control. The most obvious, though not widely recognized, weakness here is that current budgetary procedures are asymmetrically weak in dealing with taxation. Budget resolutions spell out spending limits by function while the only tax guidance offered is a single number for the amount revenues are to be raised or lowered. While there is a legislative structural reason for this imbalance[18] and the tax committees' hegemony inspires awe, stronger budget control implies greater detail in the budget resolution on the kind of tax changes it seeks. This could be accomplished by specifying broad targets by tax type (for example, income tax or excise tax) or by functional breakdown of tax expenditures (for example, to eliminate subsidies that the tax system gives to health and to housing). Along the same lines, centralized budget control could be strengthened by tighter controls on federal credit activities. For example, Congressmen Norman Y. Mineta and Edwin R. Bethune, Jr. (and 150 cosponsors) have suggested in House bill 2372 that targets for new direct loan obligations and loan guarantee commitments be incorporated in the first budget resolution and that the second resolution set binding limits on legislative activity pertaining to loans. The Mineta–Bethune bill would also require extensive reports on the status of federal credit activity and its relation to monetary policy from the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board. Of equally serious concern for control are off-budget entities, but here the major activity is that of one organization, the Federal Financing Bank, and it can be dealt with in a number of ways that do not entail revamping budgetary procedures.[19]

The long list of reforms considered under this heading of strengthening budgetary procedures requires two cautionary notes. First, if all the reforms were

[16] Starting the new fiscal year in January rather than October to lengthen the decision period is regarded as out of the question, if only because economic forecasts would have to be made so far in advance that they would be less credible than they are now.

[17] If a two-year cycle commenced in October of even-numbered years, President Reagan's first budget proposal made with the help of a full staff would be for the two years starting in October 1984, only a few months before his term expires. Starting in an odd year interposes a congressional election in the middle of the two-year deliberative process.

[18] A single spending number could not be allocated among the various committees, but the functional breakdown in the budget resolutions makes this feasible. However, there is only one tax committee in each house, so a single revenue target can be allocated to its proper committee.

[19] See Congressional Budget Office, *The Federal Financing Bank and the Budgetary Treatment of Federal Credit Activities* (CBO, 1982); and Andrew S. Carron, "Fiscal Activities outside the Budget," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 261–69.

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implemented, the process might fall from its own weight. The work load from existing procedures is already heavy, and a new calendar, stronger directions, broader coverage, and so on could bring sheer confusion and weaken the whole structure. Second, it seems ludicrous to fortify congressional procedures for pinpointing fiscal policy decisions and fine-tuning federal credit activities without giving serious consideration to how these decisions interact with monetary policy. Setting standards for fiscal policy requires some understanding of, and presumably influence over, general monetary and credit conditions. There are now only weak links between Federal Reserve decisions and the budgetary process—mostly consisting of the central bank informing Congress of its goals and accomplishments—and no forum for arriving at the appropriate policy mix. This, of course, stems from a long tradition, but since we are breaking with the past in so many other ways, maybe it is time for a review of congressional control over money and credit.

A Constitutional Amendment to Balance the Budget

The most radical approach to changing budgetary procedures would be replacing the annual assessment of fiscal alternatives with a fixed external rule, such as a constitutional requirement that the budget be balanced each year. This approach is generally favored by those who feel that the present system is biased toward excessive growth of government and deficit financing of public expenditures. The adoption of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget would considerably change existing budgetary procedures and other aspects of running the government.

One version of a constitutional amendment has passed the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and seems to gain momentum each time a budgetary target is missed or a deadline is not met. The amendment also seems to have election-year appeal because it offers members of Congress a chance to vote for the popular balanced budget without having to cut programs or raise taxes. Senate Joint Resolution 58 provides for a balanced budget by requiring Congress to adopt before the start of each fiscal year a "statement" (budget) in which planned outlays are no greater than total receipts. It also requires that the planned receipts of the budget grow no faster than national income grew in the previous calendar year. The final control is that "the Congress and the President shall ensure that actual outlays do not exceed the outlays set forth" in the budget statement. The amendment would allow a simple majority of each house of Congress to waive the receipts-growth clause, while a 60 percent vote in each house would be needed to approve a planned deficit.[20]

Obviously many facets of such a balanced budget amendment warrant ex-

[20] There is also a specific waiver for a declaration of war and a section forbidding Congress to require states to "engage in additional activities" unless the federal government puts up all the necessary funds. See U. S. Congress. Senate. *Balanced Budget–Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment.* 97th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 97-151, p. 2.

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tended discussion. Several criticisms can be listed. Eliminating discretionary fiscal policy might spur undue reliance on other aggregate control measures. Strict control of spending could shift attention to regulation as an alternative or to credit activities unless control over them was strengthened. The amendment's weak guidance for the rate of growth of receipts could make estimating receipts an even more political exercise than it is now. The case for the amendment boils down to a belief that history demonstrates that nothing less will bring about a balanced budget.[21]

One aspect of Senate Joint Resolution 58 directly impinges on budgetary procedures. The stipulation that the president and Congress ensure that actual outlays do not exceed planned outlays would seem to require a whole new set of budget-policing procedures. Currently the entire budgetary process is based on guiding legislation (authorizations or appropriations) that set upper limits on the commitment of funds over a certain period. The actual amount spent as a result of such commitments—outlays—is not directly controlled by existing procedures. Actual outlays either for a particular program or in the aggregate may exceed planned outlays for any number of reasons: an unforeseen economic or natural event; unexpectedly rapid completion of contracts; incorrect projections of case loads, prices, or interest rates; and so on. These factors would still exist under a constitutional amendment, so there would have to be an enforcement mechanism to ensure that if a preponderance of the uncontrolled items were overrunning the planned outlay level, some underruns would be available for offset. In practice, this would almost certainly mean that Congress would have to delegate to the president the power to make such adjustments.[22] If Congress made such a delegation with no constraints, this would give a president broad license to impound (not spend appropriated) funds, which ironically was the "abuse of power" (by President Nixon) that brought on budget reform in the first place. Giving the president a line-item veto, a measure favored by President Reagan, would have a similar effect. An alternative would be for Congress to delegate the power to impound subject to limits on how much any particular program could be cut. This, in turn, is the equivalent of agencies living under an insecurity similar to that of a continuing resolution: not knowing in advance how much they will have to spend.[23]

[21] For a fuller discussion of the pros and cons of a balanced budget amendment, see Bruce K. MacLaury, "Proposals to Limit Federal Spending and Balance the Budget," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), pp. 213-23; and Alvin Rabushka and William Craig Stubblebine, eds., *Constraining Federal Taxing and Spending* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, forthcoming).

[22] Congress could assign a committee the power to ensure that actual outlays stayed on target or it could regularly appropriate so little that an overrun could not occur. Neither approach would last long: committees have no executive power, which is necessary to control outlays, and sham outlay estimates are sitting ducks for frustrated spending committees.

[23] It is actually a greater insecurity because a continuing resolution creates uncertainties about the level of funds an agency can *commit* while the balanced budget amendment creates uncertainty about *spending*, something that most agencies have much less ability to control.

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A constitutional amendment would greatly change federal budgeting. It would inevitably shift more power to the executive branch and would focus more attention on matters such as the budget being on target—just as public attention now focuses on money supply growth being on target—and less attention on broad budget policy goals. For more than just the obvious reasons a constitutional amendment would therefore open a new chapter on how the federal government conducts its operations.[24]

Conclusion

The preoccupation of this article with budgetary decision-making processes should not divert attention from the real issues behind the policy crisis. Government officials are seeking to find a non-inflationary way to move massive amounts of resources from consumer industries to investment and defense industries, from the public to the private sector, from Washington to the state capitals, from the dole to wages and dividends, from the current standard of living to the nation's future well-being. Under the best of circumstances, these changes would be hard to bring off. The fact that we are attempting to move very fast only heightens the dislocations that change always brings. Add a partisan political environment and a Hippocratic ethic for politicians ("Do no harm") and you have a recipe for stalemate or a hypocritical compromise ("Do no electoral damage").

No budgetary process or external imperative can make tough decisions easy. The present procedures have proved flexible enough in the past to accommodate a variety of economic circumstances. As economic and political changes have made a shift to greater restraint in public spending seem desirable, budgetary control procedures have been strengthened and the shift has been carried out. The budgetary process would help any grand compromise reached in 1982 between the president and Congress by providing a legislative vehicle that forced all parties to such an agreement to join. And the process can be strengthened for future years by formally incorporating early reconciliation and increasing the scope of budget resolutions. Or it can be put back to the guidance procedures of budget reform's early years. The choice will depend on the expected need for tightness of budgetary control.

A constitutional amendment to balance the budget at bottom expresses a lack of faith that Congress can achieve budgetary control and a strong belief in the importance of such an achievement. The difficulties of reaching a budget compromise in 1982 have apparently created a climate where voting for a constitutional amendment to balance the budget is an easy vote for an esteemed goal. In

[24] If two-thirds of both houses of Congress approved an amendment like Senate Joint Resolution 58, it would than have to be ratified by three-quarters of the state legislatures and would take effect in the second fiscal year after ratification. Since the amendment takes spending and taxing for the preceding year as a base, budgeting up to the effective date would probably be very divisive.

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reality, such an amendment would bring about profound changes in the government, not all of which are intended by its proponents.*

* This article is adapted from the author's essay in the recent book *Setting National Priorities: The 1983 Budget*, published by the Brookings Institution and edited by Joseph A. Pechman. The author thanks Henry J. Aaron, Arthur M. Hauptman, Darwin G. Johnson, and Robert D. Reischauer for helpful comments, Allan M. Rivlin for research assistance, and Jane R. Taylor for secretarial assistance.

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Right-Wing Religion: Christian Conservatism as a Political Movement

MICHAEL LIENESCH

Conservative movements are the meteors of our political atmosphere. Awesome and unpredictable, they streak across our skies in a blaze of right-wing frenzy, only to fall to earth cold and exhausted, consumed by their own passionate heat. This, at least, is the established view. In the last year, this theory has been called upon to explain the rise of Christian conservatism, what scholars have called the "New Christian Right." In size alone the movement is impressive: some have claimed it to number as many as 50 million conservative Protestants, 30 million "morally conservative" Catholics, along with millions of allies among Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and members of fringe sects. In spirit, it is extreme and passionate, uncompromising, totally committed, and at times apocalyptic. Moreover, in strategy, the movement is surprisingly sophisticated, for the Christian conservatives have come equipped with candidate "hit lists," moral "report cards," and "Christian political action manuals." Critics have responded with alarm, their warnings betraying not only concern but fright, with such charges as "single-issue zealots," "fascism masquerading as Christianity," and "Christian Stalinists."[1] Even traditional conservatives have voiced concern; the leaders of the Christian right, admitted columnist James J.

[1] Cited in Jeffrey K. Hadden and Charles E. Swann, *Prime Time Preachers: The Rising Power of Televangelism* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1981), pp. 148 and 149. The estimate is from Richard A. Viguerie, *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead* (Falls Church, Va.: Viguerie Co., 1981), p. 129.

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Kilpatrick, "give me the willies."[2] Added one Reagan aide, a self-professed right-winger, "This marriage of religion and politics is the most dangerous thing, the creepiest thing I've ever seen."[3]

Critics first began to take serious note of the rising political power of conservative religion in 1980, with several factors attracting their attention. In late 1979, George Gallup released the findings of an extensive poll showing that as many as one in three sampled adults had experienced a religious conversion, that almost half believed that the Bible was inerrant, and that more than 80 percent thought Jesus Christ was divine. These startling findings were supplemented by a series of investigations concerning the power of the so-called "electric church," the network of television preachers that has boasted some 1,300 radio and television stations, audiences of up to 130 million, and net profits estimated at anywhere from $500 million to "billions." Even more striking was the coming of the Christian conservative activists, who throughout 1980 could be seen in ever-increasing numbers at political caucuses, campaign rallies, and party conventions. Television evangelist Pat Robertson announced "We have enough votes to run the country," and many believed him.[4] On election day, observers like pollster Louis Harris were ready to conclude that the white followers of television preachers had given Ronald Reagan his victory margin. Meanwhile, the Christian conservatives themselves boasted of their decisive role. "It was Jesus that gave us victory," announced Bobbie James, wife of Alabama Governor Forrest ("Fob") James. "God in his mercy heard the prayers of Christians all over this country."[5]

Yet in retrospect, the Christian conservative movement seemed less influential. Scholars reviewing Gallup's findings began to discover that the legions of evangelicals were divided and uncertain on many issues. Students of the "electric church" offered more realistic figures concerning the influence of television preachers, finding that listeners numbered about 10 million, not 130 million, and that audiences for most of the programs have been declining (some as much as 21 percent in 1980), with contributions likewise falling off. As to political power, the Christian conservative movement seemed somehow less significant than before. Researchers inquired into membership totals to find estimates shamelessly inflated. The Moral Majority, for example, claimed by its founder the Reverend Jerry Falwell to number as many as three million, was realistically estimated to have approximately half a million members. Pollsters began to re-

[2] James J. Kilpatrick in Hadden and Swann, *Prime Time Preachers*, p. 149.

[3] Reagan aide (unnamed) in "Preachers in Politics," *U.S. News and World Report*, 15 September 1980, p. 26.

[4] Pat Robertson in Alan Crawford, *Thunder on the Right: The "New Right" and the Politics of Resentment* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 161. On the Gallup findings, see "The Christianity Today-Gallup Poll: An Overview," *Christianity Today*, 21 December 1979, pp. 12–19. For the television evangelists, see William Martin, "The Birth of a Media Myth," *Atlantic*, June 1981, pp. 7–16.

[5] Bobbi James in "How Some Evangelicals Feel About Moral Majority," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1981. The Harris poll is discussed by John D. Lofton, Jr., "Pollster Harris Credits Moral Majority Vote for Reagan's Stunning Landslide Win," *Conservative Digest*, December 1980, p. 13.

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vise their opinions of the evangelical electoral clout. Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab reviewed the returns to find that evangelicals had had no measurable influence on the 1980 elections. Moreover, in the aftermath of the election, some conservative candidates began to disclaim the contribution of their Christian allies. Within six months' time, observers had turned from terror to scorn. The flaming Christian meteor seemed a fading illusion. As for Falwell and his colleagues, the reporters began to note, "backlash is brewing."[6]

Nevertheless, the Christian right will not disappear, for right-wing religion is a permanent feature of the American political scene whose presence, far from meteoric, is all too predictable. This article examines its character, as well as the reaction it provokes—the sequence of astonishment, terror, and eventual complacency symbolized by the "meteor" theory. More importantly, it explores the way scholars have studied such movements. For two decades, social scientists have witnessed the rise and fall of a vast array of social movements, and by and large, their perceptions of these movements have been informed by sociological theories now as much as 30 years old. This article will examine and criticize four of these theoretical models: collective behavior, status politics, organizational accommodation, and pluralist compromise. In criticizing such theories, it will suggest alternative views. The immediate purpose of this article is to explain the politics of Christian conservatism; its ultimate intention is to understand why we so often misunderstand the nature of our political movements.

Collective Behavior and Interest Group Conservatism

Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the study of social movements has been dominated by the theory of collective behavior. Following the work of Emile Durkheim, social theorists have argued that rational society created irrational people. With division of labor, the emotional ties of traditional society were replaced by the rational rules of the modern organization. As shared traditions gave way to individual roles, modern people became atomized and alienated. In times of crisis, the theory held, these anomic individuals tended to revert to aberrant behavior, such as mass protest or mob action.[7]

After the second World War, scholars combined these insights with the psychological concepts of T. W. Adorno and Erich Fromm in an attempt to explain the mass psychology of nazism. In 1955, with the publication of Daniel Bell's *The New American Right*, social theorists led by Bell himself, Richard Hofstadter, and Seymour Martin Lipset applied this revised collective behavior theory

[6] "Jerry Falwell's Troubles," *Newsweek*, 23 February 1981, p. 23. For realistic estimates of the influence of the television preachers, see Martin, "Media Myth," p. 11. On the Moral Majority's inflated membership figures, see Hadden and Swann, *Prime Time Preachers*, pp. 164–65. Electoral influence is discussed in Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Election & the Evangelicals," *Commentary*, March 1981, p. 30.

[7] On the origins of collective behavior theory, see Emile Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York: Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. 353–409. For background, see Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 1–21.

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to McCarthyism and the extremist groups of the American right.[8] McCarthyism, they argued, was the product of alienation and frustration. Its passions sprang from a deep dissatisfaction with American institutions. The supporters of Senator Joe McCarthy, along with their right-wing allies, could be best understood as anomic individuals projecting their personal problems and psychological resentments into the public realm. In short, to these social theorists, the essential feature of McCarthyism was its irrationality. In 1962, Hofstadter linked the irrational behavior of the radical right to Protestant fundamentalism. "To understand the Manichaean style of thought, the apocalyptic tendencies, the love of mystification, the intolerance of compromise that are observable in the right-wing mind, we need to understand the history of fundamentalism," he wrote in *The Radical Right*, "and those who would understand it will do well to supplement their acquaintance with Rohrschach techniques or the construction of the F-scale with a rereading of the Book of Revelations."[9]

From the 1950s on, this theory of alienation and irrationality has provided the most popular model for the study of right-wing movements. Beginning with Hofstadter, it has been applied to conservative protests ranging from nativists and Know-Nothings, to the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan. The common characteristic of these groups, Hofstadter suggested, was not their conservatism, but their "pseudo-conservative" character. From Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality*, social theorists adopted the argument that these rightist protesters, while employing the rhetoric of conservatism, were in fact radical enemies of authority and tradition. Thus the pseudo-conservatives, while claiming to uphold American values, were, in fact, consciously or unconsciously working to overturn them.[10]

This theory has become a common explanation of the recent resurgence of the right. Alan Crawford has described the New Right as a collection of irrational extremists, "radicals, reactionaries, and hucksters." To Crawford, a "traditional" conservative, this new conservatism is "not only unconservative, but anticonservative."[11] The liberal James Wechsler has endorsed the thesis, picturing the protests of these right-wing extremists as similar to those of leftist radicals, "the right-wing counterpart of [the] mindless thunder on the old Marxist left and its 'New Left' heirs."[12] In effect, the New Right, especially the religious right, has become the radical movement of the 1980s, what Crawford has called "neopopulism," an "anticonservative right," even "rampageous democracy."[13]

Collective behavior theory has not been above criticism, however. Perhaps

[8] See Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955).

[9] Richard Hofstadter, "Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited: A Postscript—1962," in Bell, ed., *The Radical Right* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 86.

[10] On the application of collective behavior theory, see Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in Bell, ed., *The New American Right*, p. 35. See also T. W. Adorno, et. al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

[11] Crawford, "Preface," *Thunder on the Right*, p. xvi.

[12] James Wechsler, "Introduction," in Crawford, *Thunder on the Right*, p. xii.

[13] Crawford, *Thunder on the Right*, pp. 290, 303, 311.

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the most influential of its critics was Michael Rogin, who in *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* showed that the social theorists of the 1950s had misinterpreted the McCarthy phenomenon. To these theorists, McCarthyism was a populist protest of alienated extremists who acted in the tradition of agrarian radicalism. In a careful historical analysis of electoral returns, Rogin demonstrated that McCarthyism did not, in fact, follow from populist radicalism, but from Republican conservatism. Its electoral base, he argued, was the right-wing of the Republican party.

This analysis provides some perspective on contemporary Christian conservatism. The New Christian Right has been described as a mass protest movement. According to Rogin's premises, it is neither a mobilization of the masses, nor concerned with protest, nor even a true political movement. Instead, the Christian right is in large part an elite phenomenon, a relatively small group of preachers and politicians allied to the right-wing of the Republican party. Its ideology is based not so much on radical protest as conservative reaction. Above all, its organization, far from an irrational mass movement, is much closer to the traditional liberal interest group. The New Christian Right practices an updated conservative version of old-fashioned liberal politics. In theoretical terms, it might best be called "interest-group conservatism."[14]

Historical Background of the New Christian Right

Historically, the Christian right has been an alliance of preachers and politicians. Though some historians trace its roots to conservative Puritans like Nathaniel Ward, Cotton Mather, or Jonathan Edwards, it is probably more accurate to locate the creation of the Christian right in the post-Revolutionary Federalist clergy—Timothy Dwight, Jedidiah Morse, and the black-robed legions who saw themselves as the last line of defense against deism, free thought, and revolution. In the nineteenth century, the torch was passed to prohibitionist, nativist, and anti-union ministers, and by the turn of the century, the revival tent preachers like Billy Sunday had taken up the cause, attacking anarchists, immigrants, and liberal reformers. ("If I had my way with these ornery wild-eyed socialists and IWW's," declared Sunday, "I would stand them up before a firing squad . . . .")[15] Shortly thereafter, the radio evangelists came into prominence. In the 1930s, the Christian conservative crusade was led by Father

[14] See Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), esp. pp. 21–31.

[15] Billy Sunday in George H. Williams and Rodney L. Petersen, "Evangelicals: Society, the State, the Nation (1925–75)," in David F. Wells and John D. Woodbridge, eds., *The Evangelicals* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1975), p. 219. On the Federalist preachers, see James M. Banner, *To the Hartford Convention* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); on nativism, Ray Allen Billington, *The Protestant Crusade* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938); on Reconstruction and populism in the South, Charles Reagan Wilson, *Baptized in Blood* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980); and on twentieth-century fundamentalists, Ralph Lord Roy, *Apostles of Discord* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1953).

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Charles F. Coughlin, in the 1940s by the Reverends Carl McIntire and Gerald L. K. Smith, and in the 1950s by Dr. Fred Schwarz, the Reverend Billy James Hargis, and others.

As the historian Leo Ribuffo has shown, since the coming of the New Deal—if not before—these conservative preacher-politicians have been allies of the right-wing of the Republican party. They have worked for Senators Arthur Vandenberg and Robert A. Taft, lobbied for the Bricker amendment and supported Joseph McCarthy, opposed the Roman Catholic John F. Kennedy and voted for Barry Goldwater. Throughout, they have been proud of their position on the right of the Republican right. "A special place in hell is being reserved for people who believe in walking down the middle of the political and religious road. It will be their privilege," declared the Reverend David Noebel, "to fry with Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson."[16]

The New Christian Right is best understood as an alliance of conservative preachers. Although its leaders publicly boast of its mass membership, they privately admit that the primary constituency is several thousand ministers. Additionally, observers have pointed out that much of the Christian conservative support is found in denominations with traditions of strong pastoral leadership, such as the Latter-Day Saints, the Churches of Christ, and Falwell's independent Baptists (not to be confused with the less authoritarian Southern Baptists). According to the Religious Roundtable's Ed McAteer, a former salesman for Colgate-Palmolive, Christian conservatives " . . . look to their leaders, as you would in a business. And so, if we get the leaders persuaded and educated and directed, then it makes the job more effective, and quicker too."[17] In his addresses to local audiences, Jerry Falwell tells how protest is to be directed from the pulpit. "Here's what you do," he told an audience of Florida pastors organized to lobby against the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). "You tell everybody in your congregation to bring two stamped envelopes to church on Sunday. And don't assume they know who their state representative is. . . . Make them write those letters in church. It's all perfectly legal as long as you don't use the building for special meetings. Do it right during the service." The Christian right is first and foremost a movement of ministers. Their democratic protest sometimes smacks of theocratic reaction. ". . . America is waiting for leadership, preachers," Falwell once told a ministerial meeting, "and you're it."[18]

[16] David Noebel in Richard V. Pierard, *The Unequal Yoke: Evangelical Christianity and Political Conservatism* (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1970), pp. 41–42. Noebel is one of many figures from the anti-communist crusades of the 1950s who are active in the leadership of the religious right of the 1980s. On the fundamentalist-conservative alliance, see Leo P. Ribuffo, "Liberals and that Old-Time Religion," *Nation*, 29 November 1980, pp. 570–73.

[17] "Roundtable's President Ed McAteer Is Music Man of Religious Right," *Conservative Digest*, January 1981, p. 5.

[18] Falwell in "Militant Television Preachers Try to Weld Fundamentalist Christian's Political Power," *New York Times*, 21 January 1980, p. A21; and in "Evangelical Conservatives Move from Pews to Polls," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 September 1980, p. 2630.

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The New Right and the New Christian Right

The conservative preachers are in turn influenced by conservative politicians. Observers and participants alike seem to agree that the New Christian Right was organized by New Right strategists. In late 1978 and early 1979, several leading New Right activists—Paul Weyrich of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Howard Phillips of the Conservative Caucus, and Richard Viguerie, director of the New Right direct mail operations—began to approach Christian school lobbyists like Robert Billings of the National Christian Action Coalition and McAteer of the Christian Freedom Foundation with the suggestion of a New Right–Christian alliance. Together this core recruited several leading television evangelists, notably Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and James Robison. From these early meetings came a number of organizations, including the Roundtable, headed by McAteer, and Falwell's Moral Majority, directed by Billings. The New Right operatives provided access, information, and resources, and brought their new Christian allies into closer contact with conservative organizations like Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and the Heritage Foundation, as well as with conservative Republican politicians like Senators Jesse Helms and Gordon Humphrey. In return, the lobbyists and evangelists were able to offer their powerful influence among conservative Christians by using mailing lists of as many as two million and television audiences of millions more. Far from a "grass-roots" uprising, the religious right was organized from the top down. At the apex stood the New Right strategists who set much of the original agenda for their less sophisticated Christian recruits. The conservative organizers provided "a lot of perspective," said one evangelical. "They [drew] our attention to issues we might otherwise have missed."[19]

The New Christian Right is far from the model of the irrational mass movement. Despite frequent flurries of public protest, most of the movement's efforts have been private and intensely pragmatic. The Christian conservative lobbyists were originally concerned with protecting the Christian schools from Internal Revenue Service investigations over the issue of racial imbalance. The television evangelists were frightened by persistent rumors concerning government regulation of the Christian broadcasting industry. Many ministers, Falwell among them, were worried about tax regulations involving church properties. Their specific interests were narrow, but the Christian conservatives were eager to trade. New Right organizers began to bring them together with other conservative interest group members in regular strategy sessions—the "Kingston group" and "Library Court" meetings are often cited examples—where bargains were struck, vows of secrecy exchanged, and coalitions built. One Chris-

[19] Christian activist Richard Zone, Christian Voice operations director, in Robert Zwier and Richard Smith, "Christian Politics and the New Right," *Christian Century*, 8 October 1980, p. 938. See Paul Weyrich, "The Pro-Family Movement," *Conservative Digest*, May and June 1980, pp. 14–24. On the role of the national network of conservative organizations, see James L. Guth, "The Politics of the 'Evangelical Right': An Interpretive Essay." Paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1981, pp. 8–15.

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tian leader acknowledged to the evangelical *Christianity Today* magazine that he had agreed in one of these sessions to back the National Rifle Association's opposition to gun control in return for its support for one of his causes. By mid-1980, the evangelicals had become skilled practitioners of pressure-group politics. Their strategy, far from irrational radicalism, has been the pragmatic politics of interest-group conservatism. Richard Viguerie has put it succinctly: ". . . all the New Right has done is copy the success of the old left."[20]

Status and Symbol: The Politics of Symbolic Protest

Though inspired by Durkheim's theory of collective behavior, twentieth-century social theorists have probably been influenced even more by Max Weber's concept of status. According to Weber, social groups could be understood as seeking either "status," the shared claims of honor and prestige, or "class," the control of economic resources. Often these factors were closely associated, with social standing being determined largely by economic power. At times, however, status and class could be independent influences.[21]

The social theorists took up this latter suggestion, contending that status and class were, in fact, independent and unrelated explanations for social behavior. Both Hofstadter and Lipset, for example, saw insecurities over status as the cause of much social resentment and intolerance in the United States, including anti-Semitism and racism. Status politics, they argued, took place when social groups felt threatened by the gains of others. Ironically, such status-threatened groups included both insecure old-family Americans and anxious, status-striving ethnics. In each case, status insecurities led members of these groups to seek out enemies or scapegoats. By contrast, concerns about class led to more pragmatic responses, to rational goals such as redistribution of income, and rational strategies such as union organizing or lobbying. To Hofstadter, it was the absence of such instrumental programs that distinguished the followers of the radical right, who expressed their anxieties ". . . more in vindictiveness, in sour memories, in the search for scapegoats, than in realistic proposals for positive action."[22]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, social theorists applied the concept of status politics to all types of social movements. With Joseph Gusfield's *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*, the concept gained new sophistication. To Gusfield, the assumption that status politics was purely emotional seemed unrealistic. In the temperance movement, he found an example of status protest that was both "expressive" and "instrumental,"

[20] Viguerie, *The New Right*, p. 78. See also Edward E. Plowman, "Is Morality All Right?" *Christianity Today*, 2 November 1979, pp. 76–85.

[21] See Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party," *From Max Weber*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 180–95.

[22] Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in Bell, ed., *The New American Right*, p. 44. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," ibid., pp. 167–73, 192–95.

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using emotional symbols to achieve rational ends. Gusfield showed how a small-town, Protestant, middle-class establishment effectively used the issue of alcohol to shore up its social position against urban, Catholic, immigrant groups. The symbol of their status was the successful passage of the prohibition amendment. Gusfield pointed out, however, that the temperance crusaders were more interested in establishing the amendment as a symbol than in preventing the actual consumption of alcohol. He argued that symbolic politics was a rational strategy to attain prestige, but an irrational, or at least ineffective, means of achieving programmatic results.[23]

In studies of contemporary conservatism, the concepts of status and symbol have been common. Sociologists Ann Page and Donald Clelland, for example, adopted a version of status politics in their treatment of the Kanawha County, West Virginia textbook dispute, which they depicted as a conflict between "cultural fundamentalists" and "cultural modernists." Alan Crawford has relied heavily on the idea of status frustration in his analysis of anti-ERA forces. In a recent paper, James David Fairbanks has applied the work of Gusfield to the Christian conservatives, presenting the religious right as another symbolic crusade. Though the theory of status politics has remained influential, critics have suggested that it can be misleading. In effect, they have argued that the concentration on prestige has led scholars to neglect the role of power. That is, by focusing on symbols, the status theorists have failed to examine much of the social, economic, and political substance of protest movements. In particular, they have overlooked that symbolic protest requires political organization. In this regard, scholars have yet to analyze adequately the different organizational roles of leaders and followers. In short, the existing studies have failed to describe the substantive politics that underlie symbolic protest.[24]

Status Politics and Christian Conservatism

Christian conservatives can be seen as predisposed to status anxiety. Their social standing varies by region, denomination, church size, and other factors, but they can be generally understood as tradition-bound people struggling to preserve their religious values in an increasingly secular society. James Guth has suggested that they are the "first modernized generation," a simple, rural, unpretentious people caught in the throes of industrialization, urbanization, and upward mobility. In his study of Baptist preachers, Guth found support for the

[23] See Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), pp. 166–83.

[24] See Ann L. Page and Donald A. Clelland, "The Kanawha County Textbook Controversy: A Study of the Politics of Life Style Concern," *Social Forces* 57 (1978): 265–67; Crawford, *Thunder on the Right*, pp. 148–49; and James David Fairbanks, "The Evangelical Right: Beginnings of Another Symbolic Crusade?" Paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1981. The critics of status politics are discussed in Gerard A. Brandmeyer and R. Serge Denisoff, "Status Politics: An Appraisal of the Application of a Concept," *The Pacific Sociological Review* 12 (1969): 5–11.

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Moral Majority strongest among those from farm and small-town backgrounds. The journalist Frances FitzGerald, interviewing members of Falwell's Thomas Road Baptist Church, discovered many to be the children of farm families who had taken advantage of educational opportunities to move into higher status positions in the rapidly developing urban South. As early as 1971, in a study of two anti-pornography campaigns, a team of scholars led by Louis Zurcher predicted that controversies concerning social status would occur most often in smaller cities with recent rural histories and rapid urban development. All of the existing analyses of the Christian right seem to agree that its social base can be found among such transitional populations. As Guth wrote, "That the current religious militance draws much of its strength from the rapidly modernizing regions of the South and West hints that in some way the processes of modernization and secularization may be responsible for this movement."[25]

Yet status anxiety alone is not enough to account for controversy. Zurcher and his colleagues noted that social movements require a cadre of leaders to mobilize discontent. This leadership role has been claimed by the New Christian Right. Its organizers understand the power of symbols in bringing Christians into the political process. Thus they present social issues using symbolic catchwords and phrases—"crime in the streets," "welfare chiselers"—which arouse deep anxieties and call forth strongly held convictions. "I believe that virtually all of the problems facing the nation are moral," Howard Phillips has observed. The manipulation of moral issues is one element of a larger strategy to attract voters away from the established political parties and towards the new conservative organizations. The parties, Phillips explained, are "simply instruments for gaining power. They may use issues, but issues are not intrinsic to their meaning or purpose." By concentrating on emotional moral issues, the New Right and its allies can attract devoted partisans to conservative campaigns: ". . . people who are motivated by issues," Phillips reasoned, "are far more reliable than people who are merely motivated by the lust for power or the desire for patronage."[26] Without doubt, the leaders of the New Right and Christian right are themselves concerned about moral problems, but their use of symbolic issues is also, by their own admission, politically motivated. "The New Right is looking for issues that people care about," Weyrich has confessed, "and social issues, at least for the present, fit the bill."[27]

[25] Guth, "Politics," p. 1. See also Guth, "The Southern Baptist Clergy: Vanguard of the Evangelical Right?" Paper presented to the Southern Political Science Annual Meeting, November 1981, pp. 6–10; Frances FitzGerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," *New Yorker*, 18 May 1981, pp. 65–74; and Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., et al., "The Anti-Pornography Campaign: A Symbolic Crusade," *Social Problems* 19 (1971): 217–38.

[26] Howard Phillips, "Phillips on the New Right," *Conservative Digest*, March 1980, p. 12.

[27] Weyrich in George G. Higgins, "The Prolife Movement and the New Right," *America*, 13 September 1980, p. 108.

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The Role of Economics in the New Christian Right

In the same manner, symbolic politics allows leaders to respond to the economic anxieties of their followers. The existing economic analyses of the religious right are largely impressionistic, but observers seem to find two distinct groups within the movement: a small elite of well-educated, mostly professional, middle-class activists and a large, constantly changing mass membership of marginally educated, lower- and working-class followers. The recent Gallup poll showed that evangelicals included more women, more persons with grade-school educations, and more unemployed than the national norm. According to Gallup, only 10 percent of evangelicals were professional, while 25 percent did manual labor. Even controlling for race—unusually large numbers of evangelicals are black—the potential mass constituency for Christian conservatism is predominantly among lower- and working-class people. Guth's study of Baptist preachers confirmed that the strongest support for the Moral Majority was in working-class congregations.

Yet the leaders of the religious right have not dedicated their organizations to meeting the economic needs of these constituents. On the contrary, the Christian conservative strategists have realized that economic interest will tend to draw their potential conservative converts towards liberal economic policies. Thus they have used symbolic issues, not to meet economic ends, but to override them. "In the past," Weyrich has observed, "we conservatives have paraded all those Chamber of Commerce candidates with the Mobil Oil bill boards strapped to their backs. It doesn't work in middle-class neighborhoods." With symbolic politics, moral commitment can overcome economic self-interest, pulling Christians into the conservative camp and away from liberal candidates. "Yes, they're emotional issues," admitted Weyrich, "but that's better than talking about capital formation."[28]

The New Christian Right is committed to a conservative economic course. The financial base of Christian conservative organizations has yet to be analyzed adequately, but observers describe them as relying on both large contributions and small, direct-mail offerings. The relative influence of large and small donors cannot be known. Nevertheless, reliance on business and corporate sponsorship has been heavy enough for one observer to label it the "flowering of 'corporate populism.' "[29] Among movement leaders, criticism of big business is rare, while praise for the corporation, the entrepreneur, and the free market is frequent and glowing. Jerry Falwell describes capitalism as a holy institution. "The free enterprise system is clearly outlined in the Book of Proverbs in the Bible. . . . Ownership of property is biblical. Ambitious and successful busi-

[28] Ibid. See "The Christianity Today—Gallup Poll," p. 14; FitzGerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," p. 70; and Guth, "The Southern Baptist Clergy," p. 11.

[29] Wechsler, "Introduction," in Crawford, *Thunder on the Right*, p. xiv.

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ness management is clearly outlined as part of God's plan for His people."[30] In its economic program, the Christian right follows free market principles: opposition to unions (the "pro-family" movement has suggested withholding federal funds from school systems which allow unionization of teachers), to public regulation (it considers "un-Christian" most attempts at public oversight of business and industry), and to social services (it has fought the minimum wage, supported the Reagan budget cuts, and called for elimination of all but essential social welfare programs). FitzGerald has told of her surprise that local businessmen were willing to offer support to Falwell's Lynchburg church. She soon discovered that Falwell had ". . . never campaigned against discotheques, against the selling of wine and beer in the local supermarkets, against the showing of Hollywood films in the local theatres—or, indeed, against any form of business enterprise." Falwell's economic philosophy, she concluded, ". . . coincides with the interests of the local business owners and managers far better than it does with those of most people in his own congregation. . . ."[31] For while some members of Falwell's own church receive welfare payments, he has been quick to state that the purpose of the Moral Majority's economic program is to put an end to welfare, to "defeat welfarism in America."[32]

Moral Symbolism and Political Power

In politics, the New Christian Right uses moral symbolism to achieve local political power. Many of the conservative causes of the recent past have involved the attempt of tradition-bound populations to gain control over local school boards, community councils, or party organizations. The Kanawha County parents who closed the local schools in protest over the use of "un-Christian" schoolbooks was a typical case. Many theorists see this type of grass-roots protest as the most prominent characteristic of the new conservatism. The resources provided to local groups have been significant. In the West Virginia protest, for example, lawyers from the Heritage Foundation acted as counsel to local parents, while conservative professionals handled fund-raising and publicity. To some observers, however, this kind of support has often seemed to serve the purpose of control. For the leaders of the New Christian Right view popular protest with ambivalence and even trepidation. Alan Crawford has shown that the New Right leadership, while espousing an ideology of community action, has attempted to tie local groups to national organizations. Emphasizing direct mail and media campaigns, the New Right organizers tend to nationalize issues. Television preachers, with their ready-made, coast-to-coast audiences, prefer the national to the local arena. Because the national organizations provide ser-

[30] Jerry Falwell, *Listen, America!* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1980), p. 13. On the financial sources of fundamentalist conservatism, see Bruce Buursma, "Evangelicals Give Reagan a 'Non-Partisan' Stump," *Christianity Today*, 19 September 1980, p. 50.

[31] FitzGerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," pp. 119 and 120.

[32] Falwell, *Listen, America!*, p. 12.

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vices to local activists, they can also make demands. Crawford has described community organizers' resentment over the top-down control of Conservative Caucus director Phillips. Said one professional, "He had a set of rules they had to follow and they couldn't deviate from them in the least."[33]

Politically, the religious right seeks both to organize as well as control popular protest. Jane Gurganus Rainey's study of one Kentucky Bible crusade has shown the process. Though local parents initiated the case for Bible distribution in the public schools, the campaign itself was soon dominated by outsiders, including representatives of the state Moral Majority chapter, the Kentucky Heritage Foundation, and the John Birch Society. Rainey pointed out the importance of the national communications network of right-wing organizations in providing leadership. Indeed, her case study showed that these organizations used the local group to pursue their own concerns. She also described the way one faction of the local Republican Party ("Citizens for Reagan") sought to make partisan use of the campaign, and how local politicians attempted to turn the Bible distribution controversy to their own political benefit.

The author confessed her surprise that the parents' group would limit itself to the largely symbolic issue of Bibles in the schools, rather than focusing on more pressing political problems. Yet the state and national organizations had little interest in local problems.[34] In his classic study *Southern Politics*, V. O. Key showed how Bourbon elites in the Reconstruction South used the symbolic issue of race to overcome the potential populist alliance of poor whites and blacks. In such a situation, he argued, those who "have" maintained their power, while those who "have not" remained powerless. His observations seem applicable to these local protests. The leaders of the New Christian Right are anxious to extend their organizational influence. They are very reluctant, however, to oversee the transfer of power downward. Jerry Falwell for one has never tried to upset the political consensus in his home city of Lynchburg. "You have to know Jerry," one local businessman observed. "You'd know he was no fanatic."[35]

From Movement to Organization: Accommodation and Alienation

The theory of organizational transformation has been another prominent influence on the study of twentieth-century political movements. In his *Political Parties*, Robert Michels introduced the idea of organizational accommodation, meaning that all social movements must create enduring institutional structures in order to survive and prosper. The creation of these structures leads inevitably to the concentration of power among a few active and informed leaders, what

[33] Cited in Crawford, *Thunder on the Right*, p. 39. See also pp. 39–41.

[34] See Jane Gurganus Rainey, " 'Stand Up For Jesus': A Case Study of Confrontation and Cultural Encounter in the Educational Politics of the Christian Right." Paper presented to the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, November 1981, pp. 42–50.

[35] Cited in FitzGerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," p. 119. See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), pp. 302–10.

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Michels called the "iron law of oligarchy." In turn, these leaders seek the establishment of administrative procedures that make the day-to-day operation of the institution possible. Within this process, Michels observed, the organization moves toward a course of increasing moderation, as leaders give less attention to the original goals of the movement and more to the developing maintenance needs of the administrative apparatus. For Michels, a social democrat trying to explain the failure of left-wing European political parties, the "iron law" implied that all movements—no matter how committed, idealistic, or vigorous—would succumb over time to the demands of oligarchy, bureaucracy, and moderation.[36] Yet to the social theorists of the 1950s, Michels's pessimistic theory of democratic decline seemed a hopeful vision of moderation and order. To Hofstadter, the proof of the theory was the transition from Populism and Progressivism to the New Deal, which he described as an evolution from moralistic protest to institutional reform. With this change, he wrote approvingly, "two generations of noisy but seemingly futile agitation" had become "quietly and effectively institutionalized."[37]

When the social theorists attempted to apply the idea of organizational accommodation to contemporary right-wing movements, however, they found the application problematic. Following Michels, they held that with the growth of organizations, the concerns of leaders would begin to diverge from those held by rank-and-file followers. In meeting the needs of their institutions, leaders would forego partisan stands in favor of practical organizational policies. Moreover, their contact with other leaders would bring them into closer conformity with mainstream values. To the social theorists, this process of cooptation seemed a possible antidote to the ideological excesses of the radical right. This theory has some application to recent religious conservatives. In his study of Southern Baptist ministers, Guth found that those pastors with more education, more seniority in their churches, and more commitment to organizational structures like the Southern Baptist Convention have been the most strongly resistant to the appeals of the Christian conservatives. With increasing professionalization, Guth has suggested, conservative militants would evolve into moderate organizational loyalists.[38]

Yet the social theorists were never altogether convinced of the moderating influence of organizations on right-wing movements. In 1964, for example, Hofstadter wrote with some chagrin of Barry Goldwater's implacable resistance to the pragmatic code of party politics. The Goldwater Republicans, fearing cooptation, resisted conciliation with moderate members of the Republican party. The implications of this type of resistance for the religious right are problematic. Guth has conceded that conservative militants may prove capable of resist-

[36] Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1915), pp. 365–92.

[37] Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 236. See, too, idem., *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), esp. pp. 316–28.

[38] See Guth, "The Southern Baptist Clergy," p. 16.

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ing organizational cooptation altogether. It is entirely possible, he wrote in his study of the Southern Baptist Convention, ". . . that many conservative ministers and churches may withdraw, perhaps providing the core of a new Baptist denomination."[39]

Other scholars have expressed even stronger reservations about the concept of accommodation. In an influential article, Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash have argued that moderation within movement organizations would lead to factionalism and schism. In particular, those organizations concerned with issues of ultimate truth must face the risk of losing their most ideologically committed followers. The economist Albert Hirschman has also suggested that as organizations become more moderate, they tend to discover discontent among their most doctrinaire members. According to Hirschman, these alienated activists will express their discontent either through "exit," by leaving the organization, or "voice," by staying and expressing their dissatisfaction.

Among students of contemporary religion, too, the accommodation thesis has found few disciples. For well over a decade, they point out, the large "mainline" churches have been losing membership to the smaller, newer denominations. Those churches which have grown the most quickly have also been the most zealous. Indeed, one religious scholar has found the most vigorous churches to be the most absolutist, the most intolerant of dissent, and the most uncompromising.

Thus the accommodation thesis has not held with regard to religion. Moreover, it does not seem to apply to religious politics. For while accommodation has taken place within the Christian conservative movement, so has alienation. Such changes seem to be complementary: As the Christian right has become more organized, many of its members have become more frustrated and estranged. The result has been faction and schism.[40]

In terms of accommodation theory, today's religious right can be seen as a transitional phase between movement and organization. The Moral Majority provides a case in point. In its short life, its leaders have worked diligently to gain control of local and state chapters. "We are trying to get organized," Falwell has said, "trying to get those loose cannons out there under control."[41] On occasion, the Moral Majority's national headquarters has been forced to censure or remove overzealous local representatives and replace them with more sophisticated organizational loyalists. More frequently, it has sought to educate local leaders by sponsoring seminars in public relations and media skills. The goal, as vice president Ronald Godwin has put it, is to "avoid embarrass-

[39] Ibid.

[40] See Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change," *Social Forces* 44 (1966): 327–41; Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 62–75; and Dean M. Kelley, *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 94–96.

[41] "An Interview with the Lone Ranger of American Fundamentalism," *Christianity Today*, 4 September 1981, p. 22.

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ments." In turn, the seminars and training sessions have tied local operatives more closely to state and national officials. At the same time, the leadership has begun to move from the extreme positions of what Godwin has called the "media period" to the more cautious positions of the "organizational period."[42] Recent statements by Falwell have emphasized the importance of moderation. "The fact is," he has remarked, "we have to find common ground for everybody. There has to be room for compromise. Nobody gets everything they want."[43] Increasingly, the leaders of the Moral Majority see themselves moving towards accommodation. "In our enthusiasm," director Billings has said, "we sometimes do or say things that we wouldn't do if we were a little more experienced and mature."[44]

With accommodation, however, the Moral Majority has lost the support of members who were attracted to its original uncompromising commitment. Even within the movement's first year, the potential for internal discord had already been realized. In Maryland, Moral Majority leaders drew media attention through their campaign to condemn a local bakery for selling gingerbread cookies that were "explicitly sexual." Boasting that he had "no problem censoring my own people publicly,"[45] Falwell reprimanded the chapter. When a California minister, identified as a Moral Majority spokesman, announced that homosexuality was a mortal sin that should merit capital punishment, Falwell quickly repudiated the statement. In attempting to create a more moderate image for the organization, however, Falwell has lost the support of many members who see moderation as compromise with the devil. Some California Christians, for example, disenchanted with the Moral Majority, have formed their own independent coalition which pursues a hard-line platform that includes banning *Ms.* magazine from public libraries and outlawing the renting of motel rooms to unmarried couples. The potential for such popular protest is unpredictable. Rainey, drawing upon her experience with the Kentucky Bible protesters, has warned of mass intolerance. "The foot soldiers may well reflect different nuances from the generals," she wrote, "and it is important that the nature of the movement not be judged solely on the merits of the suave urbanity of a Jerry Falwell."[46]

Within the religious right, the process of accommodation must confront the persistent problem of factionalism. Contrary to popular opinion, conservative Christianity is by no means monolithic. Conservative Christians can agree on certain basic principles like the virgin birth, the atonement, the resurrection, and the personal second coming. Most would profess belief in the inerrancy of

[42] Godwin in "Moral Majority Starts Ad Campaign to Counter Critics," *New York Times*, 26 March 1981, p. B14, and Guth, "Politics," p. 21.

[43] Falwell in "The New Moral America and the War of the Religicos," *Washington Post*, 24 August 1980, p. H4.

[44] Billings in "Evangelical Conservatives," pp. 2629-30.

[45] Falwell in "Jerry Falwell's Troubles," p. 24.

[46] Rainey, " 'Stand Up For Jesus,' " p. 46. See also "Unholy Crusade on a Sexual Battlefront," *Maclean's*, 4 May 1981, p. 13-17.

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the Bible. Beyond these basic tenets, however, there is little common ground. Fundamentalists emphasize doctrinal purity with the strict interpretation of the Bible as a primary concern. Evangelicals are more interested in spreading the news of salvation through Christ. Charismatics—members of pentecostal, holiness, and apostolic groups—emphasize the baptism in the Holy Spirit, the intensely individualistic experience of personal faith. Among the charismatics, whose members range from the provincial and primitive to the cosmopolitan, the important issues extend from the narrowly biblical to the broadly secular. As to the members of mainline churches who consider themselves political conservatives, they, too, hold diverse theological positions.

These sectarian differences imply political divergences. Fundamentalists see the teaching of creationism as an important political issue. Evangelicals are more interested in moral reform campaigns, such as banning pornography or prostitution. Charismatics are harder to predict, though many of them see political choices in personal terms and demand, for example, that Christians vote only for "born-again" candidates. The mainline church members often have their own special interests. Many Catholics, for example, are interested primarily in the issue of abortion.

Thus, Christian conservative organizations, which seem so united to outsiders, in fact form uneasy alliances. By making use of widely accepted but vaguely defined issues—prayer in the schools to cite one example—leaders have attempted to reconcile the constant potential for conflict. Yet reliance on such broad but vaguely defined themes has reduced doctrine to bland clichés. Consequently, when the organizers of the 1980 "Washington for Jesus" rally tried to agree on a common platform, they were forced to retreat to the statement that America was doomed unless it heeded the example of Jesus. Falwell has admitted the uneasy nature of the alliance: ". . . in another context," he has said of doctrinal differences, "we would be shedding blood."[47]

In response, many Christian conservative organizations have turned to a coalition strategy. Weyrich's "pro-family" movement is a case in point—an unlikely alliance of urban, working-class Catholics concerned about abortion and rural fundamentalist Protestants worried about the fate of the traditional family. In attempting to satisfy such diverse constituencies, "pro-family" organizers have expanded their platform to include not only opposition to abortion, drugs, and pornography, but also to issues like the ERA, the role of the Department of Education, and school busing for racial integration. Indeed, before it was withdrawn and rewritten, Senator Paul Laxalt's Family Protection Act had become a voluminous catalogue of almost every social program espoused by the Christian right, including many that had little or no relation to the family.

The coalition character of the New Christian Right has left it vulnerable to such proliferation of issues, and Christian conservatives have discovered that this weakens their movement. As Peter Odegard has shown in his early study of

[47] Falwell quoted in Plowman, "Is Morality All Right?" p. 84. On the divisions within conservative Christendom, see "Pulpits and Politics, 1980," *Church & State*, November 1980, pp. 7–10.

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the Anti-Saloon League, reform movements become diluted as they turn their attention from one to many issues: Constituencies are narrowed, commitments are weakened, and intensity is diminished when spread among several causes. The coalition strategy has tended to divide rather than unite special interests. As one evangelical complained, the "pro-family" coalition could "lead to the election of a moron who holds the right view on abortion."[48]

Throughout its short history, the Christian conservative movement has faced the problem of applying religious principles to political situations. Its leadership realizes that intense spiritual commitments do not translate easily into broad partisan ideology. Nevertheless, movement leaders have sought to use religious and spiritual precepts to portray conservative political positions. Such a strategy has proved troublesome. Many Christian conservatives have been unwilling to accept conservative economic programs or foreign policy stands as "biblical" or "moral." Some do not consider it their religious responsibility, as one evangelical explained, to resist the "unholy abandonment of the Panama Canal" or the "immoral rejection of Formosa."[49] Among fundamentalists, there is wide concern that as religion becomes political, theology will begin to seem more like ideology. They worry, as evangelist Jimmy Allen has put it, that "a non-partisan movement for Jesus . . . always seems to turn into a Republican rally." Evangelicals have expressed annoyance that the principles of social welfare announced in the Sermon on the Mount have been lost in the scramble to embrace conservative positions. As one angry theologian declared, "I would hate for evangelical Christianity to become a spiritual version of the National Rifle Association."[50] Charismatics consider their faith to be compromised by voting for secular conservatives. Even mainline church members see their religion being corrupted. The ultimate disservice to the "right-to-life" movement, wrote one Catholic priest, would be for it to end up "discredited as a right-wing sham."[51] For many members of the religious right, politics is a poor substitute for faith. Billy Graham has expressed these sympathies in warning conservative preachers not to become so absorbed in political concerns "that they lose sight of the priority of the Gospel."[52]

The ultimate threat to the religious right is separatism. Among fundamentalists in particular, the commitment to politics is tenuous. For true Bible believers, the political world can be attractive and enticing, but it is also dangerous, and for some, evil. Many separatist fundamentalists refuse whenever possible to engage in public life. Throughout the 1960s, liberal evangelicals exhorted reticent

[48] Cited in "Getting God's Kingdom into Politics," *Christianity Today*, 19 September 1980, p. 10. See Peter H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 79.

[49] John W. Montgomery, "The Limits of Christian Influence," *Christianity Today*, 23 January 1981, p. 60.

[50] Jimmy Allen and evangelical theologian David Hubbard in "A Tide of Born-Again Politics," *Newsweek*, 15 September 1980, p. 36.

[51] Higgins, "The Prolife Movement," p. 109.

[52] Billy Graham quoted in "Jerry Falwell's Troubles," p. 23.

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fundamentalists to become involved in the social reform movements of the decade. Among those who resolutely refused was Falwell who, in a 1965 sermon aimed at civil rights advocates, denied any role for the clergy in politics. He later recanted, labelling the sermon "false prophecy."[53]

Nevertheless, much of the Christian right tends toward an apolitical stance. In fact, for every new leader recruited to the movement, several others have retreated. Even before the 1980 elections had come to a close, the talented Pat Robertson, prominent early in the campaign, had become concerned enough over the loss of religious values to resign from the Roundtable. Evangelists like Jim Bakker, Rex Humbard, and Oral Roberts have similarly renounced partisan political involvement. ("If I backed a Republican for President," remarked Humbard, "what about all the Democrats in my audience?"[54])

It is among the movement's foot soldiers, however, that the commitment to politics is most tenuous. Organizer McAteer has summarized the problem: "The people involved in the moral revolution would rather be working for their churches, orphanages or going to the lake."[55] Within the religious right, political reform must often compete with the more important demands of personal salvation. As television evangelist Jimmy Swaggart has said, ". . . legislation and new faces in office won't solve our real problems. From the beginning of time, changing the heart of man has been the only answer."[56]

Pluralist Theory and Christian Conservatism

A final important influence on the study of twentieth-century social movements has been pluralist theory. In *The Process of Government*, American political scientist Arthur F. Bentley made the startling suggestion that public life could be studied best by examining the process of coalition building instead of the structure of established institutions. To Bentley, the idea of process was the key to analyzing the multifarious reform groups that were the product of his time. With his pluralist theory of politics, protest and reform became legitimate topics of study.

Yet when pluralist theory was passed from Bentley to his students, his model of protest became more a theory of stability. By the 1950s, pluralist theorists were arguing that the controlled interaction of social groups had created a system that was both dynamic and stable—open to moderate reform, but closed to extreme conflict. These theorists contended that open competition among social groups would create constantly changing coalitions, thereby preventing the domination of any single interest. In addition, because individuals would identify with many different groups, they would be less willing to commit themselves

[53] Falwell in FitzGerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," p. 114.

[54] Humbard in Guth, "Politics," p. 17.

[55] McAteer in "Religious Right Goes for Bigger Game," *U.S. News and World Report*, 17 November 1980, p. 42.

[56] Swaggart in "Thunder on the Right," *People Weekly*, 13 October 1980, p. 34.

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to any one special interest and therefore less inclined to take uncompromising positions.[57] Further, in order to survive in this system, protest groups would need to adopt the principles of coalition-building and compromise. Those who refused to abide by these rules would be relegated to the extreme fringes. To the social theorists who adopted these pluralist principles, the most troubling aspect of the radical right was its refusal to engage in consensual politics. "The right wing tolerates no compromises," wrote Hofstadter, "accepts no half measures, understands no defeats. In this respect, it stands psychologically outside the frame of normal democratic politics, which is largely an affair of compromise."[58]

Pluralist theory also provided a ready explanation for the failure to thrive that has characterized so many extreme movements. With its broad-based, pragmatic parties, the American political system offered an unappealing landscape to ideological protests. The channels to change were open to all. But this diverse democratic system could only operate through the sharing of power. Thus, demands had to be limited, and compromise widespread. To the pluralist theorists of the past 30 years, these requirements closed the door to ideological programs or moralistic crusades. Among the theory's contemporary champions, the Christian conservative movement seems the latest threat to this consensual order. Patricia Harris has described the "Christian crusade" as damaging the nation's "consensus orientation," Anthony Lewis has worried about the fate of "political safety in a pluralist society," and Yale President A. B. Giamatti has denounced the Moral Majority for its "radical assault" on the principles of pluralism.[59] Concluded activist Norman Lear in a recent fund-raising letter, "The future of our pluralistic society is at stake. . . ."[60]

In spite of its appeal, many scholars contend that pluralist theory offers an unrealistic description of American democracy. In particular, critics have charged that pluralism is based not so much on the conflict of groups as the cooperation of leaders, that the changing coalitions described so often by pluralist thinkers obscures the fact that decisions are made by relatively few.[61] In such a

[57] See Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1908); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 197–203; and Bernard Berelson, et. al., *Voting* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[58] Hofstadter, "Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited," in Bell, ed., *The Radical Right*, p. 86.

[59] Harris and Lewis in Ribuffo, "Liberals and that Old-Time Religion," p. 572; A. Bartlett Giamatti in "Head of Yale Calls Moral Majority 'Peddlars of Coercion,' " *New York Times*, 1 September 1981, p. A1.

[60] Norman Lear, undated fundraising letter, People for the American Way. On the application of pluralism to the study of extremist groups, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 3–33.

[61] See E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 35. Other critics include Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966): 285–95; Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1967); Theodore J. Lowi, *The Poli-*

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situation, it is understandable that many citizens would feel alienated and angry. Thus, these critics have contended, popular protest is a rational response to political powerlessness. In *The Strategy of Social Protest*, William Gamson has drawn on the histories of some 50 "challenging groups," including labor, reform, and nativist organizations, to show that protest is not only a common strategy, but also an effective one in achieving power. In challenging the status quo, Gamson argues, disfranchised groups have done best by pursuing a strategy of confrontation. His argument is applicable to the religious right. For while Christian conservatives have practiced the process of bargaining and compromise, they have been even more comfortable with attack and combat. The leaders of the movement are uneasy pluralists. They pursue a strategy of conflict.[62]

The Role of Protest in the New Christian Right

The New Christian Right understands the role of protest. Weyrich has argued that Christian conservatives constitute a classic challenging group. "We are not conservatives," he has stated. "We are radicals seeking to overturn the Establishment." Their strategy of protest relies on confrontation: "Frame [issues] in such a way that there is no mistaking who is on the right side and who is on the wrong side," Weyrich has told his operatives. "Ultimately, everything can be reduced to right and wrong."[63]

The theorists of the New Christian Right are expert at inspiring popular discontent. Crawford has shown how New Right media experts rely on the anger and fear of their audience to attract attention and support. Their purpose, as they have described it themselves, is to "stir up hostilities."[64] The conservative strategists are adept at making their readers feel threatened. "Our grand old flag is going down the drain," wrote Falwell in a recent fundraising letter. "Don't kid yourself. You may wake up some morning and discover that Old Glory is no longer waving freely."[65] Most importantly, they know how to present issues in terms of confrontation. As Weyrich has put it, ". . . this is really the most significant battle of the age-old conflict between good and evil, between the forces of God and forces against God, that we have seen in our country."[66]

The strategy of protest requires enemies, and the tendency of Christian conservatives to seek out scapegoats has been frequently noted. Concerned critics

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tics of Disorder (New York: Basic Books, 1971); and Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View from the Bottom," *Journal of Politics* 32 (1970): 501–30.

[62] See William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975), pp. 141–43.

[63] Weyrich in Higgins, "The Prolife Movement," p. 108; and in "Evangelical Conservatives Move From Pews to Polls," p. 2630.

[64] NCPAC's Terry Dolan in Crawford, *Thunder on the Right*, p. 51.

[65] Falwell, undated fundraising letter, Moral Majority.

[66] Weyrich, "The Pro-Family Movement," p. 15.

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cite the dangers of racism and anti-Semitism in the movement. Many have warned of the threats posed to the civil rights of homosexuals. Others have pointed to the campaigns against feminists and women's rights advocates. While some scholars have sought to defend Christian conservatives against charges of intolerance, most have instead expressed concern. The religious right seems determined to create enemies. Their leaders have spoken often of vague anti-Christian conspiracies, of a "godless minority of treacherous individuals who have been permitted to formulate national policy. . . ."[67] The influence of "secular humanists"—intellectuals, educators, members of the social service professions—in controlling public policy has been cited. California evangelist Tim LaHaye has claimed that a group of some 250,000 humanists has taken control of the basic institutions of American society, including the public school system, the broadcast media, the Methodist Church, and the United Nations. Moreover, Christian conservatives have found enemies among liberal legislators, whom they variously identify as "radical," "socialist," and "atheist." Christian audiences must be told, Weyrich has explained, that these humanist politicians are ". . . attempting to prevent souls from reaching eternal salvation."[68]

The protest politics of the Christian conservatives has served the interest of conservative politicians. Though some conservatives, like Barry Goldwater, have expressed concern and even disdain, many have been grateful for evangelical support. Whether and how their gratitude will be expressed—in patronage, policies, or opportunities for power—remains to be seen. For their part, Christian conservatives have not been impressed with the accessibility of their erstwhile conservative allies. Roundtable's McAteer has complained bitterly that the Reagan administration is "not really concerned" about putting Christians into positions of power.[69] Yet for the present, the alliance between Christian conservatives and conservative politicians holds. In American politics, as the historian Leo Ribuffo has shown, this fundamentalist-conservative coalition has existed for over half a century.[70] Nor does the alliance seem ready to dissolve. On the contrary, among Christian conservatives the strategy of political protest has apparently only begun. Concluded a confident Weyrich, "The New Right—and to an extent we're like Communists in this—feel victory is inevitable."[71]

[67] Falwell, "Introduction," in Viguerie, *The New Right*, p. iii.

[68] Weyrich, "The Pro-Family Movement," p. 15. See also Tim LaHaye, *The Battle for the Mind* (Old Tappan, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1980), pp. 141–79.

[69] "Ed McAteer," p. 7. See also "Goldwater: Time Has Passed Him," *Moral Majority Report*, 21 September 1981, p. 6.

[70] Ribuffo, "Liberals and that Old-Time Religion," pp. 570–72.

[71] Weyrich in Peter Ross Range, "Thunder from the Right," *New York Times Magazine*, 8 February 1981, p. 75.

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Conclusion

The standard theories applied to social movements—collective behavior, status politics, organizational accommodation, pluralist compromise—suggest that political movements must pursue a course of mobilization, protest, cooptation, and consensus. Yet Christian conservatism has not followed the predicted plan. Far from a flaming meteor, it seems more like a fixed star in our heavens. Its critics would do well to be wary of the threat it poses.

These Christian conservatives should not be totally disparaged, however. Their commitments are undoubtedly sincere. Most of them would surely fail to realize that their honest moral worries have been used to carry out a planned ideological strategy. History reminds us that conservative Christians are by no means always political conservatives: In the early 1900s, members of the fundamentalist Churches of Christ voted in large numbers for the socialist Eugene V. Debs.[72] Much of the faith of Christian conservatives is philanthropic and pacifist: Recent revival campaigns for nuclear disarmament should not be surprising. For whether their right-wing leaders like it or not, conservative Christians worship a populist prophet, the son of a carpenter who preached to the poor, who drove the money-changers from the temple, and who blessed the peacemakers.*

[72] See Ribuffo, "Liberals and that Old-Time Religion," p. 573.

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Bureaucratic Discretion and the National Health Service Corps

FRANK J. THOMPSON

The hierarchy assumption lives on in many discussions of policy implementation.[1] It is an overtly normative view, holding that elected policymakers ought to exert considerable control over the implementation of programs. Clear policy mandates presumably comprise one appropriate path to control. Control in this case is a function of the degree to which founding legislation defines objectives, quantifies them, specifies time-tables for obtaining them, indicates priorities (where multiple objectives exist), and spells out the administrative structure and procedures to be used in implementing the program.[2] Oversight activities comprise a second means to control. Through such activity, top policymakers ideally assure that program developments conform to their wishes.

The continued appeal of the hierarchy assumption is hardly surprising in a democratic society. It seems consistent with democratic ideals about the rule of law and the thwarting of unaccountable bureaucratic power.[3] Besides keeping

[1] Certain aspects of this case also receive attention in my *Health Policy and the Bureaucracy: Politics and Implementation* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).

[2] See Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "The Conditions of Effective Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy Objectives," *Policy Analysis* 5 (1979): 487–88.

[3] For a classic statement of this position, see Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," *Public Administration Review* 1 (1941): 335–50. See also Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), and Richard F. Bensel, "Creating the Statutory State: The Implications of a Rule of Law Standard in American Politics," *American Political Science Review* 74 (1980): 735–44.

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elected officials in control, however, the hierarchy assumption has sometimes been made a vehicle for increasing the effectiveness of program implementation. In this regard, precise policy mandates have had particular appeal. One analysis suggests that given a sound underlying theory a program's prospects improve when "policy objectives are precise and clearly ranked, both internally (within the specific statute) and in the overall program of the implementing agencies."[4] Another study argues "that the surest way to avoid intraorganizational implementation problems is to establish a specific mandate and provide sufficient resources. . . ."[5] Yet another hypothesis suggests that policy clarity "is a necessary first step toward effective implementation."[6] Observers credit precise mandates with giving an agency a major weapon to turn against those who oppose its mission. Specific statutes are also praised for reducing the prospects that an agency's officials will dissipate energy by skirmishes over interpretation of the law. Then, too, such mandates are thought to expedite evaluation and, thereby, the detection and correction of errors.

Students of the policy process acknowledge, of course, that a large gap often exists between the prescriptive ideal embodied by the hierarchy assumption and actual practice. The drafting of precise statutes, for example, will often prove difficult. Uncertainty about goals or means, the need to construct coalitions, crowded legislative agendas, and other factors can result in the passage of murky mandates. While analysts of policy readily acknowledge the various impediments to control by elected officials, many of them still pay homage to the normative ideal expressed by the hierarchy assumption. This is not to suggest that analysts have developed a blind and rigid allegiance to the maxim, nor is it a claim that the maxim is without critics. Some observers have, for instance, warned about the potential dangers of trying too hard to program decisions.[7] Nonetheless, when placed on a continuum, many analyses gravitate toward the end that emphasizes the importance of control by elected officials via precise laws and vigilant oversight.

The values embedded in the hierarchy assumption appropriately command the attention of students of bureaucracy and implementation in a democratic society. This article examines one program, the National Health Service Corps, in order to suggest what happens when the assumption is greatly relaxed. In particular, the article looks at the corps to show how certain factors contribute to

[4] Sabatier and Mazmanian, "Conditions of Effective Implementation," p. 487.

[5] Robert S. Montjoy and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., "Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective," *Public Administration Review* 39 (1979): 473.

[6] Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood, *The Politics of Policy Implementation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 33.

[7] See, for instance, Paul Berman, "Designing Implementation to Match Policy Situation: A Contingency Analysis of Programmed and Adaptive Implementation." Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Meeting, New York, 1978; Richard F. Elmore, "Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (1979–80): 601–16; Michael Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on Its Head," in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Weinberg, eds., *American Politics and Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 391–402.

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goal evolution or change when laws are vague and oversight limited; to explore the sense in which goal evolution under a relaxed hierarchy assumption can possess benign qualities; and to probe the general circumstances under which less deference to the assumption yields program results that may be viewed as positive.

Case analyses do, of course, suffer from obvious limitations as a means for generalizing about either the sources or creative potential of goal evolution under murky mandates and limited oversight. While it would be better to base conclusions on the study of a carefully selected sample of programs, this was not feasible. Nevertheless, the analysis of specific federal initiatives can contribute significantly to understanding and to clarifying limitations in existing theories in order to suggest ways of refining them. The material for this case comes from extensive research involving open-ended interviews and a careful review of public documents.

In focusing on what may well be a case of benign, or creative, adaptation, this study has not isolated one of those rare instances where it would be impossible for officials to go astray. The National Health Service Corps represents a type of policy that requires officials to allocate resources—health professionals—to geographic areas judged to be needy. (On the other hand, some programs, such as Social Security, distribute goods, income, and services without overt judgments about territorial allocation.) Students of policy warn that patronage, or pork barrel, politics plague geographically allocative policies. Members of Congress, according to this argument, want to curry favor with constituents and therefore prefer to distribute program resources over a broad area. This practice often leads to a diversion of scarce resources from critical targets, and at the same time areas that need help the least sometimes reap the greatest benefits. A substantial amount of money is thus transferred from needy locales in order to maintain the coalition that provides continued funding and authorization for the program. As a result, one observer concludes that "government may lose the ability to tackle the hard economic and social problems of the day."[8]

If the threat of the pork barrel generally hovers over policies that allocate resources geographically, the corps seemed particularly susceptible to the malady. Geographically distributive policies vary in terms of government control over the resources to be allotted. In the case of the corps, federal officials not only had to devise a means of obtaining the resource they wanted to distribute—medical personnel—in a highly competitive market, they also had to persuade these professionals to accept assignments at particular shortage sites. Thus, Congress might not be the only source of pork barrel dynamics: The resource itself, medical professionals, might prefer to work at more attractive sites where the shortage was less acute; they might be willing to join the corps only when they could obtain these preferred placements in less needy areas. If

[8] R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 213–15. See also Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 77–81.

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the corps evolved along constructive lines, then, it was not because its path was free of booby traps.

The first section of this article explores certain background information about the corps and assesses the program's ambiguous mandate, allowing for the possibility that the formal specification of physician shortage areas would fall prey to pork barrel dynamics. A second section examines the nature and sources of the program's goal evolution and how its benign adaptation helped mitigate the threat of the pork barrel. Finally, three circumstances under which a relaxed hierarchy assumption more readily contribute to salutary change are probed. These circumstances may assist students of implementation in advising on the proper levels of hierarchy and flexibility for different programs.

Vague Beginnings and the Rise of Pork Barrel Politics

During the 1960s, federal policymakers became convinced that people living in certain areas of the country lacked adequate access to medical care. Eric Redman's perceptive study, *The Dance of Legislation*, vividly describes how this conviction as well as the inspiration, commitment, skill, and good luck of certain staff members working for a sympathetic Senator Warren Magnuson helped spawn the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623).[9]

The four-page act hardly met the strict imperatives of the hierarchy assumption. The law did clarify that Public Health Service physicians were to be assigned to critical shortage areas; beyond this, however, it did little to define the goals of the legislation. The law did not specify numerical targets or timetables for the placement of physicians. More importantly, it failed to define "critical health manpower shortage area" and the criteria that should govern placement of physicians in shortage areas. Nor did the law explicate a second objective which sought to encourage health personnel to remain in practice at shortage sites. Did this mean that the bureaucracy should engage in all-out efforts to persuade corps physicians to enter private practice in needy areas once they had completed their term of service with the corps? Or did it imply something else?

The law also featured limited precision with respect to means. It did make clear that corps physicians ought to charge for their services at a rate designed to recover "the reasonable cost" of providing medical care. Patients unable to pay this rate, however, were entitled to remit a reduced amount or nothing at all. Then, too, roughly a third of the law spelled out procedures involved in defending government physicians against malpractice and negligence suits. Beyond this, the main provisions of the statute revolved around the lineup of players in the implementation game. The law clearly envisioned that the Department of

[9] Eric Redman, *The Dance of Legislation* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973). For a recent overview of the corps, although one with a quite different focus than that in this article, see Roger A. Rosenblatt and Ira Moscovice, "The National Health Service Corps: Rapid Growth and Uncertain Future," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society* 58 (1980): 283-309.

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Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) would not place physicians in a shortage area without a request from the community and the approval of such groups as state officials, local health agencies, and the area medical society. The law also established a 15-member National Advisory Council on Health Manpower Shortage Areas, comprised of health professionals and consumers, to advise the Secretary of HEW on implementation of the law. Beyond these provisions, however, the statute left the bureaucracy with ample discretion to interpret and shape the program.

The basic responsibility for implementation initially fell to the Health Services and Mental Health Administration within HEW, but a reorganization soon placed the program in the newly-created Health Services Administration. Thus the corps became part of an agency which formally claimed to have two missions. One was the direct delivery of health care to such "federal beneficiaries" as American Indians, members of the United States Coast Guard, and American seamen. Second, the agency was to develop health service delivery for medically indigent inner-city, rural, and migrant populations. Various grant programs comprised the heart of this latter initiative. For example, the Bureau of Community Health Services within the Health Services Administration not only administered the corps, it also managed the community health centers program. These centers offered a broad spectrum of medical services to residents of poverty areas while providing residents with jobs, training, and positions on governing or advisory boards.

Even though the Health Services Administration ultimately came under considerable pressure to allocate resources to a multitude of congressional districts, at the outset the perils of the pork barrel seemed remote. Instead, program managers faced the threat of having scarcely any medical personnel to place. In 1972, however, Congress moved to remedy this problem by creating the Public Health and National Health Service Corps Scholarship Training Program under which students received subsidies to pay for their medical education. For each year subsidized, the medical student was to serve a year with the corps or in some other approved position in the U.S. Public Health Service. The Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976 reauthorized the program, increased penalties for scholarship recipients who failed to meet their service obligations, and bolstered funding levels appreciably. Moreover, the 1976 law arranged the appropriation process so that funding for corps scholarships would not suffer undue neglect relative to other grant programs which were more popular with medical schools. The law insisted that no money be spent on certain health professions programs if the corps failed to get the amount the statute authorized or at least 50 percent of the total amount appropriated for the entire cluster of human resource programs including the corps.

The scholarship program did much to ensure that the corps would have medical staff to place. Annual appropriations for the scholarship program reached $85.5 million in fiscal 1980, more than the amount allocated for the corps itself. By the end of fiscal 1978, more than 11,000 individuals had received scholarship support. Partly as a result of this educational subsidy, by the end of

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TABLE 1

Field Strength of the National Health Service Corps, Fiscal Year 1972–1979

Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Physicians	150	238	277	313	395	465	694	755
Dentists	14	44	51	74	95	106	210	242
Physician Extenders and Other	17	48	64	101	106	119	385	507
Total	181	330	392	488	596	690	1289	1504

Source: Office of Program Development, Health Services Administration; and Fitzhugh S. M. Mullan, "The National Health Service Corps," *Public Health Reports* 94 (July/August, 1979 Supplement): 6.

the 1970s the field strength of the corps increased eightfold (see Table 1). The corps's appropriations increased from approximately $16 million in 1972 to over $80 million in fiscal 1981.[10]

With such resources available, pork barrel pressures soon surfaced. Much of the action in this case revolved around the formal specification of shortage areas. Although seemingly a dry, technical matter, the formal designation of needy areas does constitute an important political act, for such specifications shape perceptions of the magnitude or severity of a problem and obviously affect who becomes eligible to receive a tangible government benefit. Given uncertainty about such complications as cause–effect relationships, the designation of needy areas typically involves highly subjective judgments. Above all, no one knows for sure what the exact relationship is between more medical personnel or more medical care and health. Hence, those who classify shortage areas can lean toward more restrictive or more generous definitions of the problem with little fear of violating scientifically validated norms.

Under a vague mandate, much of the discretion in labeling shortage areas falls to civil servants. In defining areas that qualify as needy, these officials tend to pay careful attention to Congress. In this regard one analysis suggests that in dealing with Congress, government managers "generally seek to build very large coalitions for the programs they administer because large coalitions help to insure that their budgets will be approved in subsequent years."[11] Initially in the case of the corps, however, administrators in HEW hardly seemed to cultivate congressional support by conferring a shortage designation on large numbers of areas.

In part because the law called for a specification of *critical* shortage areas, officials at first adopted a relatively restrictive definition of need. While HEW ad-

[10] U.S. Bureau of Health Manpower, *National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program: A Report by the Secretary of HEW to Congress* (Hyattsville, Md.: DHEW No. HRA-79-13, 1978), p. 1; "Public Health Service Budget," *The Nation's Health* (April 1981): 6; *Health Resources News* 6 (December 1979).

[11] Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy*, pp. 50–52.

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ministrators took several factors into account, a population-physician ratio dominated their calculus. They decided that an area would need to have more than 4,000 people per primary care physician to earn a designation as a primary-care shortage site. This ratio amounted to roughly twice the national average of population to primary care physicians. Adoption of this and related rules resulted in the announcement of just over 500 primary care shortage areas in late 1974.[12]

The publication of this initial list of shortage areas did, in the words of one HEW official, unleash "the start of a flow of requests for designation that has been continuous ever since."[13] It was legislative intervention by Congress in 1976, however, that fueled dramatic increases in area eligibility. The Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-484), an omnibus package that subsidized many types of training in the health professions, included provisions related to the corps. This new statute spoke in terms of "health manpower shortage areas" rather than areas of "critical" need. It permitted HEW to consider shortage designation for specific population groups—for example, American Indians—and certain public or private nonprofit facilities—prisons, community health centers—as well as geographic areas. The new law also opened up new avenues for shortage designation by urging the bureaucracy to go beyond physician-population ratios in assessing indicators of need. These and other adjustments increased the possibility that corps benefits could be spread to greater numbers of congressional districts.

Faced with this pressure, the bureaucracy abetted expansionist forces. The total number of primary care shortage areas soared from just over 500 in late 1974 to nearly 1,200 by September 1978 and to more than 1,900 by the end of 1980. The majority of states had more counties at least partially designated as primary care shortage areas in 1980 than in 1974.[14] In stoking this increase, HEW administrators abandoned their prior rule that a shortage area needed to have a population to primary care physician ratio of more than 4,000 to one. Instead they decided that a ratio of 3,500 to one should serve as the cut-off point, or even 3,000 to one if certain special circumstances existed, including "abnormally low utilization of health services."[15]

On the surface, then, the corps may be seen as another program that fell prey to pork barrel dynamics. Congressmen wanted the benefits available for their districts; bureaucrats wanted to see their program budgets grow. With an

[12] Different types of shortage areas exist—those for dentistry, podiatry, and so on. In the context of this article, however, shortage areas will refer exclusively to primary-care health personnel shortage sites. See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Progress and Problems in Improving the Availability of Primary Care Providers in Underserved Areas* (Washington, D.C.: HRD-77-135, 1978), p. 20; and *Federal Register* 39 (1974): 37756-59.

[13] Richard C. Lee, "History and Objectives of Shortage Area Designation," in U.S. Bureau of Health Manpower, *Proceedings of the Workshop on Health Manpower Shortage Areas* (Bethesda, Md.: DHEW No. HRA-77-51, 1977), pp. 49-50.

[14] *Federal Register* 39 (1974): 37756-59 and 43 (1978): 44758-96; *Health Resources News* 8 (1981): 2.

[15] *Federal Register* 43 (1978): 1589.

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increasing number of shortage areas, the risk that corps physicians would work in areas of less critical need, or perhaps very little need at all, also increased. The implications of this development for program effectiveness cannot be understood, however, without considering the impact of a shift in program goals.

Goal Evolution and its Sources

The relaxation of the hierarchy assumption meant that the bureaucracy possessed considerable discretion in determining whether the corps was to represent a human resources or a public service policy. Adoption of the former position meant that the corps would emphasize retaining corps physicians in private practice in rural shortage areas. Adherence to the latter implied a long-term commitment to having government physicians deliver care to those who faced various barriers, especially economic ones, to obtaining service.

Toward Public Medicine

The human resources perspective initially prevailed. During the first half of the 1970s, corps officials stressed that the program should revitalize the private sector in shortage areas and not provide government medicine on a continuing basis. This perspective markedly influenced early program decisions concerning placement. During the Nixon years, HEW preferred to place doctors in communities where the residents could afford to pay for their services. This preference for wealthier shortage areas undoubtedly reflected the appeal of cost savings in that corps physicians would spend less time providing free care. Yet this strategy also reflected a concern *not* to provide government medicine on a long-term basis in areas where market forces seemed incapable of attracting physicians to the private sector. It was reasonable that physicians would put down roots more readily in communities which had the money to pay them.

Revisions of the law in 1972 responded to this trend by including precise wording that the corps should make assignments to areas without regard to the ability of the residents to pay for health care. Despite this amendment, however, HEW officials persisted in encouraging corps doctors to set up private practices in shortage areas, and in this respect went out of their way to defer to the wishes of physicians concerning assignments. As HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger expressed it in 1974, ". . . due to the emphasis on retaining personnel in these areas, no personnel are forced to serve in a community not of their choice."[16] HEW administrators also attempted to rejuvenate the private sector by dispatching physicians to shortage areas in pairs. They reasoned that a physician would feel less professionally isolated if he or she could consult and share the corps experience with a colleague close at hand. Less professional isolation

[16] U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Health Manpower, 1974: Part 1* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 193.

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might in turn prompt corps physicians to give more thought to entering private practice in the area. Given these and other placement practices, it is not surprising that positions in remote rural areas often went unfilled.[17]

Whatever the merits of the human resources model, it began to give way to a public service model by the late 1970s. Interest in using the corps as a vehicle for placing physicians in private practice in shortage areas faded markedly. By 1978, a new corps director, Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan, asserted that the corps "never intended to produce private practitioners."[18] A new way of measuring retention was implemented: Rather than focusing on the number of corps physicians who subsequently entered private practice in shortage areas, the corps redefined retention to mean reenlistment in the corps after a physician's obligated period of service had ended.

Moreover, corps officials began to emphasize the placement of doctors at "integrated" sites, that is, sites where there were already various group practices funded by the Health Services Administration. "Independent," or freestanding practices, where corps physicians set up their own clinics to deliver care, fell out of favor. The proportion of corps doctors serving at integrated sites increased appreciably during the late 1970s so that by 1980, two-thirds of the corps's professionals worked at such projects, many of which were federally funded community health centers. Moreover, corps physicians were increasingly assigned to urban settings. Following the passage of 1976 legislative amendments, the percentage of placements in urban sites more than quadrupled. The director of the corps, Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan, projected that 40 percent of all placements would be in urban areas by the mid-1980s.[19]

Vague law did, then, facilitate a major goal change. Fundamentally, the program moved from fighting geographic barriers inhibiting medical care availability to fighting economic barriers. The integrated, federally supported projects in which corps physicians were increasingly placed had as their mission the treatment of the poor. The notion of sending corps doctors to rural areas where they would treat patients from all classes waned. What factors contributed to this shift in goals and the adjustments in placement strategy that it precipitated?

Sources of Goal Change

Even in the presence of vague laws, top elected officials can still figure prominently in shaping goal evolution. Consequently, the imperatives of the hierar-

[17] See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Progress and Problems*, p. 29.

[18] Cited in Lauren LeRoy and Mary Brown, "Major Issues Related to the National Health Service Corps and the National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program" (San Francisco: Health Services Policy Center, University of California, unpublished paper, 1979), p. 5.

[19] Fitzhugh Mullan, "The National Health Service Corps," *Public Health Reports* 94 (1979, Supplement), p. 6; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies Appropriations For 1981, Part 3* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 282. These data apply to all health professionals placed by the corps rather than just physicians.

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chy assumption can find partial fulfillment. In the case of the corps, however, top elected officials played a relatively minor role in the change of corps goals. Instead, the main driving force behind goal evolution appears to have been officials in the Health Services Administration.

The case of the corps indicates that the preferences of civil servants and the buffers they enjoy may play a major role in goal change. Specifically, the experience of the corps suggests that, other things being equal, the evolution of program goals becomes more likely if: the change yields a spillover reducing critical contingencies for other programs operated by the implementing agency; original goals proved very difficult for the agency to achieve and conflicted with the agency's ethos and the ideology of its top leadership; the program sits at the end of an expensive, vertically integrated policy network that takes years to traverse; and other programs in its policy space tend to overshadow it.

Evolution at times permits one program to solve the problems of another. The change in corps goals, for example, aided the Bureau of Community Health Services with the problems of personnel placement. Several programs sponsored by the bureau, especially its community health center initiative, faced difficulties in competing with the private sector for health care professionals. The centers suffered from a high rate of physician turnover and had to devote considerable staff time to recruiting new personnel.[20] By placing corps physicians in federally funded, integrated sites, officials in the Health Services Administration helped ameliorate this potentially crippling personnel problem for the bureau.

The difficulties administrators encountered by encouraging corps physicians to start private practices in shortage areas also promoted goal evolution. A General Accounting Office report indicated that through fiscal 1976 only about six percent of corps doctors had entered or planned to enter private practice in their assigned areas once their terms with the corps expired. The threat that retention statistics would prove to be a continual source of embarrassment spurred corps administrators to search for more obtainable objectives. With retention redefined to mean reenlistments in the corps, administrators could by the end of the 1970s point to a retention rate of over 50 percent.[21]

Agency ethos and the ideology of its leadership comprised a third bureaucratic factor resulting in change. The ethos of the Health Services Administration was based on delivering medical care to the poor or the socially disadvantaged. Moreover, the agency emphasized the provision of medical care in group practice settings as well as community involvement. Given these values, a program aimed at funneling physicians into private sector practice possessed little appeal, and many in the Health Services Administration viewed such practice as a kind of cottage industry. Then, too, officials understood that the

[20] Karen Davis and Cathy Schoen, *Health and the War on Poverty* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 197–98.

[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Progress and Problems*, p. 30.

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private-sector focus would almost inevitably inch the program toward delivering care to those who could afford to pay rather than the poor.

An agency's ethos can, of course, find room for expression in the sentiments of its top leadership. By the late 1970s, the corps acquired a director who represented its basic values. Fitzhugh Mullan, a career commissioned officer in the U.S. Public Health Service, had been a corps physician in the early years of the program. In his book, *White Coat, Clenched Fist: The Political Education of an American Physician*, Mullan described his early involvement in the civil rights movement while at the University of Chicago, his support for community control initiatives while on the staff of Lincoln Hospital in the South Bronx, and his general estrangement from conventional medicine. As he put it, "I have never felt comfortable with medicine as it is taught, organized, or practiced in the United States."[22] For Mullan, the corps and its scholarship program were not only important in their own right but were also seen as a means for transforming medical practice generally. Hence, Mullan intended that under the program, "a critical mass [of physicians] will be delivering care with a set of incentives and . . . training that differs markedly from those of traditional private medicine."[23] Such views helped trigger the goal evolution that occurred.

Certain buffers made it possible for Mullan and other administrators in the Health Services Administration to implement goal change. Goal evolution was facilitated by the corps' position at the end of a sequential network of programs that were expensive to maintain and required considerable time for the achievement of their assigned tasks. In order to cut back the corps, punitively or otherwise, Congress would first need to deal with the scholarship program and the powerful constituencies defending it. The scholarship program was vital to the corps in this respect because as money flowed into the program, the investment in the corps increased. Obtaining a return on this substantial investment would take time since a medical student receiving a scholarship and deferred for graduate residency training might wait as long as seven years before fulfilling his or her service obligation. This circumstance made it difficult for Congress to inflict rapid attacks on the corps budget if it grew dissatisfied with the program's performance. Where would scholarship students with a service obligation work if the corps budget were slashed? Accordingly, in 1981, President Reagan called for an increase in the corps budget largely to fund positions for scholarship recipients who had already incurred service obligations. Given these obligations, Reagan officials have projected that the corps will expand considerably during the 1980s even if Congress yields to the president's wishes and promptly terminates the scholarship program.

Finally, the corps' position as a small part of a large complex of health policies expedited goal transformation. Other programs with larger budgets,

[22] Fitzhugh Mullan, *White Coat, Clenched Fist: The Political Education of an American Physician* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1976), especially pp. x, 58, 97, 215.

[23] Fitzhugh Mullan, "Physicians for the Underserved," *Public Health Reports* 95 (1980): 7–8.

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such as Medicare and Medicaid, attracted more attention in Congress as well as with interest groups. It ought to be emphasized that the shift in goals did not spring from a need to curry favor with powerful external groups. On the contrary, the evolution risked alienating a group that corps officials had worked hard to woo—the American Medical Association (AMA). AMA officials preferred that the corps emphasize a private sector rejuvenation. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, the corps contracted with the AMA for assistance in recruiting doctors. The good will this generated, along with the association's more pressing concerns with Medicare and Medicaid, gave the corps more room in which to maneuver. In sum, the corps' position in a crowded policy arena allowed its administrators to pursue goal changes with less concern that the AMA or some other group would immediately notice and protest.

A bureaucratic explanation does much to foster understanding of the shift in corps goals. This is not to suggest, however, that the White House and Capitol Hill did not figure at all in goal change. The arrival of President Jimmy Carter provided a milieu more tolerant of "government medicine." Carter and his top officials at HEW frequently criticized private sector medical practice. While the president and his top advisors do not appear to have understood the programmatic implications of the Mullan appointment or otherwise instigated and directed the goal shift, they acquiesced to and often approved of the changes that occurred.

Congress also contributed to a climate more permissive of goal evolution. Amendments inserted in the Health Professions Educational Act of 1976 undoubtedly made it easier for the bureaucracy to place physicians in integrated sites in urban areas. Still, there is no evidence that many members of Congress envisioned the dramatic shift toward placing corps doctors in federally sponsored, integrated practices. It is important to note that the 1976 legislation also continued to pay homage to the old human resources model. The law required the Secretary of HEW to provide technical assistance to communities for retaining the services of corps physicians in private practice; it ordered studies of the type of doctor likely to remain in a shortage area; it authorized special grants for corps members who agreed to enter private practice in shortage areas. Hence, if Congress helped establish a more permissive milieu for goal change, it hardly prescribed this change. Therefore, the case does not meet the imperatives of the hierarchy assumption very strictly.

Benign Adaptation

Did the relaxation of the hierarchy assumption and the goal evolution that resulted produce benign, or creative, adaptation? That is, were there program changes that helped achieve goals broadly endorsed in the society without the violation of norms of political accountability or other popular values? It should be emphasized that benign adaptation need *not* equal program success. The issue is not whether, taken as a whole, the corps succeeded or failed; whether it should ever have been authorized or should now be terminated; or, indeed,

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whether the adaptation served the particular interests of the bureaucracy. Rather, the central concern of the "benign adaptation" concept is more circumscribed. It accepts the statute authorizing the program as a given and then attempts to gauge whether the implementing agency shapes the program so that it fosters the achievement of broadly supported social goals without doing serious damage to such widely accepted values as political accountability.

Limited data prevent definitive assessment of the corps. Certain evidence suggests, however, that the corps' evolution may well have been benign. First, the change probably fueled greater productivity among corps physicians. Second, the evolution may well have improved the targeting of program resources by directing them toward people with more acute health problems who faced serious barriers in obtaining care. Finally, the change did not feature a gross lack of respect for the law by the bureaucracy and an absence of accountability to elected officials.

Various data indicate that the corps suffered in terms of productivity during the early 1970s. For instance, the General Accounting Office reported that as of mid-1976, corps doctors who had practiced a year or more saw 1.9 patients per hour. By contrast, the average office-based, primary care physician in the nation as a whole saw 2.95 patients per hour. In nonmetropolitan areas, the figure rose to 3.85 patients per hour.[24] These data obviously represent crude measures of productivity, but whatever their limitations, it is worth noting that corps physicians placed at integrated sites tended to have more patient visits than those at freestanding locations. In 1979, the average productivity of all corps doctors reached 3,867 encounters per year. For the same period, physicians operating in freestanding locations mustered a rate of 3,222 encounters per year. With placements at integrated sites increasing, the overall productivity of the corps rose to more than 2.7 patients per hour in the same year. Corps physicians placed at integrated sites enjoyed more immediate access to an administrative support system and became part of an institution with a track record for providing care. Both factors helped assure a steadier flow of patients. Nevertheless, corps productivity may still be too low. Yet the shift in placement strategy that goal evolution featured may well have helped the program achieve a higher level of output per doctor than it would have otherwise.[25]

Goal modification may also have targeted greater attention on groups with acute health problems who faced barriers to obtaining care. So long as officials remained committed to using the corps as a vehicle for getting doctors into private practice in rural areas, the temptation to send physicians to higher income shortage areas and to encourage them to treat the more affluent persisted. Pork barrel pressures increased the likelihood that affluent locales without acute need of physicians would obtain shortage designations and become eligible for corps doctors. Little hard evidence exists, however, that those living in

[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Progress and Problems*, pp. 19, 25.

[25] U.S., House, Committee on Appropriations, *Appropriations for 1981*, pp. 138–40, 180–89, 229–30.

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rural areas with the means to pay for medical care suffer from inadequate access to it. They may have to spend more time driving to receive care; they may also be at a disadvantage in obtaining emergency services. Nevertheless, there is much to commend the view that living in low-density areas has offsetting health advantages and that "if American country dwellers suffer from their lower physician/population ratios it is primarily in terms of convenience, not of health."[26]

Thus, while residence in a rural area more distant from medical facilities does not appear to threaten health markedly, the link between poverty and health problems seems firm. On the whole, the poor experience more illness than the affluent and die earlier. They more readily assess their health status as fair or poor and suffer more limitations on their activity due to disease.[27] Moreover, such programs as Medicare and Medicaid have not eliminated all economic barriers to medical care for this group. The poor have undoubtedly achieved greater access to medical providers as a result of these programs, but substantial segments of the poor continue to be without any medical insurance whatsoever. Interview data from 1976 indicate that one-fifth of all persons in families with incomes of less than $3,000 had neither Medicaid coverage or some other form of health insurance. A similar proportion of individuals in the $3,000–$4,999 and $5,000–$6,999 categories were without coverage. By contrast, only four percent of the persons in families with incomes of $15,000 or more lacked any health insurance.[28] Even those covered by Medicaid or Medicare confront substantial limits on the benefits they can receive. Moreover, payment for treating Medicaid patients tends to be less than medical providers receive for serving private patients. As a result, many physicians have refused to participate in the program.[29]

The use of corps doctors to staff centers that primarily served the poor need not, then, be viewed as duplicating services that the poor could easily get elsewhere. Instead, the assignments helped weave another net that could catch the ample numbers of poor people who fell through the cracks in the health insurance system.

Finally, while the evolution of the corps featured relaxation of the hierarchy imperative, it did not appear to involve abandonment of that imperative. There is no evidence to suggest that the corps flagrantly broke the law or was grossly unaccountable. Statutory goals were vague, and the intent behind the legislation was subject to multiple interpretations. The corps capitalized on the discretion

[26] Victor Fuchs, *Who Shall Live?* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 70.

[27] U.S. Public Health Service, *Health of the Disadvantaged Chart Book* (Hyattsville, Md.: DHEW Pub. No. HRA-77-628, 1977), p. 21; and U.S. Public Health Service, *Health, United States, 1979* (Hyattsville, Md.: DHEW Pub. No. PHS-80-1232, 1979, Preliminary Copy), pp. 37–39.

[28] U.S. Public Health Service, *Health, United States, 1978* (Hyattsville, Md.: DHEW Pub. No. PHS-78-1232, 1978), p. 404.

[29] John Holahan, et al., "Paying for Physician Services under Medicare and Medicaid," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society* 57 (1979): 186.

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permitted by the statute, but it did not go beyond the law. Furthermore, the corps did not cloak its changes in secrecy. The president and Congress had access to pertinent, comprehensible information about the direction the program had taken. Top elected officials may not have directed the corps's goal evolution or anticipated it, but this does not mean that they strongly disapproved of it. Indeed, it is far from clear that even the more conservative Congress elected in 1980 will radically alter the corps's approach. At times, policymakers learn what they prefer after they see it implemented. Overall, the corps emerges as unaccountable only if one adopts the imperatives of a strict command and control model of policy implementation.

What of those who prefer private-sector rejuvenation to the direction the corps pursued? The evidence suggests that even had the corps remained committed to the human resources perspective, it could not have coaxed many doctors into opening private practices in poor, rural areas. Hence, it remains doubtful that the corps's evolution sacrificed any significant prospect for accomplishment of this goal. Definitive assessment of the corps must await the acquisition of additional data. On balance, however, the evidence available suggets that the corps's evolution possessed qualities of benign adaptation.

The Hierarchy Assumption Revised

If the corps suggests that vague policy and limited central direction can sometimes spawn the benign evolution of programs, this does not mean that creative adjustment and a relaxation of the hierarchy assumption invariably go hand-in-hand, nor does it condone abandonment of this assumption. Rather, it implies a need to probe the circumstances under which greater bureaucratic discretion in shaping goals and means during implementation contributes to benign change.

Students of implementation have already pointed out circumstances under which some relaxation of the hierarchy assumption may be appropriate.[30] For instance, vague statutes may be suitable when Congress cannot formulate a good underlying theory in drafting legislation and problems seem so pressing that something must be done, when "throwing money at the problem" may be the only hope. Then, too, highly detailed statutes may seem less fruitful when rapidly changing social and economic factors promise to threaten the validity of any precisely worded policy hypothesis. Important as these and other factors are, the case of the corps more readily emphasizes the significance of other variables.

First, benign adaptation in the face of limited central direction seems more likely when a widespread consensus exists within the implementing agency as to its fundamental mission, especially when this mission is not completely at odds with the general thrust of a program Congress had asked it to implement.

[30] See, for instance, Berman, "Designing Implementation."

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Without internal consensus, vague legislation tends to dissipate energy as civil servants fight one another over the proper definition of program goals. Benign adaptation also becomes less probable if the prevailing consensus in the agency runs strongly against the entire basis of a legislative initiative. Under this circumstance, sabotage or lethargic implementation more readily occurs. Neither condition applied in the case of the corps. Top officials in the Health Services Administration shared a strong commitment to delivering care to the disadvantaged through certain group practice models and viewed the vague statute as an opportunity to pursue their goals.

Those studying implementation who theorize about the proper mix of hierarchy and flexibility need to be sensitive to the culture of implementing agencies. This is no simple diagnostic task. Such students can seldom afford the luxury of sophisticated surveys. Nevertheless, past agency behavior, the values of the professionals who dominate it, and the manner in which the agency approaches current programs often provide clues. In considering the ways in which an implementing agency might bend a statute, analysts must guard against automatically viewing the bureaucracy as the potential enemy of congressional "intent"—as a source of goal deflection. Rather, they need to be sensitive to the potential for creative interplay between vague legislation and the agency's biases or processes which at times serve as felicitous vehicles for policy specification and the working out of program problems.

Second, unclear statutes and minimal oversight more readily foster benign adaptation if the bureaucracy faces an environment relatively free of pressures inimical to cost-effective implementation. The concern here is not group disapproval of a program, *per se*; groups may support major program goals but still try to extract a heavy price for their cooperation. Then, too, disapproval of the program need not translate into opposition. In this regard, the corps' experience suggests that being in the shadow of other programs or in a vertically integrated network may buffer administrators from potential opponents and purchase the discretion needed to make a program workable.

By contrast, where external groups apply pressure that threatens cost-effective implementation, program officials may benefit more from precise statutory authority and vigorous oversight. In the face of considerable opposition, administrators typically need every resource available. Their need for resources is particularly acute in the United States where public bureaucracies suffer from very limited prestige—a circumstance that makes such bureaucrats especially dependent upon outside groups for support. In the face of opposition, then, statutory provisions augmenting an implementing agency's power position as well as persistent oversight to keep a program on track become more important. If, for instance, Congress wants Medicare officials to resist domination by hospitals and doctors on payment issues, it needs to fortify the bureaucracy with precise statutory provisions and support civil servants when they bargain or skirmish with medical providers.

Implementation analysts who wish to recommend the proper dosage of hierarchy need to hone their skills in analyzing of the implementing agency's en-

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vironment. These skills clearly go beyond establishing an understanding of the groups likely to have a stake in the program along with an assessment of their resources. It also requires an examination of the factors that can inhibit these groups from acting on the basis of these attitudes. The programs that compete for a group's attention in a policy space deserve particular consideration here. Undoubtedly, such environmental analysis will remain an uncertain enterprise, but it is essential if the applicability of the hierarchy assumption is to be gauged.

Third, the relationship between benign adjustment and the hierarchy assumption cannot be isolated from the capacity of oversight actors. In this regard, certain conditions present in Congress during the 1970s raised questions about the capacity of that body. These conditions appear in the following proposition: Benign adjustment tends to be associated with a relaxed hierarchy assumption when legislative bodies feature fragmentation, casework, and propensity to blame the bureaucracy.

Fragmentation occurs when individual members of Congress seek personal clout which in turn scatters power to subcommittees. While fragmentation increases prospects that an individual legislator will occupy a position with considerable leverage, it means that coalitions within Congress increasingly need to be created on an issue-by-issue, person-by-person basis. This along with related barriers to assembling coalitions—for example, the declining strength of political parties—means that groups can turn to an increasing number of decision-making sites to get their particular interests inserted into the law. Hence, even when members of Congress firmly grasp the nature of a problem and the technology needed to ameliorate it, the marriage of policy clarity and plausibility is often difficult to arrange. The statutory sum of all the particular interests often fails to equal a coherent whole.

Of particular importance to geographically allocative policies like the corps is that the scattering of power may make it more difficult to forge multiple-program, as opposed to single-program, logrolls. Multiple-program coalitions derive from a willingness by members of Congress to support each other's most preferred program. Within each program, however, resources might still be allotted to areas of greatest need. Single-program coalitions by contrast depend on satisfying supporters within that program alone. Pressures to spread benefits very broadly result, and the threat of creaming increases, as less needy areas absorb disproportionate amounts of program resources.[31] Single-program logrolls heighten the risk that pork barrel dynamics will become more acute if Congress is central in defining area eligibility and distributing resources. In the case of the corps, pressure for the expansion of shortage areas appears to have come primarily from Congress.

Although less important to the corps, two other legislative tendencies deserve mention: casework and "blame-the-bureaucracy." Members of Congress have directed more and more attention to currying voter favor through casework.

[31] See Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy*, pp. 210–11.

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This involves the provision of a service to a constituent who requests personal help in dealing with a public program. A member of Congress might, for instance, help reverse an adverse agency ruling or speed up a bureaucratic decision. While casework possesses positive aspects, it often becomes a substitute for more serious efforts to remedy programs. Beyond this, Congress often takes credit for a program's success while making the bureaucracy absorb the costs of failure or unpopular measures.[32] No doubt the strain of negative sentiment toward the federal bureaucracy that permeates the country's political culture encourages members of Congress to behave in this way. Whatever the origins, it means that the thrust of much oversight activity is to undercut, blame, or ridicule the bureaucracy rather than to detect and correct error.

The shift in political climate that followed in the wake of the 1980 elections along with the growing sense of economic scarcity might alter the incentive structure in Congress so that it will resist behavior that weakens programs. Fragmentation could become less evident. Pressure to target on areas of more critical need could increase. But it remains far from clear that these developments will surface. Without such change, we must avoid any automatic assumption that a strong correlation exists between greater legislative involvement in implementation and the benign evolution of programs.

Analysts of implementation seeking to advise about the proper level of deference to the hierarchy assumption need, then, to look beyond the "bureaucracy problem." They also need to gauge the infirmities and strengths of oversight institutions. This may aid analysts in their search for program fixers—those actors or coalitions who carefully monitor a program, diagnose its problems, and correct them. Following Eugene Bardach's insightful study of a California assemblyman's role in fixing a mental health program, students of implementation have tended to see members of the legislative branch in this role.[33] If legislative dynamics like those described above exist, however, the search for fixers within this body becomes very difficult. The case of the corps suggests that managers in the implementing agency itself can become prime candidates for the role of fixer. In some instances it is more likely that these managers will play this role when top elected officials become less involved with a program.

This article represents only an initial step toward specifying contingencies under which relaxation of the hierarchy assumption encourages the creative use of bureaucratic discretion. If the case of the corps cannot generate a comprehensive theory, it at least warns that more accountable bureaucracies—in the sense of more directed control by elected officials—may at times be less cost-effective agencies. This is not to suggest that relaxation of the hierarchy assumption should be allowed to slip into abandonment of that assumption. Some level of accountability obviously must be maintained in a democratic society. Still, a

[32] See Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

[33] Bardach, *The Implementation Game*, pp. 9–35.

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value good in itself is not necessarily optimized when it is maximized.[34] At a time when the view that the federal government cannot make things work is prevalent, the possible benefits of bureaucratic discretion deserve greater recognition.*

[34] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper," *The Public Interest* 41 (1975): 37.

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From Colony to Territory: Changing Concepts of Statehood in Revolutionary America

PETER S. ONUF

The founding fathers are justly famed for their development of a new "science of politics." The federal constitution was the practical culmination of a long tradition of republican theorizing. It is misleading, however, to conceive of the development of constitutional thought as the progressive refinement of theoretical principles or political axioms whose basic configuration was apparent from the beginning of the imperial crisis. Americans did not immediately perceive, much less address, every theoretical issue raised by the split with the empire. At first, even the fundamental problem of federalism was ignored. Despite a burst of constitutional activity and debate in the states, little attention was paid to defining the states' relation to Congress or to each other. Yet if pragmatic Americans avoided gratuitous arguments about the location of sovereignty, they could not avoid dealing with claims disputes among the states. These conflicts revealed that Americans held different, potentially contradictory concepts of what a state was. If the union were to survive, the conflicts had to be resolved and these concepts had to be reconciled.[1]

[1] Douglass G. Adair, " 'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 20 (1957): 343-60; Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Jack N. Rakove, *The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress* (New York: Knopf, 1979). This theme is also developed in Peter S. Onuf, "State-Making in Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as a Case Study," *Journal of American History* 67 (1981): 797-815.

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Early American concepts of statehood were drawn from several sources. States as territorial entities were inherited from the colonial period; states as independent, self-governing communities were created by the revolutionaries; and states within a community of states existed by virtue of the recognition of other states. Because the original thirteen states defined themselves against British efforts to centralize authority during the imperial crisis, they set a high value on provincial autonomy as well as American independence. Patriot leaders asserted that the colonies had been "states" and that the American people had a right to establish new governments for them. Yet the difficulty of establishing state jurisdiction, pressure for the division of large states and the renegotiation of state boundaries, and the generally recognized need to create new states encouraged Americans to question these claims and to reexamine the scope of state power. By the mid-1780s, mutual recognition through Congress was central to American statehood claims. The new synthesis was apparent in congressional policy for the territories that were destined to become states and in the radical expansion of national power at the expense of the states in the federal constitution.

The Doctrine of State Succession

Every new regime faces difficulties in establishing the legitimacy of its claims.[2] Americans invoked the doctrine of state succession in order to minimize the shock of the transition to independent statehood. According to this doctrine, new state governments succeeded old colony governments in political communities or "states" that antedated the Revolution. Colonial jurisdictional claims set the limits of the new states; colonial laws—except for those identified with recent British encroachments on American constitutional rights—remained in force. There were problems with state succession theory, however. It ran counter to the popular belief that the revolutionaries had created "new" states based on new social contracts. The doctrine thus contributed to the conceptual confusion that impeded the consolidation of state authority. While state succession doctrine provided the firmest basis for upholding state claims, it also implied limitations to state autonomy. Like their colonial predecessors, the new states were to be part of a larger community and, therefore, subordinate to a higher authority.

During the imperial crisis, Americans argued that their colonies had enjoyed and should continue to enjoy considerable autonomy. At the same time, they were driven to deny the pretensions to full sovereign authority that Tory critics

[2] For a contemporary account of this problem in America, see John Jay to George Washington, 27 June 1786, in Jared Sparks, ed., *Correspondence of the Revolution: Being Letters of Eminent Men to George Washington*, 4 vols. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1853), vol. 4, pp. 134–36: the new states did not have "the aid of habit and hereditary respect; and being . . . the result of preceding tumult and confusion, do not immediately acquire stability or strength." For recent analyses, see James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), pp. 173–209, and Garry Wills, *Explaining America: The Federalist* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) pp. 24–33.

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imputed to them.[3] Patriots insisted that their claims were not imcompatible with the imperial connection or with loyalty to the crown. While asserting their autonomy in internal affairs, Americans said they acquiesced to British jurisdiction over external affairs, though by the later stages of the crisis they were careful to stress that this subordination depended on their own consent. John Adams claimed that "we have by our own express consent contracted to observe the Navigation Act, and by our implied consent, by long usage and uninterrupted acquiescence, have submitted to the other acts of trade . . ."[4] American writers suggested that allegiance to the same king bound the colonies to England and to each other. As Alexander Hamilton noted, "He it is that conjoins all these individual societies, into one great body politic. He it is, that is to preserve their mutual connexion and dependence, and make them all co-operate to one end the common good."[5] According to the historicist logic of republican theory, the ideal empire—autonomous communities linked together by a common king—already existed; the patriots meant only to preserve its "ancient constitution."[6]

The structure of the debate over the British constitution—which the British supposedly violated—compelled Americans to suppress state particularist claims and emphasize their rights as Englishmen. The cosmopolitan premises of patriotic rhetoric and the premium placed on intercolonial consensus led American writers to stress their common grievances rather than to explore the implications of the idea that each colony constituted a distinct, autonomous political community. Yet when the imperial crisis culminated in the disavowal of George III's authority, the concept of colonial "statehood" allowed colonial leaders to deny that independence constituted a fundamental break. As Thomas Jefferson later put it, the "nation of Virginia" and the laws it had made for itself remained unchanged by the Revolution.[7] Conservative revolutionaries naturally

[3] Radical claims reduced to the logical absurdity of "imperium in imperio," according to "Massachusettensis" (Daniel Leonard), "To the Inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay," 20 February 1775, reprinted in Bernard Mason, ed., *The American Colonial Crisis: The Daniel Leonard-John Adams Letters to the Press, 1774–1775* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[4] "Novanglus," 6 March 1775, in Mason, ed., *American Colonial Crisis*, p. 207.

[5] In *The Farmer Refuted* (New York, 1775), reprinted in Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, I (New York: Columbia University Press 1961), p. 98; Kettner, *American Citizenship*, pp. 158–72.

[6] H. Trevor Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1965). British writers emphasized the distinctness of the colonies more than the Americans did. See, for instance, Sir William Blackstone's assertion that the colonies "were no part of the mother country, but distinct, though dependent dominions," *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1765–69), vol. 1, p. 112. For a fuller discussion of this point see Peter Onuf, "Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands," *William and Mary Quarterly* 34 (1977): 353–74.

[7] In a letter to Edmund Randolph, 18 August 1799, reprinted in Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, eds., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 20 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Jefferson Memorial Foundation, 1903), vol. 10, pp. 126–28. The doctrine was adopted by the United States Supreme Court and passed into international law as the law of state succession. See, for instance, *U.S.* v. *Perchmen*, 7 Peters 61 (1834).

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were attracted to this idea as it meant that Americans had not returned to a "state of nature" when they declared their independence. Therefore, private property rights were not jeopardized.

Spokesmen for states with extensive charter claims were most enthusiastic about the doctrine of state succession. A state's territorial jurisdiction, guaranteeing the rights of its citizens, was inviolable. If colonial charters were not scrupulously observed, anarchy and confusion would break loose. According to Edmund Pendleton of Virginia, such jurisdiction was "the only criterion by which the territorial claims of each state can be ascertained."[8]

As long as American state boundaries were "given," the concept of "state succession" could be squared with the competing notion that the Revolution gave Americans the opportunity to create entirely "new" states. The most conservative revolutionaries recognized the need for mass mobilization of the sovereign people against British tyranny. But in their view, the people's "incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute governments" had to be expressed through the existing states.[9] According to this precept, the people of the individual colonies formed collective entities before the Revolution, and it was in the form of such communities that the people exercised their sovereign right to create new governments by drafting new constitutions. The drafting of new state constitutions thus represented the synthesis of two different concepts of statehood. Once a constitution was adopted by a pre-existing community occupying a determinate tract of territory, a binding obligation was created.[10] No town or county then had a "right totally to disengage itself from its constitutional connexions," according to an opponent of Maine separatism. Otherwise, "anarchy and confusion" would follow.[11] Nathan Dane argued that "a power so capable in its nature of being abused in America as that of dividing states, counties, towns, &c ought . . . only to be exercised by those who have a right to form the society *de novo*."[12] By rejecting the claim that the Revolution had thrown Americans into a state of nature and insisting on the geographical and jurisdictional continuity from colony to state, the power of the people was carefully circumscribed. They could renew their existing social contracts and create

[8] In a letter to Joseph Jones, 10 February 1781, reprinted in David John Mays, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734–1803*, 2 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967), vol. 2, p. 334.

[9] Letter printed in the *Falmouth Gazette* (Portland, Maine), 2 February 1786. That the states themselves were "given," see Richard Buel, Jr., "Democracy and the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference," *William and Mary Quarterly* 21 (1964): 165–90.

[10] The people of York, for example, were "parties to the Constitution of Massachusetts and could not, consistently therewith, appoint a delegation for the purpose of its destruction." See report of town meeting, *Falmouth Gazette*, 10 December 1785.

[11] "A Lad," *Falmouth Gazette*, 30 March 1786. "D. A.," writing in *Cumberland Gazette*, 25 May, charged that "Lad's" logic denied "the sovereignty of the people." For further discussion of this point, see Ronald M. Peters, *The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), pp. 65–114.

[12] Nathan Dane to Samuel Phillips, 20 January 1786, Nathan Dane Miscellaneous Manuscripts (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress).

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new governments, but they were not free to choose what state to join or to decide to establish new states.

The usefulness of the doctrine of state succession as a prop to state authority and barrier to schismatic movements was compromised by the fact that colonial charter claims overlapped and often came into conflict. As western Pennsylvania separatists suggested, "If all charter boundaries were to be strictly observed, nothing but anarchy and confusion must be the unavoidable consequence."[13] The major weakness of the charter claims was that they did not define the territorial limits of actual political communities. Controversial charter claims could not constitute an adequate basis for political obligation; the loyalties of settlers in contested frontier areas, for example, were soon discovered to be volatile at best.[14]

The struggle between large and small state blocs over the western lands as well as the attempts by separatists in several states to set up new states showed that the crucial synthesis of state succession claims and the revolutionary right to set up new governments was unstable without a general agreement on boundaries. Such an agreement could only be reached through negotiation and compromise. Implicit in this process was a definition of statehood that compensated for the defects in the other concepts: "Statehood" was conferred on a state by the other states because of its membership in the union, representation in Congress, and participation in the common cause. This concept of statehood was traceable to Congress's call for new governments in the colonies before independence; it was equally popular with small states that sought to curtail the powers of large states, and with large states that looked to Congress to uphold their claims. As Congress resolved in 1779, "One of the great objects of the union is the mutual protection and security" of state rights.[15] "The safety of the states" was, according to a proponent of a stronger central government, "the object of a political federal union."[16] The states collectively were to guarantee each state's

[13] Petition of Laurel Hill Inhabitants to Congress, read 27 January 1783, *Papers of the Continental Congress* (henceforth, *PCC*) (Washington, D.C.: National Archives), vol. 48, p. 251. States bounded by these charter lines would have assumed fantastic proportions. Connecticut, for instance, would be "60 miles wide, and 3000 miles long." See Benjamin Franklin's comments reprinted in Julian Boyd and Robert Taylor, eds., *The Susquehannah Company Papers*, 11 vols. (Wilkes-Barre, Pa. and Ithaca, N.Y.: Wyoming Historical and Geological Society and Cornell University Press, 1930–35 and 1962–71), vol. 2, p. 265.

[14] See Governor Richard Caswell of North Carolina to Governor John Sevier of Franklin, 23 February 1787, reprinted in William L. Saunders, Walter Clark, and Stephen B. Weeks, eds., *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina* (Raleigh, Winston, Goldsboro, and Charlotte, N.C., 1886–1914), vol. 20, pp. 617–19.

[15] On 24 September 1779. See Worthington C. Ford, ed., *The Journals of the Continental Congress* (henceforth *JCC*), 34 vols. (Washington, D.C.: 1904–37), vol. 15, pp. 1095–96.

[16] Quoted from "Tullius," in *Three Letters Addressed to the Public* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Bradford, 1783), p. 7. See also the Noah and Pelatiah Webster pamphlets originally published in 1787 and reprinted in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States* (Brooklyn, N.Y., privately printed, 1888), p. 46 and p. 127, respectively.

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particular claims. "The welfare, and even the existence of the American states depend on the federal union."[17]

Though recognition is by definition the basis of any state's international standing, mutual recognition among the United States worked to diminish their independence. The price of recognition was a radical diminution of each state's independence in relation to other states. According to one writer, "No individual state as such has any claim to independence. She is independent only in union with her sister states in Congress."[18] In theory, no American state could exist outside the union, though, in fact, Vermont did so for years.

The American states were all interested in securing territorial guarantees, but their disagreements over specific boundaries jeopardized their claims and encouraged them to rely more and more on Congress to sort out their jurisdictional pretensions and uphold them. The cessions policy of the geographically large, landed states suggested they recognized that titles based on charters could only be perfected if recognized by other states in Congress.[19] Opponents of charter claims had long argued for a congressional title in the West based on its supposed succession to crown claims or on the joint efforts of "all Americans in the War for Independence."[20] Separatists also challenged large state claims and called for congressional intervention on their behalf. Thus, all parties in the western lands controversy looked forward to congressional jurisdiction—whatever title claims Congress itself could advance—and accepted the notion that secure boundaries finally depended on mutual recognition through Congress.

The challenge was to work out compromises on controversial claims. Once there was agreement on state boundaries, Congress could exercise broader powers as, for instance, in enforcing territorial guarantees. The successful adjudication of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the Wyoming Valley in December 1782 and the completion of the Virginia western land cession fifteen months later encouraged Americans to believe that settled boundaries and peace among the states were at hand. Now was the time, Congress re-

[17] Item dated Boston, 19 July 1786, in *State Gazette of South Carolina* (Charleston), 24 August.

[18] "Nestor" in *American Herald* (Boston, Mass.), 19 June 1786, reprinted from *Independent Gazetteer* (Philadelphia, Pa.), 3 June. According to Rakove, neither Congress nor the states could claim constitutional priority: their claims were interdependent. See *Beginnings of National Politics*, pp. 49, 77-79, 81-82.

[19] Onuf, "Toward Federalism," pp. 353-74, and Onuf, "Sovereignty and Territory: Claims Conflict in the Old Northwest and the Origins of the American Federal Republic" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1973). The ceding states included New York (1782), Virginia (1784), Massachusetts (1785), Connecticut (1786), and North Carolina (1790).

[20] Franklin Assembly to Governor Alexander Martin of North Carolina, 22 March 1785, reprinted in Samuel Cole Williams, *History of the Lost State of Franklin* (New York: Press of the Pioneers, 1933), pp. 63-65. The "right of conquest" was the source of a collective U.S. title in the West, according to the Rhode Island delegates in a letter to Governor William Greene, 13 October 1782, reprinted in Edmund Cody Burnett, ed., *Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress* (henceforth *LMCC*), 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution 1921-36), vol. 6, p. 503. On the crown lands see, for instance, a petition from residents of Kentucky (1780?), *PCC* 48, 245.

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solved in April 1784, "when our confederacy . . . should assume its ultimate and permanent form."[21]

Calls for Congressional Action

Anxieties about inequalities among the states and the difficulty of actually governing large states provided the major impetus for change in American thinking about statehood. Boundary controversies revealed the inadequacy of traditional definitions and coincidentally led to demands for the expansion of congressional power. If boundaries were not fixed, government itself was impossible.

"The best political writers" were agreed that "Republics . . . should never desire an extended dominion, as it has always proved inconsistent with the preservation of their liberties."[22] Many Americans believed that the preservation of colonial boundaries and the resulting inequalities among the states was incompatible with a powerful union as well as with republican self-government. A Massachusetts writer recommended that "we . . . heave up all our lines that were fix'd by charters," and draw new ones "on generous principles." This would "enlarge our ideas . . . destroy animosities, and strengthen the interest of the Union."[23] According to new state proponents in western North Carolina, the proliferation of small, new western states would strengthen the "consolidated government of the United States."[24]

After the landed states had succeeded in forcing the first western land cessions —from New York in 1782 and Virginia in 1784—separatists became the leading promoters of state division. Their rejection of state authority and call for congressional action pointed toward the limited idea of statehood in the territorial government ordinances. The Franklinites in western North Carolina claimed the "privileges of American citizenship," thus suggesting the existence of a national political community.[25] Separatists in southwestern Virginia also invoked the "indefeasible right" of American citizens "to consult and provide for their proper interests," while pledging "a sacred regard for the principles of the continental union."[26] New state leaders sought to convince their followers (and

[21] 29 April 1784, *JCC*, vol. 26, p. 316. On *Connecticut* v. *Pennsylvania*, see Robert J. Taylor, "Trial at Trenton," *William and Mary Quarterly* 26 (1969), 521–47.

[22] *Freeman's Journal* (Philadelphia, Pa.), 5 June 1785. See the discussion in Cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government," in Jack P. Greene, ed., *The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, 1763–1789* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 527–66, particularly pp. 529–30.

[23] Copy of a letter from Massachusetts, *Falmouth Gazette*, 21 May 1785. A correspondent from New Hampshire, *Cumberland Gazette*, 25 May 1786, suggested that boundaries should be established according to "nature," that is, Maine should be annexed to New Hampshire and New Hampshire should cede "a line or two of townships on the southern border" to Massachusetts.

[24] Judge David Campbell to Governor Richard Caswell, 30 November 1786, reprinted in Williams, *Lost State of Franklin*, pp. 115–16.

[25] Memorial to Congress, read 13 January 1785, ibid., pp. 46–48.

[26] Association of Southwestern Virginians, accompanying petition to Congress (June 1785), *PCC* 48, p. 287.

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themselves) that Congress possessed the "power . . . to lay off a new state" where frontier areas clearly had "a different policy and different interest" from the rest of a state."[27]

Significantly, separatists attempted to justify themselves by citing congressional actions, including the 1780 resolutions calling for cessions and the creation of a national domain where new states would be founded and, most often, the 1784 territorial government ordinance. The Franklinites believed that the ordinance sanctioned their break with North Carolina. "The Continental Congress, by their resolves, invite us to do it," the Franklin convention claimed.[28] The 1784 ordinance was "a generous and beautiful compact . . . held out" to the inhabitants of southwestern Virginia so that they might escape the "aristocratical domination" of that state, according to Arthur Campbell.[29]

The underdevelopment of political community and legitimate authority in the old states encouraged separatists to set up their own governments. These new states, however, were even more desperately in need of recognition and legitimation. Separatists thus agreed that Congress would have to exercise an expanded jurisdiction in the West. "The western people" regard Congress "with reverence, as the faithful arbiters of the rights and interests of all the component parts of the [American] Empire." The Franklinites "appealed to Congress, as the dernier resort and mean to act under their authority." They conceded that their statehood claims were defective without Congress; their new state depended on the "paternal guardianship of Congress."[30]

Pressure for the creation of new states—reflecting the political aspirations of frontier populations—challenged state authority both directly and indirectly. Separatists helped reduce the large states to less threatening proportions. Sponsored separatism in Kentucky and the western land cessions were designed to preempt the kind of involuntary dismemberment that New York suffered in Vermont. Furthermore, the statehood claims advanced by new state proponents

[27] Laurel Hill petition, read 27 January 1783, ibid., p. 251.

[28] Committee report of second Franklin convention, Jonesborough, 14 December 1784, reprinted in Williams, *Lost State of Franklin*, pp. 39–40. See also report of August 1785 session of Franklin Assembly, *Freeman's Journal*, 4 January 1786, calling for a constitutional convention, and Franklin memorial to Congress, presented 16 May 1785, reprinted in Williams, *Lost State of Franklin*, pp. 82–83, which alludes to the "friendly disposition of Congress" to "new states."

[29] Address to the Western Inhabitants, forwarded with Charles Cummings to the President of Congress, 7 April 1785, *PCC*, vol. 48, p. 289. Maine separatists like "Impartialis Secundis," *Falmouth Gazette*, 9 July 1785, believed Congress would support a separation because of its "declared Sentiments concerning the ten new States."

[30] Frankland Justicative Memorial, *American Herald*, 2 and 9 January 1786; Extract of a letter from Virginia, dated Washington, D.C., 1 June 1785, *Pennsylvania Packet*, 3 October 1785. See also William Cocke to Benjamin Franklin, 15 June 1786, reprinted in Williams, *Lost State of Franklin*, p. 104, and "Impartialis Secundis," *Falmouth Gazette*, 11 June 1785. Separatists from Vermont to Franklin had to deal with popular prejudice for Congress and against the independent assumption of authority. See Ira Allen's complaint in his "Information," 11 May 1781, *Collections of the Vermont Historical Society*, 2 vols. (Montpelier, Vt., 1870–71), vol. 2, p. 122, and Arthur Campbell to Patrick Henry, 15 June 1785, in William Palmer, ed., *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, 11 vols. (Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1875–93), vol. 4, pp. 37–38.

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were much more modest than those of the original states. Separatists could not claim colonial antecedents—though it is revealing that Vermont and Maine separatists attempted to prove that their regions constituted distinct communities before the Revolution. Because they hoped to overturn old state claims, separatists were driven to argue for the crown's title to vacant lands, to which Congress was to have succeeded at independence.[31] New states could not claim a prescriptive right to a specific tract of territory based on colonial precedent. Therefore, they claimed that the original territorial right was located in a higher, supra-state authority, and that authority alone could grant territory to a new state. Separatists thus subordinated state claims to national claims and consequently defined statehood as an inferior, derivative status.

Separatists were not alone in advocating the division of large states. That the new American republics would have to be small, perhaps in some cases smaller than the colonies they succeeded, was generally agreed. It was "very natural," James Lovell of Massachusetts wrote, "to separate an extensive jurisdiction." "We have unquestionably more territory than we can govern," John Jay of New York conceded, with the rebellious northeastern counties (Vermont) in mind.[32] According to one observer, "the unwieldiness of many of our present governments in extent of territory" meant that separations "must sooner or later take place."[33]

If there was a consensus that some states were too large and that new states should be created on the northern and western frontiers, it was also generally agreed that frontier settlers could not be allowed to take the initiative. The "epidemic . . . spirit of making new states" was as dangerous to the union as the exaggerated claims of the large, landed states.[34] For, as a Cheshire County, New Hampshire convention warned, "If every district so disposed, may for themselves determine that they are not within the claim of the thirteen states . . . we may soon have ten hundred states, all free and independent."[35] "If Congress are not firm on that head," Jefferson thought, "our several states will crumble to atoms by the spirit of establishing every little canton into a separate state."[36]

[31] Vermonters claimed that a charter had been issued to Philip Skene to establish a new colony. See Hiland Hall, *The History of Vermont, from its Discovery to its Admission into the Union in 1791* (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell, 1868), pp. 195–96. A similar plan proposed for Maine, according to "Farmer," *Falmouth Gazette*, 23 July 1785.

[32] Lovell to Horatio Gates, 1 June 1779, *LMCC*, vol. 4, pp. 243–44; Jay to Governor George Clinton, 7 October 1779, reprinted in Hugh Hastings, ed., *The Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York* 10 vols. (New York: State of New York, 1899–1914), vol. 5, pp. 311–14.

[33] *Freeman's Journal*, 15 June 1785.

[34] Hugh Williamson to Governor Alexander Martin, 18 November 1782, *LMCC*, vol. 6, p. 545.

[35] Report of the committee, convention of towns in Cheshire County, 15 November 1780, *State Papers of New Hampshire*, 10 vols. (Concord, N.H., 1877), vol. 10, pp. 381–83. See also "Jonathan of the Valley," *Falmouth Gazette*, 12 November 1785.

[36] In a letter to Richard Henry Lee, 12 July 1785, reprinted in Julian Boyd, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 19 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), vol. 8, p. 287.

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Territorial Government Ordinances

Pressure for the creation of new states and concern for the security of the old states was synthesized with growing support for an enlarged congressional jurisdiction over the national domain in the territorial government ordinances. Jurisdictional controversies precipitated a new consensus about American statehood: states should be reasonably small and roughly equal in size; once reasonable boundaries had been fixed, they should be guaranteed against any threat, internal or external; the United States collectively should be empowered to secure state boundaries and to admit new states to the union. Congressional territorial policy reflected this conceptual development.

The territorial government ordinance of 23 April 1784 did not establish an elaborate system of congressional control over new western states.[37] As soon as settlers could act collectively they could, by adopting an existing state constitution for temporary use, enjoy the same degree of self-government as the original states. When their numbers increased to 20,000, they would be authorized by Congress to draft their own constitution. Finally, at the moment the new state's population equalled that of the smallest original state, it would be admitted to the union. Not surprisingly, separatists interpreted the ordinance as a call to political action. They identified their own new states with the new states Congress said it would sponsor. Yet the liberalism of the ordinance was entirely prospective for it could only apply to national territory, not to frontier settlements in the old states.

The most significant difference between the new states sought by separatists and the new states provided for by Congress was that Congress's new states were to be established before there was any settlement. The boundaries of the ten new states were predetermined. They did not describe the limits of existing political communities nor did they represent claims based either on colonial precedents or the political compromises that the original states were still working out with one another. These new states could not be plagued by the chronic territorial disputes that characterized relations among the old states. This also meant, however, that they would be nothing like the original states or even like the new states proposed by separatists. The states created by the territorial government ordinance had not always existed—they had no colonial antecedents—nor were they, like Vermont, truly self-created states. They were artificial creations, made by Congress for the benefit of the United States.

The overriding concern in American territorial policy was public revenue. A "state" came to be thought of as something altogether inert, something that

[37] *JCC*, vol. 26, pp. 274–79. See editorial note and resolution drafts, March 1 and 22, and April 23, in Boyd, ed., *Jefferson Papers*, vol. 6, pp. 599–615. I am indebted to Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial System," *William and Mary Quarterly* 29 (1972): 231–62. See also Arthur Bestor, "Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of Consensus," in John Porter Bloom, ed., *The American Territorial System* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1973), pp. 13–44.

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could be "sold."[38] Securely "connecting" the new states "with the union" was imperative if this public resource were not to be forfeited.[39] Revisions of territorial policy from 1784 to 1787 reflected these joint concerns. The boundaries prescribed by Jefferson and the other authors of the 1784 ordinance did not make much sense to later congressional committees or to westerners themselves.[40] It also became clear that more elaborate provisions would have to be made for the government of the territories in the preconstitutional phase. Each new state would have to go through a period when, as James Monroe wrote, it would "in effect . . . be under a colonial government similar to that which prevailed in these states previous to the revolution."[41] The development of new terminology was a belated recognition that "territories" were nothing like "states," even in the attenuated American sense.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was not a conservative betrayal of the 1784 ordinance. Later committees shared Jefferson's concern with preserving and extending the union of states, protecting private property, and securing public revenue. They also recognized the legitimizing function of republican self-government within constitutional limits. Congress did not abandon the liberal scheme of the 1784 ordinance; instead, it clarified and prepared to implement the policies it had earlier articulated. The debasement of statehood claims was apparent in the emergence of the new status of territory and the elaboration of congressional control in the pre-statehood period. This was already implicit in the 1784 ordinance whereby the progression from one stage of development to another was to be authorized by Congress, thus resolving any lingering ambiguity about the constitutional priority of states and the union. If as self-governing communities these new states resembled the old states, the scope of political action was radically limited for them in that private rights and the rights of the American public would be secured against the new legislatures. The new states were prohibited from interfering "with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States"[42] as well as from levying discriminatory taxation against national or nonresident property.

The artificiality and passivity of the new states to be organized in national territory stands in sharp contrast to the revolutionary seizure of power by the original thirteen states. Statehood for the original United States involved a rejection

[38] See Timothy Pickering to Elbridge Gerry, 1 March 1785, in Charles King, ed., *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, 6 vols. (New York: Putnam's, 1894–1900), vol. 1, pp. 72–3. According to Richard Henry Lee, writing to Washington, 15 July 1787, *LMCC*, vol. 8, p. 620, a new ordinance "seemed necessary, for the security of property among uninformed, and perhaps licentious people."

[39] 15 October 1783, *JCC*, vol. 25, pp. 693–94.

[40] Jefferson thought that the small size of the new states was crucial to the "happiness" of the westerners; in large states "we treat them as subjects, we govern them, and not they themselves." Jefferson to Monroe, 9 July 1786, in Boyd, ed., *Jefferson Papers*, vol. 10, pp. 112–13. But Monroe thought that the number of new states would have to be reduced and their boundaries enlarged if there were to be new states at all. Monroe to Jefferson, 19 January 1786, *LMCC*, vol. 8, pp. 285–86.

[41] In a letter to Jefferson, 11 May 1786, *LMCC*, vol 8, pp. 359–60.

[42] See n. 37.

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of higher authority and an assertion of autonomy and distinctness. The new western states would only come into being, however, by assimilation to higher authority, through recognition by the existing states, and by admission to the union. New state claims were premised on a rejection of particular colony–state claims and the consequent elevation of a congressional title to unlocated lands. A union that included these new political communities, as territories or states, was necessarily a different kind of union than that which bound the original states.

A Stronger Union

By 1787, the need to establish effective control over the states was generally recognized. The federal constitution was drafted in the aftermath of a nation-wide scare over a counterrevolutionary conspiracy among debtors, separatists, and the British, exacerbated by the hardening of sectional lines in American politics. William Grayson of Virginia hoped that the convention would define "in the most accurate manner the limits of the states" and provide "an adequate remedy" for separatism and domestic insurrection.[43] Though the convention inspired new proposals for the renegotiation of state boundaries, the only basis for acceptable reform was the ratification of jurisdictional agreements on general powers as well as specific boundaries that had been reached over the previous decade. Thus, Article IV, section III established Congress's right to admit new states, while prohibiting the division or junction of existing states "without the Consent of the Legislature of the State concerned as well as of Congress." The same section established Congress's jurisdiction in the territories whereas section IV guaranteed "to every State in the Union a Republican Form of Government."[44]

These constitutional provisions reflected a broad consensus for the expansion of congressional authority over jurisdictional issues. Landless states and separatists had always advocated congressional supremacy. By then most of the landed states had retreated from state succession to colonial charter claims, as they ceded their distant western claims and looked to Congress to secure the remainder. In turn, Congress was able to plan new states in the new national domain without challenging the territorial integrity of the existing states.

American concepts of statehood had also changed, and this change permitted a reconception of the union. The new states proposed in the territorial government ordinances reveal the dimensions of that change. The original states in-

[43] Grayson to Governor Randolph, 12 June 1787, *LMCC*, vol. 8, pp. 609–10. Edward Carrington thought there was no doubt that Britain was "in readiness to improve any advantages which our derangements may present for regaining her lost dominion," in a letter to Randolph, 8 December 1786, in Palmer, ed., *Virginia State Papers*, vol. 4, pp. 195–99. See also the discussion in William M. Wiecek, *The Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 11–72.

[44] James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1902*, 12 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1903–06), vol. 1, pp. 30–31.

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voked concepts, like the doctrine of state succession, that emphasized their distinct claims; they had written constitutions to legitimate the independent exercise of authority. Challenges to state jurisdiction, however, by other states and by separatists demonstrated the limitations of these ideas of statehood. Because state boundaries were in fact established through bilateral or multilateral agreements, mutual recognition became central to American statehood pretensions. As a result, Americans began to think of statehood in increasingly diminutive terms. The new states to be sponsored by Congress would be carved out of national territory within predetermined boundaries and with their public lands plighted to the United States. These states could claim none of the jurisdictional autonomy—specifically, control over their own territory—that the original states had claimed and that had led to so much controversy.

Americans were prepared to think of old states as well as new states in these modest terms. New sectional alignments in American politics had begun to replace the old divisions between landed and landless state blocs and between large and small states. The constitutional convention finally disposed of the issue of state size in the "Connecticut compromise" through which the states would be equally represented in the Senate. The convention delegates endorsed the principle of state equality, specifically with reference to future western states.[45] If new states were equal to the old states, old states would be equal to the new, and thus share in their diminutive character. Statehood defined in these terms was not only compatible with a stronger union: it demanded one.*

[45] Staughton Lynd, "The Compromise of 1787," reprinted in Lynd, *Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 185–213. See also speeches by George Mason, Hugh Williamson, James Madison, and Roger Sherman in *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), pp. 266–68, 272–74, and 288.

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Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana

NAOMI CHAZAN

Ethnic politics, despite severe vacillations in regime types and ideological predilections, have come to play an increasingly prominent role in Ghanaian politics since independence in 1957. The exacerbated political manifestations of ethnicity, so apparent in the 1970s, prompted one observer to comment that "of all the highly significant cleavages of modern Ghana (sub-region, age, class, income, education, and so forth) none is more salient than that of ethnicity."[1] At the same time, however, the ethnic composition of Ghana's seven regimes has varied. Control of state power has moved from southern Akan groups during the Nkrumah years; through a Ga-Ewe coalition under the National Liberation Council (NLC); the central Akan (Asante-Brong) alliance of Busia; the ethnically more balanced National Redemption Council (NRC)—Supreme Military Council (SMC) constellation; a minority agglomeration with disproportionate northern representation in the administration of the Third Republic; and finally to a heavily Ewe-based ruling clique in the Provisional National Council. The shifting ability to translate ethnic strength into political power requires further examination and explication. The purpose of this article is to come to grips with the dual phenomena of the intensification of ethnic politicization and the mutability of ethnic participation through a closer analysis of the main features of ethnic politics in the country.

Ethnicity has been put to manifold uses (and misuses) in the Ghanaian political context. Some writers have chosen to ignore or underrate the ethnic factor.[2]

[1] Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Purposive Depoliticization: The Public Policies of Two Ghanaian Military Regimes," *African Studies Association,* 21st Annual Meeting, November 1978, p. 1. Also see David R. and Audrey C. Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana* (New York: Elsevier, 1975), p. 223.

[2] Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 4.

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This purposeful neglect, however, overlooks very concrete identities recognizable as central organizing principles in Ghanaian social life.[3] The breakdown of principal ethnic groupings reflects these realities. The major Akan configuration (subdivided into Asante, Fante, Brong, Akim, Nzima, and other smaller units) constitutes 44.1 percent of the population. The Mole-Dagbani group comprises 15.9 percent, the Ewe 13.0 percent, the Ga-Adangbe 8.3 percent, the Guan 3.7 percent, the Gurma 3.5 percent, and other groups 11.4 percent.[4]

Some other political analysts have created an elaborate ethnic myth that links all gyrations on the political front to ethnic forces.[5] This recourse to ethnic explanations alone ignores the essential fluidity that is the foundation of solidarity in the country. Ethnicity is distinct from, yet overlaps, regional divisions. Similarly, socio-economic disparities between ethnic groups add a vital class component to ethnic determination.[6] The intermingling of geographic, cultural, developmental, and income variables in the definition of ethnicity belies the reduction of political explication to gross ethnic terms; it also underlines the possibility of alternating ethnic affinities in changing circumstances.

These pitfalls have led other scholars to deal more directly with the political repercussions of the complex ethnic patterns evident in the country. Two different approaches are current. The first, and until recently the most prevalent, has viewed ethnicity as potentially detrimental to national integration and has focused on discussions of managing ethnic conflict.[7] The second approach has contended that ethnic and state loyalties are not necessarily incompatible, that these frames of reference are mutually reinforcing and cannot easily be separated meaningfully in political terms.[8]

[3] Highlighted most convincingly in Fred Hayward, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana," *American Political Science Review* 70 (1976), p. 493.

[4] Based on Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Purposive Depoliticization," p. 2, derived from the Ghana Census of 1960.

[5] One of the most problematic examples may be found in Earl H. Phillips, "Ethnicity in Ghanaian Politics," *The South African Journal of African Affairs* 9 (1979): 14–21.

[6] A ranking of ethnic groups on a socio-economic scale, from Ga to the northern groups, may be found in R. E. McKown and David J. Finlay, "Ghana's Status Systems: Reflections on University and Society," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 11 (1976), p. 173. Kodwo Ewusi, "Disparities in Levels of Regional Development in Ghana," *Social Indicators Research* 3 (1976), p. 8, ranks regions in order of development: Accra, Central, Western, Eastern, Ashanti, Volta, Brong-Ahafo, Northern, and Upper.

[7] The problems of incorporation in general are dealt with in such works as Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., *From Tribe to Nation in Africa* (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1970) and P. Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). In Ghana this approach informed Smock and Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism.*

[8] I. M. Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 3 (1960): 129–39 is an early example. This has been repeatedly shown in the Ghanaian context. Otto Klineberg and Marissa Zavalloni, *Nationalism and Tribalism Among African Students* (Paris: UNESCO, 1969), p. 240; G. E. Hurd and J. J. Johnson, "Education and Social Mobility in

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While much of the literature emanating from this debate provides important insights into the subtleties of ethnic interactions in Ghana, it tends to use these elements as explanations for broader political processes. The analysis of this article diverges from many of these works in that it is concerned with comprehending the various manifestations of ethnic politics. Accordingly, it approaches ethnicity more as a descriptive concept and concentrates on uncovering reasons for changes in ethnic political patterns. From this perspective, ethnic solidarity is one of the elementary units of political and social action in Ghana. The malleability of political relationships between these groups and the state thus becomes the subject of more detailed scrutiny.[9]

Three key facets of the problem of ethnic politics in Ghana will be addressed. First, the conditions that have led to the pervasive politicization of ethnicity in recent years will be isolated. Second, the dynamics of political conflict will be investigated in order to map out the multiple ways ethnic politics and ethnic struggles have been played out. Finally, the palpable difficulties observable in the process of conversion of ethnicity into political power will be examined. Although the analysis will focus on the events of the years 1972–1979, reference will be made to the recurrence of patterns identifiable in the earlier years of independence. In light of this comparison, it will then be possibe to outline some practical and theoretical implications for future change.

The main contention of this brief exploration is that the rhythm of ethnic politics in Ghana is a function of state actions and of the fluctuations of state power.[10] The activation of ethnic sentiment, resistance, and dissent may be traced back to the composition, structure, policies, and performance record of various ruling coalitions at different points in time. It is not so much the existence of ethnicity that is important, but the politicization and alteration of ethnicity as a response to particular measures that must be stressed.[11] The intensity, scale, duration, and objectives of political interplays can be related to the propensity of successive regimes to employ exclusionary strategies and progressively coercive tactics. The appearance of inter-elite, communal, or mass

Ghana," *Sociology of Education* 60 (1967): 55–79; Fred Hayward, "Rural Attitudes and Expectations About National Government," *Rural Africana* 18 (1972), p. 47; and Naomi Chazan, "Political Culture and Socialization to Politics: A Ghanaian Case," *Review of Politics* 40 (1978), p. 16.

[9] This approach is adopted by R. Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 6 (1974): 457–85. Also see Jonathan Barker, "The Paradox of Development: Reflections on a Study of Local-Central Political Relations in Senegal," in Michael Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 47–63.

[10] This view is far from original and has been highlighted by many observers. For one comprehensive example see Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976). The new volume by Peter Osei-Kwame, *A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980) is also instructive.

[11] Smock and Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism,* pp. 1–6.

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forms of ethnic conflicts is thus largely attributable to the ability of governments to deal with specific requests articulated in ethnic terms.[12]

The gradual peripheralization of the ethnic locus of state power—its transfer from major ethnic groups to marginal ones—may therefore be seen not so much as the reflection of the numerical strength of certain groups, but rather as an outgrowth of the extent of their proximity, dependence, and commitment to their connection with the state. The ability to maximize the coincidences of class, ethnic, and local forces within a common movement when political transitions are popularly controlled—especially at the ballot box—relies on the continued viability of linkage structures to the state apparatus. These avenues of access to the state center have undergone considerable changes over the years, resulting in concomitant shifts in the ethnic constellation of political mobilization. Politicization of ethnicity and ethnic participation in politics are consequently separate, yet interrelated, processes. The former concerns reactions to events on the state level as they affect specific groups; the latter is a significant indication of the ongoing relevance of state power to local interests and concerns. These propositions will be examined and amplified below.

The Dynamics of Ethnic Politics: The Politicization of Ethnicity

The political awareness and sensitivity of ethnic groups in Ghana has been aroused, albeit in many different ways, by the varying modes of their incorporation by successive governments and the subsequent policies and accomplishments of these regimes.[13] The activation of the ethnic political framework around these issues can be demonstrated systematically during the Acheampong phase of military overrule.

When the NRC came to power in 1972, it constructed a center of political gravity based on a military-bureaucratic-chief alliance that intentionally bypassed mediatory structures of either a vertical or horizontal order. The depoliticization of cross-cutting political networks was effected through the banning of political activity by the ex-Progress Party and the ex-Convention People's Party (CPP) alike and the placement of severe limitations on the rights of political organization and dissent. The curtailment of ethnic avenues of access was carried out through an active campaign against any manifestations of ethnicity. The word tribe was banned from all documents "as a step to eliminate divisive and tribal forces which militate against national unity and progress."[14]

[12] These distinctions are based on D. G. Morrison and H. M. Stevenson, "Integration and Instability: Patterns of African Political Development," in *American Political Science Review* 66 (1972): 902-27.

[13] The awareness of political events has been repeatedly shown to be extremely high. See Hayward, "Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom," and Chazan, "Political Culture and Socialization to Politics."

[14] Government of Ghana, *NRC Two Years in Office* (Accra: Government Printer, 1974), pp. 57, 59.

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The NRC even advocated the elimination of tribal names as surnames (Asante, for example) and the cessation of the practice of ethnically distinctive facial marking.[15] At the same time, with remarkable acumen, I. K. Acheampong constructed the most ethnically balanced government in independent Ghana by creating regional commissioners with cabinet standing and by controlling foci of vertical political activity without appearing to jeopardize very real ethnic interests.[16] This neutralization of political linkage structures and the substitution of alternative military, bureaucratic, or chief-linked corporate allies fundamentally remodeled the structure and composition of ties to the regime at the onset of the NRC phase. The substitution of incorporation for representation provided the basis around which polity-society interchanges devleoped in the first stage of Acheampong's tenure.

In these circumstances the politicization of ethnic groups was initially kept to a minimum. The only significant outbreak of ethnic strife came from the Ewes in the Volta region. Ewe militancy was partly a carryover from the period of antagonism to Busia, and it revived the troubles of Ewe absorption into Ghana that dated back to the 1956 referendum. In part also, Acheampong's forceful rejection of Ewe aspirations and his problematic relations with Togo (with its concentration of Ewe) fueled Ewe displeasure. Constant admonitions against agitation notwithstanding, by 1973 it was clear that an Ewe-based secessionist movement was in an advanced stage of formation. Ewe unrest continued throughout the 1972–1975 phase and intensified in the latter years of Acheampong's rule.[17] Government, in turn, was adamant in suppressing the source and especially the ethnic aspect of discontent and claimed that it would hold out regardless of what it considered to be the activities of a few disgruntled individuals.[18]

The general quiescence engendered by the new political arrangement was short lived, however. A series of coup attempts and a succession of subversion trials, coupled with an unfounded self-confidence, led Acheampong in the fall of 1975 to change the structure of the NRC to a more coercive apparatus. The composition of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was confined to the commanders of the various branches of the armed forces. The effect of this move was not only to break the military-bureaucratic alliance of the original center of political gravity, but also to curtail the institutionalized cooptation of local political units and regional agglomerations. The net impact of this drastic measure was to create an enclosed and isolated ruling coalition, subject to the

[15] Government of Ghana, *Report of the First Conference of the National Redemption Charter* (Accra: Government Printer, 1975), p. 45.

[16] Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Purposive Depoliticization."

[17] Among other events, the Volta regional Commissioner was replaced and the Movement for the Liberation of Togoland established. Some details appeared in *West Africa* no. 2928 (27 July 1973). A more detailed account was given by Cameron Duodu, "Secession in Ghana?" *Africa* 34 (1974), pp. 14–15.

[18] Duodu, *ibid.*

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whims of a head of state who no longer maintained other than sporadic links with critical sections of the population.[19]

The highly centralized, self-encapsulated, and repressive SMC administration evoked almost immediate class and ethnic responses. The rapid proliferation of ethnic discontent came to include not only the Ewe, but also virtually all major Akan groups (Asante, Fante, Brong, Akim), the Ga, and some groups in the north. The center of opposition moved from the coast to Kumasi, which became the hotbed of anti-government opposition.[20] With few exceptions, almost all key groups reacted dramatically to the blockage of their direct and indirect access (via patron intermediaries) to the decision-making apparatus.

By its reconsolidation action, the SMC also exposed itself to substantive attacks on policy questions. These came to center around three major issues: problems of economic management and well-being; questions of inequitable distribution; and an overriding preoccupation with injustice, civil liberties and human rights. Topics that had heretofore been unfocused were now squarely related to the government itself and to its behavior. Regional discontent was highlighted in this way. The wealthier coastal and central regions were at odds with the military regime on policy matters, and demands from the more underdeveloped northern and upper regions grew as well.[21] Between 1975 and 1977, a pattern of regional discontent with policy came to the fore, often overlapping ethnically-rooted disaffection with opportunities for representation.

At this juncture, another form of ethnic solidarity politicization coalesced—that of local communal activation. Strata-local forces entered the political arena as it became apparent that the early gains of Acheampong's policy of national self-reliance and Operation Feed Yourself were ephemeral. The hopes of attaining self-sufficiency in food were quickly replaced by soaring prices, shortages in a wide array of basic commodities, infrastructural malfunctions, and growing economic disparities.[22] The lack of policy direction from the government triggered local encapsulation with the incidence and number of local political disputes growing at this time, and local institutions taking on new import. Not only did interest in local issues increase throughout the country, but renewed activity at this level was often a response to events at the state level. The

[19] This category is discussed in Naomi Chazan, "The Africanization of Political Change: Some Aspects of the Dynamics of Political Cultures in Ghana and Nigeria," *African Studies Review* 21 (1978), esp. pp. 28-9. Specific details may be found in Michel Prouzet, "Vue Politique et Institutions Publiques Ghanéennes," *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* 145 (1978): 51-85.

[20] Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Purposive Depoliticization," deals extensively with some of these costs, pp. 6-10.

[21] For some insights, see Fred Hayward, "Perceptions of Well-Being in Ghana: 1970 and 1975," *African Studies Review* 22 (1979): 109-26; and Donald Rothchild, "Comparative Public Demands and Expectation Patterns: The Ghana Experience," *African Studies Review* 22 (1979): 127-47. Another, more positive view is presented in Maxwell Owusu, "Economic Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Military: Ghana's National Redemption Council," *Africa Today* 22 (1975): 31-52.

[22] For one critical assessment, see Donald Rothchild, "Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972-1978," *Comparative Politics* 21 (1980): 459-79.

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stimulus of poor economic performance was thus critical to the politicization of ethnicity in a variety of settings.[23]

By 1977 ethnic forces had been mobilized against the SMC to protest exclusion from the core of state activities, to counteract diminishing benefits from government policies, and to oppose and seek compensation for the receding availability of resources. The gradual enlargement of the extent and the diversity of forms of ethnic dissidence paralleled growing dissatisfaction with regime activities in numerous spheres. A weak political center, actions by the government which may be construed as antagonistic to particular interests, and greater sectional animosities combined to underline ethnically based opposition at the time.

It is somewhat ironic, at least on the surface, that the most ethnically balanced government of Ghana since independence was also subjected to the greatest assault from ethnic quarters. Yet this coincidence drives home the degree to which ethnic discontent is linked not only to disapproval of government constructs, but more pertinently, to a government's inability to carry out tasks instrumental to economic development and distribution.[24] The intertwining of exclusion and malfeasance was particularly pronounced in Ghana under Acheampong's SMC.

Although the reasons for the proliferation of ethnic intrusions into politics in Acheampong's Ghana may easily be attributed to state-linked measures, the frameworks of these intrusions exhibited a remarkable diversity. Sometimes ethnic solidarity was expressed in cultural and linguistic terms.[25] At other times ethnicity was presented in regional or geographic terms.[26] And at still other points, ethnicity was manifested in local-communal—traditional political, territorial, or kin—terms.[27] These alternate definitions of ethnic solidarity reflected multiple criteria for the organization of vertical political structures. The fluidity of ethnic boundaries mirrored the shifting of peculiar structural

[23] In many instances, local communities acted as functional alternatives to the state. See Barbara Callaway, "National-Local Linkages in Ghana," *African Review* 4 (1974): 407–22. These findings are somewhat at odds with Dov Ronen, "Alternative Patterns of Integration in African States," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (1976): 577–96.

[24] Diddy R. M. Hitchings, "Towards Political Stability in Ghana: A Rejoinder to the Union Government Debate," *African Studies Review* 22 (1979): 171–76. Also in Fred Hayward, "Correlates of National Political Integration: The Case of Ghana," *Comparative Political Studies* 7 (1974):165–92. In general the instrumentality of local politics is stressed in Walter Barrows, "Comparative Grassroots Politics in Africa," *World Politics* 26 (1974):288–9.

[25] This interpretation is underlined in Smock and Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism*. Also see E. O. Apronti, "Language and National Integration in Ghana," *Présence Africaine* 81 (1972):162–69.

[26] Paul Andre Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana* (London: Longman, 1979).

[27] Most strongly stressed in John Dunn and A. F. Robertson, *Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Dennis Austin, "Introduction," in Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham, eds., *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966–1972* (London: Frank Cass, 1972), p. 10; and in Maxwell Owusu, *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

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forms, which in turn were affected by changing instrumental concerns. All possible ethnic-political presentations, either separately or in conjunction, could be brought to bear on the political situation depending on particular conditions.[28]

The governmental sources and fluid demonstrations of political ethnicity in the 1970s may be found in earlier phases of Ghanaian independence.[29] In each instance, government actions determined not only the intensity of ethnically based dissent, but also the ways in which this opposition was articulated. Even if ethnic politicization is largely a variously defined response to governmental challenges, the ability to pinpoint the impetus for and the structure of ethnic political mobilization provides few clues to an understanding of the dynamics of political exchanges and ethnic conflicts. How ethnic politics work and what forms such political activity takes requires a closer examination of the modes and manners of political confrontation.

Political Conflicts and the Uses of Ethnicity

The rhythm of ethnic political interchanges may be viewed as part of a process involving governmental challenge, response, reaction, and subsequent reformulation. Within this dynamic, possibilities for the creation of an expanding and escalating spiral of violence that moved from elite, to communal, to mass forms of political exposition were demonstrated all too painfully in the brief period of intense political activity between 1975 and 1978.

The first phase of political interactions between state and ethnic groups, following the consolidation of the SMC, lasted from 1975 to the beginning of 1977. The challenging of civilian exclusion coupled with waning economic fortunes wrought growing demands for policy changes. The objective of these demands, cast in class and ethnic terms, was to effect shifts in the goverment's uses and distribution of state power. The purveyors of these demands were mostly urban elites who, having heretofore been able to manipulate and benefit from government achievements, found their position directly affected by the reduced circumstances of state resources.

[28] Maxwell Owusu, "Policy Studies, Development, and Political Anthropology," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 13 (1975):375-76 makes an argument for the exclusive use of geographic community over kin or ethnic group. Joseph Kaufert, "Situational Ethnic Identity in Ghana," in John Paden, ed., *Values, Identities and National Integration* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1980), pp. 41-53, shows how definitions of ethnicity change under differing circumstances.

[29] Nkrumah's policies tended to arouse a good deal of local discontent: see Harriet Schiffer, "Local Administration and National Development: Fragmentation and Centralization in Ghana," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 4 (1970):57-76. Another specific example may be found in J. Bayo Adekson, "Army in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Nkrumah's Ghana," *Armed Forces and Society* 2 (1976): 251-72. Busia on the other hand fomented ethnic discontent. See Valerie Plave Bennett, "The 'Non-Politicians' Take Over," *Africa Report* 17 (1972):19-22. An excellent summary may be found in Smock and Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism*, pp. 227-39.

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Ethnic politics in such a context could best be called inter-elite conflict.[30] Elites of different ethnic origins rallied the support of other segments of their ethnic groupings in a smiliar situation not only to protest against measures perceived as detrimental to their well-being, but also to acquire gains at the expense of other similarly organized elites.[31]

The modes of conflict behavior were indicative of the selective nature of the demands and the narrow social foundations of the opposition to the state. The expression of malaise took the form, most notably, of petitions, increased public commentary and criticism charging government inaction, and the sporadic withholding of professional services. These were spearheaded mostly by student and professional associations, assuming the ethnic overtones of the Akar and the Forest region as demands persisted.

The reaction of the SMC in general, and Acheampong in particular, to the growing civilian unrest was almost immediate. Without the cushioning effect of mediating bodies, the impact of demands raised by non-formal political groupings tended to be more direct than those conveyed by overarching linkage associations. In response, the SMC chose a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, it continued to stress the negative ramifications of opposition, to call for national unity, and to apply coercive means to deal with its detractors. On the other hand, the Acheampong government felt so pressed that it began to announce its commitment to returning Ghana to civilian rule. The combined tactics of non-accession to specific requests, increased coercion, and a quest for legitimacy did not, however, mitigate the conflict. By October of 1976, when it became clear that public protestations were not modified, Acheampong, or as he preferred to be called, Kutu, proclaimed his intention of returning Ghana to civilian rule under the rubric of a "union government" (Unigov) concept.

Union government was, despite many efforts at refinement, essentially a hazy notion that sought to construct a democratically sanctioned non-party incorporation of major horizontal (class-linked) and vertical (ethnically based) groups, including the police and the military.[32] In January 1977, the SMC appointed a committee chaired by Justice Koranteng-Addow for the purpose of investigating options for return to civilian rule and specifically, to collect views on the Unigov concept.

Almost from its beginning, the Unigov proposal backfired. It supplied the opposition movement with what it lacked before: a common, immediate focus for dissent. The announcement of the Unigov formula therefore signalled the end of elite political conflict and ushered in a second, much more volatile, period of communal confrontation that lasted from early 1977 to the spring of 1978.

[30] Morrison and Stevenson, "Integration and Instability." Also Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration: A Radical Approach," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 5 (1967), esp. p. 5.

[31] Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians*, p. 251, correlates education and ethnicity.

[32] For details see Maxwell Owusu, "Politics Without Parties: Reflections on the Union Government Debate," *African Studies Review* 22 (1979):89–108.

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The challenge of Unigov triggered a widespread demand for change in the structure and composition of the military coalition. An attempt to change government policies thus became an all-out effort to bring about a more basic change in regime with the objective of taking over state power.

The attempt to change the nature of the regime became a focal point for broad mobilization. Patron intermediaries who had been excluded from the military regime saw in the opening up of public debate an opportunity to reassert their position. The type of organization rested on the cooptation of support of increasingly wider ethnic circles at the conjuncture of the formal and non-formal polities. In class terms, students and academics, professionals and businessmen, church organizations and traders, cocoa producers and individual trade unions were coopted by the Unigov opposition.[33] In ethnic terms, the Akan, Ga, and Ewe discontent coalesced, and the regions in which these groups were located became foci of anti-government activity. Northern and Western elements mostly stood by the SMC, however, as did certain sections of the Volta region, the Dagomba, and small ethnic groups in the Upper region.

Thus a more encompassing, communally based pattern of conflict with deep roots in the countryside began to take shape. From January to July 1977 civil disorder spread as anti-Unigov sentiment ran high. Further discontent was fueled by the SMC's unwillingness to give opponents of Unigov a fair hearing.[34] The unrest peaked in May 1977 when students rioted against the government and demanded Acheampong's immediate resignation. In June the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies put out a call for a nation-wide strike if the government did not step down in favor of a transitional administration by July 1. With no response from the SMC, the country was effectively immobilized in the summer of 1977.

The flurry of activity accompanying the strike action forced the SMC to publish a detailed timetable for return to civilian rule. This phased, two-year, transition schedule—which envisioned a series of plebiscites leading to a hand-over in 1979—fell far short of the opposition's demand for immediate withdrawal and underlined the regime's recalcitrance.

The second round of communal confrontation preceded the referendum on the form of civilian rule—commonly referred to as the Unigov referendum—that took place on 30 March 1978.[35] The lines of conflict were clearly drawn between pro- and anti-Unigov forces. The former was centered around the SMC-sponsored Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council and the National Charter Committees, and found a disproportionate amount of support among ex-CPP

[33] The peculiar position of traders is developed well by Keith Hart, "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11 (1973):61-91 and idem, "Swindler or Public Benefactor? The Entrepreneur in His Community," in Jack Goody, ed., *Changing Social Structure in Ghana* (London: International Africa Institute, 1975), pp. 1-35.

[34] Confirmed in interviews held in Accra, July 1977, with the late Colonel Roger Felli (formerly Commissioner For Foreign Affairs) and the late Major General Odarfey-Wellington of the SMC.

[35] Details may be found in Naomi Chazan and Victor LeVine, "Politics in a 'Non-Political' System: The March 30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana," *African Studies Review* 22 (1979):177-207.

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hardliners, northern and western regions, and non-Akan ethnic groups. The anti-Unigov Forces collected around the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice and the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship, led by ex-Progress Party politicians and having widespread Akan and coastal support.

The pattern of conflict preceding the Unigov referendum was intense and unremitting. Thuggery, organized violence, arrests, beatings, and inter-ethnic clashes were commonplace. At times it was difficult to distinguish the extent to which ethnic violence was directed at the government from the degree to which it was simply inter-ethnic violence. The acrimony of the conflict was attributable in no small measure to the conduct of the SMC, which resorted to intimidation, harrassment, and at one stage, open brutality to curtail Unigov opposition.

The referendum was held in this highly charged atmosphere. There is little doubt today that Acheampong manipulated the returns. Even so, he could barely muster a 55 percent majority in favor of Unigov, with Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, the Eastern, and in all probability the Volta regions voting strongly against the government's proposal.

The results of the Unigov referendum underscored both the extent of communal discontent and the constraints placed on dissidents confronted with an intransigent regime. Following the referendum, Acheampong ruthlessly rounded up Unigov opponents and curtailed even the most minor signs of discontent. Civilian disobedience reached new heights, and the country simply ground to a standstill.

A third phase of fragmentation and disintegration ensued wherein elite demands for policy changes and communal requests for a new regime persisted. In addition, a mass-based and rejectionist strand of conflict surfaced which took three distinct forms. In some instances, displaced ethnic patrons simply escaped the country. In other cases these ethnic intermediaries engineered a withdrawal from the state and a reassertion of local modes of self-reliance divorced from dependence on the state or its leadership.[36] The quest for alternatives focused on the local-political community that in various presentations became the center for renewed power struggles, new types of participation, and the expansion of leadership networks.[37] The ascendance of local politics and the contingency of national political affairs on local interests constituted a concrete expression of an effort to alter the definition of the political community.[38] A third variant of rejectionist strategies centered on an urban and populist de-

[36] This pattern of intermittent contact was apparent in previous periods. See Martin Staniland, *The Lions of Dagbon* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 171; Dunn and Robertson, *Dependence and Opportunity*, p. 273.

[37] Yakubu Saaka, *Local Government and Political Change in Northern Ghana* (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1980), p. 109; Martin Staniland, "The Manipulation of Tradition: 'Politics' in Northern Ghana," *Journal of Development Studies* 2 (1973):373–89; Tom Boyd, "Value Orientations Influencing Decision-Making in Rural Communities: An Exploratory Study," *Development and Change* 3 (1971/72):41–59.

[38] Callaway, "National-Local Linkages"; Austin, "Introduction," in Austin and Luckham, eds., *Politicians and Soldiers*, pp. 1–15.

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mand for a redrawing of political norms, a redefinition of the rules of the political game, and the elimination of the patronage structure of politics.

This alienation from the political community due to disagreement with the premises on which it was founded threatened the validity of the existing system. These rejectionist forces, all in some way a questioning of state power, were placed well beyond the purview of government influence.[39] They guided the highly heterogeneous social bases of political action operative in Ghana at the close of Acheampong's years in office.

Government obduracy during the latter part of the 1970s defined the pattern of political exchanges and their consequent reverberations. Acheampong's exclusionary tactics spurred initial unrest. His refusal to deal with specific requests fostered generalized discontent. This in turn precipitated the government's utilization of increasingly coercive measures and eventually resulted in a loss of control over political events in the country. The aims of opposition groups shifted accordingly; from demands for alterations in the uses of state power, objectives came to be defined in terms of a demand to assume state power. Eventually state power itself—its viability and its modalities—became the core issue of political debate.

As the intensity of conflict grew, the bases of political interaction expanded from inter-elite, to communal, to mass constellations.[40] A widening circle of individuals and groups were included in the political orbit. With no compromise on key subjects, a cycle of violence evolved which assumed more extreme forms as time progressed. Political conflicts changed orientation and direction in relation to government conduct. On this basis it is possible to discern a ladder of political interactions containing different ethnic presentations at each rung.

The uses of ethnicity at each stage followed the overall patterns of political conflict. Ethnicity in inter-elite conflict was among several instruments for the aggregation of protest. At the communal level, ethnicity became an indispensable means for political mobilization. As political disaffection set in, ethnicity took on new functions: In the withdrawal rejectionist scheme, varied definitions of ethnicity became the framework through which disengagement strategies were implemented. In the more populist mode of rejection, ethnic politics became itself the object of discontent.

The emphasis on ethnic matters and the predominance of ethnicity in each phase of political confrontation therefore varied. Most notably, as political considerations shifted from challenging the structure of state power to querying its validity and as local interests began to displace national ones, the preoccupation with harnessing ethnic identity was replaced by an overriding concern with utility and instrumentality.[41] Local disputes, factional alignments, and contests over resource allocations in more enclosed areas received particular attention at the

[39] There was a good deal of animosity directed at chiefs at the time: see Samuel Essien, "The Role of Chiefs Under the Military Regime," *Afriscope* 6 (1976):22–23.

[40] This progression was highlighted in ethnic terms, but not exclusively so.

[41] Barrows, "Grassroots Politics," pp. 284–5.

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ethnically defined community level.[42] In the same vein, methods of counteracting the failures of the political community were far more significant in populist action than strictly ethnic interests, although these were far from entirely absent.[43]

By the end of Acheampong's rule, it was difficult—if not impossible—to speak of the politics of ethnicity without reference to broader patterns of political conflict, or to deal with ethnicity, even in the most fluid sense, apart from other widely prevalent cleavages. The salience of ethnicity in each phase of political conflict and the uses to which ethnicity was put depended upon situational factors, predominant principles of social organization,[44] historical experiences, symbolic referents, and dominant modes and items of production—all of which varied in accordance with the scale, intensity, and precise geographical setting of political struggles.[45]

In a very real sense, then, ethnic dynamics interlocked with other considerations, resulting in the emergence of a diversified pattern of differentiated ethnicity. Within this broad array could be found groups that were fragmented, often working at cross-purposes, and basically unequal. The schisms that accompanied national disintegration fomented not only generalized political unrest, but also a high degree of ethnic, sectional, regional, and local communal distance.[46] By the summer of 1978, Ghana was in a state of political and economic disarray. All the various strands of political conflict were evident on the Ghanaian political scene at this juncture. Their objectives and the roles played by ethnicity provide important insights into the relationship between ethnicity and power during the critical year of political reordering that followed Acheampong's ouster.

Ethnicity, Participation, and the Transfer of Power

Between July 1978 and September 1979 Ghana underwent three changes in government. The turnovers followed the options left open upon the demise of

[42] Previous periods are covered superbly in David Brown, "Local Politics and Local-Centre Linkages in Ghana," *IDS Bulletin* 10 (1979):8-12; and Ken Kwaku, "Tradition, Colonialism and Politics in Rural Ghana," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 10 (1976):71-86.

[43] This point is stressed by Richard Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 182-3. Also see Keith Hart, "The Politics of Unemployment in Ghana," *African Affairs* 75 (1976):494-5.

[44] McKown and Finlay, "Ghana's Status System," p. 177, claimed that as possibilities for mobility were circumscribed, ethnic and class differences became more pronounced.

[45] The more urban aspects of these conflicts are covered well in Victor A. Olorunsola, *Societal Reconstruction in Two African States* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977), esp. pp. 168-280. A more limited view is presented in Claude Welch, "The Right of Association in Ghana and Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16 (1978):639-56.

[46] Robert Price, "The Pattern of Ethnicity in Ghana: A Research Note," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11 (1974):470-75, sets out a social distance scale for Ghanaian bureaucrats, highlighting Ewe alienation. Similar results are found in Roberta Mapp, "Cross National Dimensions of Ethnocentrism," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 6 (1972):73-95.

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SMC I: a military takeover, a populist revolt, and elections for a return to civilian rule. First, fragments of the military under General F.W. Akuffo—in an exhibition of inter-elite conflict—interceded to restore a modicum of order and, not coincidentally, to reinstate the image of the military.[47] This second SMC set in motion, albeit somewhat reluctantly, the process of return to civilian rule through multi-party electoral competition. Akuffo convened a Constituent Assembly, lifted the ban on party activity, and sought to accommodate the requests of politicians in the hope of gaining a reprieve once civilians took over.

The Akuffo interregnum also attempted to come to grips with the economic chaos of Acheampong's legacy. By imposing a particularly severe austerity program, however, the caretaker government generated a new wave of discontent highlighted by a series of strikes in the spring of 1979.[48] The country was again plunged into disorder, this time in the midst of an election campaign aimed at establishing a new, democratically elected coalition.

On 4 June 1979, two weeks prior to the scheduled election, a second option left open at the close of Acheampong's rule (that related to elite-mass conflict) was realized as Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, at the head of a hastily assembled Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), gave vent to popular frustration by perpetrating a reformist coup.[49] Rawlings's intervention, so sadly underresearched, focused initially on the eradication of the SMC power structure. Not only were the main officers of the former military governments summarily executed, but other military and civilian personnel were called to account and tried by popular tribunals. Severe sentences were imposed on those found guilty by the special courts. Lines of military authority were shattered, the senior civil service apparatus was dismantled, and the state corporation mechanism was shaken.[50] AFRC activities also centered on an effort to restore probity and stressed the centrality of moral accountability. A campaign against those manipulating the political and economic situation to further personal interests—particularly smugglers, hoarders, and black marketeers—was conducted with vigor.[51]

The effects of efforts at exposing official malfeasance and at the same time strengthening the hands of ad hoc citizens units were not, however, as clear-cut as Rawlings and his cohorts would have liked. First, although the moralistic

[47] Kwame Abaka Pobee, "Ghana in Catharsis," *Legon Observer* 10 (13 October 1978), p. 79.

[48] Most notable were student strikes. At one stage in May 1978 dozens of professional and worker associations were on strike.

[49] For background, see Emmanual Hansen and Paul Collins, "The Army, the State, and the 'Rawlings Revolution' in Ghana," *African Affairs* 79 (1980):3-23. Another excellent piece is Cameron Duodu, "The Rawlings Story," *Statesman*, 15 June 1979.

[50] These actions were protected under the transitional provisions appended to the constitution: *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* (Accra: Government Printer, 1979), esp. pp. 168-77. Some of the ramifications are described in Jon Kraus, "The Political Economy of Conflict in Ghana," *Africa Report* 25 (1980):9-16. A controversy is currently brewing on the subject and has been detailed at length in *West Africa*, June-September 1981.

[51] The razing of the Makola market in Accra was one of most notable of these anti-*Kalabule* activities.

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reformism of Rawlings himself is unquestionable, in order to carry out his call for public accountability he was forced to strike out against its grossest offenders. This meant a structural upheaval undermining the authority of the few institutions that were still in some kind of working order. The unintended structural changes of the moral revolution, perhaps a by-product of the need to destroy the system in order to resurrect it, left the country without substitutes or replacements for the structures that the Rawlings forces had so systematically shaken. Second, since the AFRC rejected not only the manner in which certain institutions functioned, but also the people who benefited from these institutions, it was almost inevitable that actions taken during this time would severely strain existing inter-group relations. The AFRC specifically fueled class antagonisms, supported worker and student rallies against elite exploitation, and highlighted class awareness. Simultaneously, these activities stimulated a middle-class backlash that had heretofore been averted. Class cleavages were also accompanied by ethnic ones. The AFRC was perceived as having a disproportionate representation of Ga and Ewe; Rawlings himself was an Ewe.[52] Akan, and specifically Asante, reaction to AFRC moves was often interpreted in ethnic terms and therefore further fueled ethnic cleavages. Finally, the AFRC legacy was problematic in that through its assertion of popular supervision, it sacrificed what minimal control it had. The systematic diffusion of governmental powers—particularly of arms—generated a lack of order that could not easily be remedied.

In the midst of the AFRC housecleaning turmoil, elections were held to return to civilian rule. The relatively free elections scarcely two weeks after the Rawlings intervention picked up on a third option left open by Acheampong: that the disintegration of the country would endure until the scheduled transition laid down by Acheampong himself. It would have been difficult to predict that this possibility would become a reality after a military intervention and a populist upheaval. That it did is a credit not only to Rawlings himself, but also to the centrality of civil rights that had become so much a part of Ghanaian politics in the previous decade.

The general elections of 1979, much as other popularly controlled transitions in the past (especially the elections of 1956 and 1969), were cast in the mold of communal confrontation and furnish a unique opportunity to examine in greater depth the relationship between ethnicity in its manifold presentations and power in contemporary Ghana. For this reason, the process of conversion of ethnic politicization into political power at this point deserves some detailed analysis.

Of the nearly two dozen parties launched after the ban on political activity was lifted, six survived to enter the 18 June 1979 elections. The People's National Party (PNP) was constructed on the old CPP organization, with a careful superimposition of a new guard of young men. The moving force behind the establishment of the PNP was Imoru Egala, a northerner who had bankrolled

[52] Kraus, "The Political Economy of Conflict."

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CPP activities since 1966. The party candidate for president, Dr. Hilla Limann, was a Sissala from the Upper region and Egala's nephew. Behind the PNP could be found a series of wealthy patrons, trade union heads, Muslim leaders, farmers, students, clerks, and urban poor. The ethnic composition of the party was heterogeneous—the vice-presidential candidate, J. W. de Graft Johnson, for example, was Akan—with strong bases in the north and the west. Most PNP activists, though not all, had supported Acheampong, the Unigov concept, Akuffo, and Rawlings.

The Popular Front Party (PFP) was the self-proclaimed successor of the Progress Party (PP). Its founder and presidential candidate, Victor Owusu, and other activists had all been ministers in the Second Republic. The vice-presidential contender, Alhaji Yacubu Tali, was an aristocratic northerner who had also participated in the PP administration. The PFP's roots were strongest among professionals and academics, and it drew heavily on Asante and Brong support.[53] Its leaders had been vocal in the anti-Unigov campaign.

The United National Convention (UNC) was essentially a mirror of the PFP socially, but diverged from it ethnically. Its leadership—Paa Willie Ofori-Atta and A. A. Afrifa—rejected the Asante-Brong oligopoly concentrated in the PFP, and formed a Ga-Ewe alliance with certain Akan (Akim, Asante, Fante) representation.

Other parties tended to be more localized in composition and scope. The Action Congress Party (ACP), headed by Frank Bernasko, was a Fante creation.[54] The Social Democratic Front (SDF), ostensibly a trade union party, put forward Dr. Ibrahim Mahama, a leading member of the Andani gate of Yendi (a branch of the royal family), as its presidential aspirant, and revealed itself as a localized, northern rooted configuration. Dr. Johnny Bilson's Third Force Party, which failed to win even one seat, lacked a strong horizontal or vertical base in Ghanaian society.

The key social characteristics of the new parties were a third-decade update of political alliances formed in the years since independence.[55] The composition of these units was marked by the reemergence of recognized politicians of the past. Parties came to typify the intensification of ethnic cleavages wrought by the Acheampong years. Personal differences and animosities, much more than in the past, occupied a central position in the political arrangements of 1979. Finally and most notably, there was little to distinguish the social composition of each party's leadership: all were patron-intermediaries capable of capitalizing on local and ethnic connections. Thus, while the sources of support for the parties differed, their activist core was remarkably alike.[56]

[53] Interviews with PFP leader B. J. daRocha, Accra, 1980.

[54] Bernasko was ex-commissioner of Agriculture under the NRC. The main non-Fante supporter of the ACP was the poet Kofi Awonoor.

[55] These configurations were not, however, a complete throwback to alliances of yesteryear. The grand Akan alliance of 1969 was shattered. The ACP and SDF were new forces. Perhaps the strongest similarities dated back to some characteristics of the 1956 elections. See Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[56] Some of these points were raised in an editorial in *Legon Observer* 11 (19 January 1979), p. 26.

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TABLE 1

Results of Parliamentary Elections, 1979

	Central	Greater Accra	Eastern	Ashanti	Brong Ahafo	Volta	North	Upper	Western	Total
PNP	8	6	11	2	2	11	7	15	9	71
PFP	–	1	6	19	10	–	4	1	1	42
UNC	–	3	4	1	–	5	–	–	–	13
ACP	7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	10
SDF	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	3
TFP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
Ind.	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1

Source: Richard Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1979," p. 40; *Legon Observer*, 13 July 1979, p. 220.

The significance of the social roots of party alignment was magnified by the blurring of ideological differences among the parties. To be sure, the PNP did take up the ideological mantle of Nkrumaism, and the PFP reasserted Busia's commitment to capitalism, liberalism, and free enterprise. But when translated into specifics these discrepancies were not readily apparent. The list of objectives of all parties enumerated similar grievances and harped incessantly and in a surprisingly similar manner on themes of economic rehabilitation, civil rights, national unity, and the need for inspiring leadership.[57]

Differences did emerge in the image of parties and the style of leadership projected during the campaign. The PNP surfaced as much more organizationally adroit, more efficient, and pragmatic than the lackluster and aloof PFP network. These outward presentations do not, however, obscure the fundamentally listless and lethargic nature of party confrontation preceding the June ballot. In the midst of protest and fragmentation, the major parties cooperated with each other to a remarkable degree in petitioning Akuffo and later Rawlings. At times they were indistinguishable. While party mobilization and tactics followed a well-versed routine, the campaign itself stood in stark contrast to the emotional fires played out elsewhere.

Given the limitations on the range of choice presented to the electorate, success at the polls hinged, all the more forcefully, on the ability of the respective parties to muster communal backing and to maximize ethnic support.[58] In this struggle, the PNP came out on top, securing 71 of the 140 parliamentary seats (see Table 1). Hilla Limann, the PNP presidential candidate, running together with the vice-presidential candidate Professor J. W. Graft-Johnson, polled 35.51 percent of the presidential vote, as opposed to the Owusu-Yacubu Tali

[57] These comments made on the basis of a comparison of the manifestoes of the PNP, PFP, SDF, ACP, and TFP, were all circulated in Ghana in the spring of 1979.

[58] The elections exhibited a marked similarity in the structure of conflict to the communal conflict phase during the Unigov struggle of 1978.

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slate (29.66 percent). In the second round, held on July 4, Limann beat Owusu 61.98 to 38.02 percent.[59]

The returns suggest some initial trends that are significant in understanding the nature of the results. First, the PNP's victory was a countrywide one: it gained seats in every one of the nine regions.[60] The PFP won seats in seven regions, the UNC in four, and the ACP in two regions; the SDF seats were limited to the northern region alone. Secondly, with only minor exceptions, parliamentary and presidential votes followed the same pattern. Finally, the outcome of the elections appeared to follow a communal/ethnic pattern, which could be gleaned from the analyses of the sources of support for the main parties. The PFP ran strongly in the core Akan areas of Ashanti and Brong and picked up votes in the north and east as well. The UNC victory, with the exception of Afrifa (who was later executed by the AFRC) was confined to Ewe, Ga, and Akim areas. The ACP made a dent only in Fante regions. And the PNP's strong showing in the west, the upper and northern regions, and in the Volta area facilitated its final victory. The ethnic factor apparently was the critical variable in explaining the outcome.

If the ethnic factor was indeed so powerful, however, the PNP victory is all the more perplexing, considering the PNP's Muslim background, the northern configuration of its leadership, and its limited quantitative base in comparison to the numerical superiority of the Akan core of the PFP alliance. It is therefore necessary to go beyond crude ethnic explanations to achieve a better understanding of the significance of the returns.

The PNP victory was rooted in three interrelated factors. First and most obviously, the PFP–UNC split tilted the balance in favor of the PNP. In many areas, the UNC conducted the PFP campaign for the PNP victors by discrediting PFP candidates and their qualifications. More significantly, by providing an alternative slate which reflected similar ideas, the UNC became a PFP spoiler in many constituencies. If the total presidential vote for Owusu and Ofori-Atta were combined, then the class and ethnic groups they represented pooled 47.12 percent to Limann's 35.51 percent. The extent of popular support for this combination was therefore not reflected in the final tallies. The internal party fragmentation thus militated against the replication of the grand Akan ethnic alliance that had facilitated Busia's rise to power in 1969.[61]

The PNP, confronting a multiplicity of competing groups with strong local foundations, did do better than other parties, however. A second reason for its triumph lay in the success of both its presidential and parliamentary candidates in offering refreshing, new and young choices alongside those of veteran politi-

[59] Provisions for a second round were made in the Presidential Elections (Amendment) Decree, 1979, which followed up on the SMCD 228 (26 March 1979) Presidential Elections Decree.

[60] Richard Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1979," *African Affairs* 69 (1980), p. 403. See also Donald Rothchild and E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Ghana's Return to Civilian Rule," *Africa Today* 28 (1981), p. 12.

[61] Emily Card and Barbara Callaway, "Ghanaian Politics: The Elections and After," *Africa Report* 15 (1970):10–15, and Smock and Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism*, p. 244.

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cians. The attraction of the young men, particularly in the north, to the PNP made the party a representative of youth, mobility, and change. It is important to note that the party that succeeded in embodying these concepts in the past was always victorious. In 1956 it was Nkrumah's coastal CPP; in 1969 Busia's central Akan Progress Party fulfilled this role; and in 1979 the PNP's northern young men understood this concept well.[62]

A third factor in the PNP victory was the party's capacity to maximize combinations of class, ethnic, and local factors in different areas. By presenting different admixtures of images to local collectivities, the PNP capitalized on essentially multi-faceted local interests. Indeed, PNP heterogeneity mirrored a sensitivity to the fundamentally local roots of Ghanaian political choice. Precisely because it could appear in varying lights in different areas, the PNP succeeded better than the PFP, which counted too much on a uniform Akan presentation lacking flexibility in local and class terms.[63]

This skill of the PNP was especially pronounced in its ability to distinguish the differences between ethnic, territorial, and communal local organizing principles in the various constituencies. Thus, in the crucial eastern region, which the PNP won, the party played on the centrality of the local community as the focus of politics. In the Volta region it understood the crucial cultural component of ethnicity there almost better than UNC politicos. And in the factionalized Northern and Upper portions regionalism—with religious overtones—was stressed. Despite the strength of the PNP win in the north, the margin of victory there was less striking than in the eastern, western, and Volta regions. Thus, although the PNP leadership did highlight the northern factor, and its victory there was pivotal, its provision of different class, ethnic, and local faces to different constituencies made it more heterogeneous, more variegated, and ultimately a more truly national party than its competitors.[64]

These complex and subtle variables at work in the campaign highlight several significant features of the PNP's victory and, more generally, of politics in Ghana. In a free election in Ghana, the party most adroit at maneuvering the multiple social forces will most likely win. There, too, politicians most adept at disassociating themselves from the past are better able to attract a broad range of followers. Third, a form of two-party system is emerging in Ghana, but this system is at best variable in the social forces it contains and excludes.[65] Indeed,

[62] Jeffries stresses this conclusion in "The Ghanaian Elections," p. 212. For more information on the young men in the north, consult Saaka, *Local Government and Political Change*, esp. pp. 117–18. In the 1969 elections this pattern was highlighted in John Dunn, "Politics in Asunafo," in Austin and Luckham, eds., *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, p. 203.

[63] Again, Jeffries highlights this observation in "The Ghanaian Elections," pp. 412–13.

[64] The critical uses of this technique of voter mobilization has repeatedly been stressed in the past. For the 1969 elections see Yaw Twumasi, "The 1969 Elections," in Austin and Luckham, eds., *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, pp. 140–63. For the 1956 elections see Austin, *Politics in Ghana*.

[65] Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections," overdoes this point, pp. 412–13. A more interesting perspective is provided in Hitchings, "Towards Political Stability in Ghana." The similarities between the 1979 ballot and the 1956 pre-independence elections in terms of the fragmentation and uncer-

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vote-getting power lies not in long-range historical stances, but rather in an immediate and changing capacity to project universal versus parochial interests at any given time. Thus, while the PP in 1969 outdid the NAL in its claim of broader vision, the PNP overcame the PFP with a similar claim in 1979. Finally, it would be a gross oversimplification to impute success at the ballot box to ethnic solidarity rather than to more complex, interlocking local and class considerations.[66] The rise to power of the northern element in 1979 was not a reflection of ethnic strength but of the ability of the PNP to discern the differentiated nature of social configurations in specific locales and to capitalize upon its political uses through skillful manipulation.[67] The conversion of ethnicity into political power was therefore moderated by the capacity to identify and utilize varying ethnic presentations throughout the country.

The factors involved in this fairly straightforward explication for the northward movement of the locus of political power are necessary in comprehending the outcome of the elections. They cannot suffice, however, since they do not reveal why the PNP's ability to muster local support was superior to that of its opponents. To tackle this question one must return to the context of conflict and to the tempo of political change that enveloped Ghana at the time of the 1979 ballot.

Seven years of military rule wreaked considerable havoc in the linkage structures that had adhered individual Ghanaians, via select mediators, to the state nexus. As the rejectionist pattern of political conflict confirmed, these delicate mechanisms were severely undermined under Acheampong's quixotic guidance. Disgust with the malpractices of the government, coupled with the lack of maintaining contact with the state, rendered confidence in government—indeed, in any government—difficult. The electoral contest did not occur in a vacuum separate from other political processes.

Dislocations were particularly apparent in the relatively advantaged regions of the forest and the coast. Expectations of government in these areas were high, and the failure to measure up to demands caused particular dissatisfaction in these portions of the country. In the more removed north, expectations were far more limited and easier to meet successfully. Acheampong placed particular stress on regional redistribution in his constructive earlier phase, and more attention was devoted directly to northern needs and concerns. The SMC

tainty of the period emerge constantly. For an interesting perspective on factionalism under Nkrumah, see Kwame Ninsin, "Reflections on Socialism and Participation in Ghana," mimeo (12 July 1979), Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon.

[66] Again, Jeffries in "The Ghanaian Elections" is insistent on this point. This is hardly a departure from past patterns. The Islamic factor here was of some importance, although this facet of the campaign must still be studied with some care.

[67] For an interesting comparison on the need to manipulate sectional alliances see Richard Joseph, "The Ethnic Trap: Notes on the Nigerian Campaign and Elections, 1978–1979" appearing in *Issue*, nos. 1/2 (1981).

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was therefore able to "satisfice" northern requirements better than those of other regions.[68]

These disbursements to the north were rewarded by the perpetuation of northern contact with and support for SMC initiatives in the second half of Acheampong's term of office. Voters in the northern and upper regions backed the Unigov proposal overwhelmingly, as did the electorate in the western region. Support elsewhere, where evident, was far more conditional. In the same vein, northern and western leaders backed Akuffo's economic regimen and were quick to express support for Rawlings's housecleaning operations. In short, the western and northern extremities maintained the most consistent (though not entirely unequivocal) attachments to the state; meanwhile, their counterparts in the center of the country were either deadlocked in opposition or had withdrawn from its vagaries.

When it was clear that a change in government was unavoidable, a distinct advantage accrued to elements that diverged from, but nevertheless had allied themselves with, the outgoing government. In the 1979 election, the north and the western regions accomplished this. In 1969 the core Akan regions of Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo fit this criterion as well.[69] Those who had been at odds with and pointedly excluded from the sources of state power prior to these elections were unable to gain office even when some free choice was offered.

The ability of the groups closest to the power apparatus to utilize their position for subsequent political gain was facilitated by changes that took place in the structure of the patronage network. During the 1970s, economic constraints and the diminution of state resources brought about alterations in patron–client relations in many sections of Ghana. The fragility of patronage was most acute in areas that suffered the most tangible reduction in standards of living. Many northern patrons, however, flourished since they successfully expanded their local power and resource base—particularly land—at the same time as they managed to funnel goods and services from the state to their home communities.[70]

Shifting patronage links had an important bearing on the PNP victory of June 1979. First, in crucial constituencies, the PNP could and did attract disaffected voters away from established patrons to PNP-backed alternatives. This accounts for the significant PNP gains in the swing Eastern and Volta regions.[71]

[68] This is dealt with in Rothchild, "Comparative Public Demand and Expectation Patterns," from which the term satisfice is culled.

[69] Although this point has not been sufficiently stressed in the 1969 literature, the PP's edge at that time could easily be associated with the NLC's anti-CPP campaign, and their nurturing of Busia prior to the elections. The significance of the CPP's position prior to the 1956 elections in the outcome of the elections has been underlined frequently.

[70] Indications of the significance of the acceleration of the process of rural class formation are discussed in Kwame Ninsin, "Land Rights and Ghana's Social and Constitutional Development," 4 December 1980, Department of Political Science Seminar, University of Ghana, Legon.

[71] These were regions that supposedly were equivocal on Unigov in the 1978 referendum. For a

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Second, the PNP profited indirectly from the propensity of patrons with strong local bases to encourage self-encapsulation and withdrawal strategies: In cases where local self-reliance techniques had been accelerated during the latter part of the 1970s, there was little need for interaction and consequently less concern with the outcome of the election.[72] And, third, the PNP benefited from the generally low participation rate in the election.[73] Partly, these abstentions may be attributed to the confusion engendered by the Rawlings intercession. More pertinently, there was a conscious abstention by a majority of the electorate. This absenteeism was not a function of indifference, but rather, constituted a knowing disengagement from the political scene at the state level. Indeed, "unremitting demands for the introduction or restoration of liberal and limited government in many African countries appear to reflect the rejection of authoritarianism by bourgeois classes that [were] steadily consolidating their power."[74] Many Ghanaians, by withholding their votes, seemed to be voicing a rejection of this middle class hegemony against which Rawlings, too, was protesting. Politicization generally was hence not tantamount to participation.

The outcome of the 1979 elections cannot be considered apart from the political and economic environment in which they took place. The relevance of state power to local interests, and hence of the elections to ongoing events, was not self-evident. Where it was, it was not merely a function of the manipulation of ethnicity or of strata-local forces. More significant were the degree of dependence, proximity, and adherence of specific groups to the state. Since such attachments relied on positive experiences with state interactions via the good offices of patrons, those people who were mostly concentrated in the PNP and had been able to employ state contacts to enhance their local standing were able to capitalize on this record at the polls.[75]

The results of the election points to a threefold pattern of power peripheralization. For the first time in Ghanaian history, northern elements held

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strong statement on shifting patronage ties at elections see Maxwell Owusu, "Politics in Swedru," in Austin and Luckham, eds., *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana*, p. 239. For another view see Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientilism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," *American Political Science Review* 66 (1972):483-517.

[72] For background see Brown, "Local Politics and Local-Centre Linkage," p. 12; Staniland, *The Lions of Dagbon*, p. 171; and Barbara J. Callaway, "Transitional Local Politics," *African Studies Review* 15 (1972):403-12.

[73] Officially participation was listed at 35-36 percent. Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections," estimates this at 67 percent, closer to the 1969 turnout. This estimation is highly exaggerated. What is significant is that absolute participation in 1979 was a quarter of a million *less* than in the 1978 referendum, a further indication of the degree of disillusion.

[74] Richard L. Sklar, "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (1979), p. 552.

[75] Richard Rathbone, "Ghana," in John Dunn, ed., *West African States* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 35. Similar conclusions are reached by Dennis Austin, *Ghana Observed: Essays on the Politics of a West African Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), pp. 3-8.

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sway at the state level. Second, the elections marked the consolidation and retrenchment of middle class politics in the country. Third, the boundaries of the political community of Ghana had receded. The power base taken on 24 September 1979 by the leaders of the Third Republic was smaller in size, scope, impact, and social range than that of the preceding regimes. As the apex of the political pyramid in Ghana became more pointed, the base became more fragmented.

These findings need not, however, overshadow the significance in Ghanaian political history of the inauguration of the Third Republic. It heralded the passing of the most arbitrary and capricious phase of Ghanaian politics since independence and crowned the popular agitation of preceding years with a tangible reward. It also underlined the national flavor of Ghanaian political competition, even if this overarching constellation was mitigated by sobering limitations. In effect then, Ghana was about to embark, albeit from a much more precarious starting point, on a new effort to fuse a meaningful political order.

The Third Republic, however, was short-lived. Not only did its weak underpinnings hamper its ability to manipulate the political and social environment, but its efforts at national rehabilitation frequently missed the mark. The regime's approach to economic reconstruction was cautious and unimaginative. Piecemeal agricultural policies, coupled with a haphazard effort to attract foreign loans, left the economy rudderless. Economic performance was further set back by widespread corruption in ruling circles. These difficulties were compounded by the fractious tendencies that emerged within the PNP, and by Limann's mishandling of civil–military relations. The ex-President orchestrated a campaign against Jerry Rawlings and the leading Ewe members of the AFRC, fueling Ewe discontent to new heights. The fragility of the regime, its ineffectiveness, its lack of vision, and its northern bias rendered it open to growing criticism from diverse quarters.

On 31 December 1981 Jerry Rawlings once again effected a military coup. The new Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) announced its intention to overhaul the political machinery of Ghanaian society and to institute a social revolution. To this end, the PNDC sought to embrace popular participation through People's Defence Committees and Citizen's Vetting Commissions. Moreover, a real attempt has been made to expand the structure of the ruling coalition to incorporate non-Ewes and civilians. Despite these efforts, the second Rawlings administration has not been able to stem the tide of disaffection, rejection, and ethnic self-encapsulation. The reins of power have been maintained by force. In response elites have continued their squabbles (with Akan-Ewe cleavages peaking); linkage networks have consolidated communal antagonism; and the bulk of the population has withdrawn into its ethnic shell.

The second populist experiment in Ghanaian politics merely reaffirms, at this juncture, the fragility of state power and the limitations placed on its wielders in the midst of the breakdown of the state. The manifestation of ethnicity as an object of revolutionary action and as a framework for detachment from the state nexus highlights its essential elasticity. The contradictions emanating from

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these diverse presentations furnish a further obstacle in the revision of the state apparatus in Ghana.

Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana: Some Implications

This article has attempted to relate the rhythm of ethnic politics in Ghana to more generalized patterns of politicization, conflict, and political participation. Ethnicity in various forms seems to be a critical manifestation, but hardly as a direct cause of these broader occurrences. Viewed from this perspective, both the exacerbation of ethnic differences as well as shifts in the ethnic distribution of state control can be seen as interconnected outcomes of the same complex process that related the struggle for political power to an overwhelming preoccupation with economic and social well-being.[76]

Politics, political economy, and allegiance to the political community are intertwined through the mechanism of ethnic politics. According to one analyst, "Integration is then about identity and organization, consciousness and action, including a range of relationships between a sense of difference and the state or political whole. These possible integrative relationships are highly various."[77] Ethnicity, in one sense a reaction to state power, itself becomes a challenge to this hegemony when it constitutes a substitute framework for political action and thereby assumes an existence autonomous of the state domain.

This admittedly exaggerated attempt to perceive the flow of ethnic politics in Ghana as a function of state actions and the variability of the relevance of state power implies several possibilities for the future of Ghana. Most immediately, the fragile ethnic base of Ghanaian government underlines the need for ethnic sensitivity in the apportionment of resources and the distribution of services, lest already disgruntled ethnic groups become even further disaffected.[78] In the long range, policies designed to deal with ethnic competition must take into account a more complicated set of factors than heretofore assumed: On the one hand, as many observers have stressed, an appropriate formula for the management of ethnic politicization should be devised. This requires, as is generally conceded, the creation of structural provisions for ethnic representation and subsequently for greater accommodation on a continuous basis.[79] Around these structures it might be possible to generate cohesive values and norms alongside more localized symbolic referents.[80] On the other hand, if ethnic politics is an

[76] Victor T. LeVine, "The Crisis of Political Conscience in Ghana: A Symposium Introduction," *African Studies Review* 22 (1979), p. 85.

[77] Bernard Schaffer, "Organization is Not Equity: Theories of Political Integration," *Development and Change* 8 (1977), p. 38.

[78] Rothchild and Gyrmah-Boadi, "Ghana's Return to Civilian Rule," p. 13; J. Kraus, "The Political Economy of Conflict," p. 9.

[79] Smock and Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism*, p. 20.

[80] Lynn Fischer, "Student Orientations Towards Nation-Building in Ghana," in Paden, ed., *Values, Identities, and National Integration*, pp. 271–84.

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outgrowth of weak government policies and performance, solutions must pay more attention not only to managing ethnic conflict but also to augmenting and improving state capabilities. The maintenance of the state political community relies as much on enhancing its utility as in fostering appropriate identities and participation.

Some implications of this mode of analysis for future research also come to mind. Although many investigations have already been conducted on local politics, it might be necessary to analyze in greater depth rural class formation and the differentiation of ethnicity in the countryside.[81] Little work has been done on patronage links and changes in these areas in recent years. The connection between power and resources—particularly land—also requires elaboration. Without answers to these questions it will be difficult to proceed in the investigation of the dynamics of the ethnic politics in the years to come.

Finally, because the politics of ethnicity is not constant, ethnicity is a useful descriptive concept which may reveal vacillations in state policies and state power. It might be necessary to return, when better equipped, to a closer examination of power constructs and the relationships between the state and power in the Ghanaian context and perhaps in other parts of Africa as well. The conceptualization of the state and state power may be in need of serious revision.*

[81] Some research is now being conducted under the auspices of the department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon.

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 24th Annual African Studies Association Meetings held at Bloomington, Indiana, 21-24 October 1981. The author would like to thank Fred Cooper and Donald Rothchild for their support and suggestions, and to acknowledge a deep debt to the Mary Ingraham Bunting Institute of Radcliffe College and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, where this paper was prepared.

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America in Search of Itself: A Review Essay

CHARLES V. HAMILTON

Both in the title and the content of his book, Theodore H. White tells us that the 1980 presidential election was essentially a process whereby Americans were asking themselves a serious question. He states that query in several ways: ". . . a questioning not only of control but of national purpose itself . . . a nation that questioned its own beliefs . . . the nature of the federal government's power" and "What was the proper role of government in a country of free people?" These are certainly grand and perennial topics. He starts, properly, with the end of World War II (1945), but he places emphasis on the election of 1956 as a turning point.

That year saw the beginning of the end of the "Old Country," namely, the style of American politics dominated by power brokers who could wield influence because they held large blocs of votes. It was a presidential election not yet so thoroughly innundated by television. "American voters still came in packages, and these packages were the building blocks of American politics. Most packages were deliverable by someone who, if he was friendly, was known as the 'leader,' or if he was hostile, as 'boss' of the 'machine.' "[1] Some, of course, would call it the good old days, when ethnicity was certainly an important factor, but when politicians did not bring it to the floor of nominating conventions or make it a facet of overt public policy: ". . . such ethnic planning and balancing was always done behind curtains."[2]

[1] Theodore H. White, *America in Search of Itself: The Making of the Presidents 1956–1980.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 35.

[2] Ibid., p. 36.

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White takes us through the 1960s and 1970s, covering ground familiar to both participants and observers of those dynamic decades. He stresses things we have long since mulled over—the impact of television, the assassinations, a growing civil rights movement, Vietnam, party reforms, energy crisis, Watergate, hostages in Iran. Precisely because these events have been told so often, the informed reader might tend to rush over them. This is understandable, but there is also a too casual quality in the exposition. For example, White is a creditable reporter, known and respected for his attention to facts, but there is no obvious excuse for the error he commits at one point in describing the civil rights trauma in Mississippi in the summer 1964. On page 104, he writes, "In the next few months, three young white people from the North will be murdered by them [local whites]." Two of the civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, were white and from New York City. The third, James Earl Chaney, was black and from Meridian, Mississippi. This is an unfortunate, disappointing reportorial mistake that should have been avoided. The racial composition of the victims was an important fact—then, for immediate political and legal reasons, and now, for the sake of historical accuracy.

There are no new analyses or insights in White's account of this period, but that is not his purpose or point. He comes down to the Carter administration with a judgment that is rather widespread: a president who certainly meant well, did his best, but was not equal to the task, one who ". . . arrived in Washington having won both his nomination and his election on personality alone, without an organized party behind him."[3] He overpromised and underperformed: comprehensive welfare reorganization; complete overhaul of the tax system; a balanced budget by 1980; restoring the country's energy independence. Carter's White House did not know how to (or did not care to) work with Congress. There was internal administrative bickering and more than a few reflective retreats to Camp David. Faced with rising inflation, an energy crisis (that he apparently could not articulate effectively to the country or Congress), American hostages in Iran, and Senator Ted Kennedy, Carter, of course, had no alternative but to concede defeat to Ronald Reagan early on the evening of 4 November 1980.

All this is interestingly recounted by White, who, as we know, is one of the better journalist-historians of the time. Even though we have read most of these accounts before from other sources, he nonetheless adds just enough personal anecdotal material (private interviews with the candidates and others, for example) to hold attention. His descriptive accounts are much more engaging than his analytical efforts.

I

Things have come unstuck in American politics, White tells us. The "old ideas" from the New Deal are now being challenged. He is uncomfortable with the

[3] Ibid., p. 196.

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emerging new interest groups who push their causes too hard: "I had long dealt with famous national spokespersons of the feminist cause, unrelenting and remorseless women. I did not like such women lobbyists any more than I liked lobbyists who pushed any cause too hard—railway lobbyists, oil lobbyists, black lobbyists, foreign lobbyists, gay lobbists, or moral lobbyists."[4] His judgment (indictment would not be an inaccurate term) of the Democratic party by 1980 is that it has governed too much and done much mischief—paraphrasing Thomas Jefferson's assessment of the French monarchy and the French Revolution.

White is not pleased with the development of affirmative action, which has resulted in a bewildering array of special entitlements for ill-defined ethnic groups. New groups of "protected classes" developed, and exactly who belonged to which group was, at best, "perplexing."

He is also not pleased with the burgeoning Great Society programs that created new claimants to the public largesse. "All in all, much more than half the population of the United States depended in whole or in part on federal aid or protection."[5] He concludes:

> All this had happened so gradually that few realized how much the nature of American government and politics had changed. Government had ceased to be, as Franklin Roosevelt once saw it, the umpire between business and labor, between the rich and the poor; it had become the nourisher of dependency. . . . For liberals, the melancholy drama was one with no third act, no clear end in sight. They had set out to free everyone and had created a nation of dependents instead.[6]

In a sense, this is what James Q. Wilson has described as "a process of addition," an essential element of democratic politics.[7] One might take issue with White's interpretation of the results of the programs, but this debate has been conducted in many places and is still going on.[8] In any case, he is not specific enough in his condemnation to make the challenge worth the effort.

II

White says that for conservatives, "the slowly unfolding drama of the previous twenty years had been one of growing menace."[9] Thus, they were going to try in 1980 to construct a government that was truly limited in what it promised and what it performed. His America in search of itself, then, is really his definition of the Reagan administration's efforts to reverse a trend that began surely as

[4] Ibid., p. 29.
[5] Ibid., p. 135.
[6] Ibid., pp. 135–36.
[7] James Q. Wilson, "The Dilemmas of Conservatism," *The American Spectator*, March 1982, p. 13.
[8] See, for example, Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, "The Great Society Did Succeed," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Winter 1976–77):601–18.
[9] White, *America*, p. 136.

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long ago as the New Deal, namely, increased federal government activity in domestic (certainly not international) affairs. The "search" is a pursuit to achieve less federal government involvement in a number of areas: education, energy, business regulation, environment, housing, and welfare. When seen in this way, it is not really a search for new ideas—in the sense of ideologies—but for policies that fit deeply embedded, well-established ideas. Throughout the book, White emphasizes the importance of "ideas" to Americans.

> Everywhere else in the world, politics dominate culture. Not so in America. Americans are not a people like the French, Germans, or Japanese, whose genes have been mixing with kindred genes for thousands of years. Americans are held together only by ideas, the clashing ideas of opportunity and equality—as it were, by a culture of hope. From the mid-fifties to 1980, these ideas and their derivative culture were to push American politics from hope and goodwill to promise and performance so bizarre as, finally, to collapse. . . . The Reagan leaders held the accusing finger on ideas whose time had apparently come and gone.[10]

This makes the 1980 presidential election quite a referendum, and it is not entirely clear that such was the case. To be sure, there was widespread frustration over inflation, humiliation over the Iranian-hostage situation, and plummeting approval of Carter. But it is not certain that the 1980 campaigns served as clear vehicles for debating policy alternatives. In fact, much of the latter portion of White's book, where he discusses the primaries and the election, is concerned with personalities, television's impact, campaign strategies, and the like. Carter, indeed, talked of two contrasting "visions" of the future, and Reagan spoke of "getting government off the backs of people," but little else. And given the nature of American elections, little more could be expected. As White says, "My thinking is that by the time of the 1980 election, the pursuit of equality had created a system of interlocking dependencies, and the American people were persuaded that the cost of equality had come to crush the promise of opportunity. These ideas struggled with each other all through the campaign, and the one idea prevailed over the other. This could make the election of 1980 a watershed in history."[11]

Whether one sees it in these terms, as politics of addition versus politics of subtraction, or in the way Samuel P. Huntington describes the case as ideals versus institutions,[12] there remains, it seems, an overriding aspect not dealt with by White's analysis.

III

One understands a great deal about American governance to the extent that one understands the strongly held preference for limited government. Americans

[10] Ibid., p. 71.

[11] Ibid., p. 419.

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

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have always had a distrust of government. That government is best which governs least is no idle afterthought. The idea that government should be fragmented in order to guard against tyranny, against abuse of individual liberty, is a very persistent idea. Thus, we created a constitutional system deliberately designed to make government action protracted, slow, and controlled. This preference has consistently coincided with a preference for the private sector, especially in economic matters. Even the New Deal in its own way paid homage to these embedded notions. Americans have always wanted a less active government, and therefore they have had to settle for forceful, active government only in episodic times of crisis. They have not preferred a constantly active government, so they have had to live with a periodically reactive government.

For the most part, some variant of pluralist politics has been preferred and has prevailed. We have seen what I call "mobilization politics"—a process of strong, centripetal leadership—mainly in times of crises. Then, the traditional pluralist process and forces defer to mobilizing elites who move quickly and exercise prerogatives which otherwise would be resisted. Importantly, a crisis does not necessarily predict success for the mobilizers. Essentially, it serves as the catalyst for elites to seize the opportunity to act. Even during such times—war, economic crises, socio-political crises—there remains the lingering preference eventually to "return to normalcy." When the crisis is over, when mobilization politics is no longer perceived as necessary, then, hopefully, forceful and concerted governmental action will end. The problem (perhaps "dilemma" would be a better word) is that it is never really possible to return to the previous normalcy, to the *status quo ante*. As a result of the crises and necessary governmental intervention, new interests are created and become vested; new expectations, demands, and even institutions are created; and we find that we are in a fundamentally new and changed environment. But the nostalgic longing for a prior normalcy persists.

If America is in search of itself, it may well be in search of a past it can no longer reclaim. And this is so precisely for many of the reasons White describes in his book: developing technology, a vastly different demographic situation, new ethnically-conscious groups prepared to act more overtly than covertly, and new international pressures economically and politically.

Franklin Roosevelt was able to achieve as much as he did because of the crisis of the Depression. Lyndon Johnson rode the waves of the anomic crises of Kennedy's assassination and the mid-sixties racial and urban turbulence. Carter failed in many of his efforts because he was not able to convince enough people of the need, as he perceived, for mobilization politics, and thus override the perennial politically centrifugal forces. On the other hand, during his first year in office, Reagan effectively utilized the inflation crisis to mobilize Congress behind his budget and tax cutting programs. Of all political leaders, the president has the greatest capacity to define the crisis and to focus national attention. His initiative and leadership in such matters are expected. Again, this is only, but importantly, an opportunity, not a guarantee of success. Even FDR could not "pack" the Supreme Court. But the president's agenda becomes the major

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focus, initially setting the terms of the policy debate. Thus, immediately after his election, Reagan mobilized support against fighting the crisis of inflation. A year later, with rising unemployment, he focused on the budget deficit and high interest rates, attempting to divert attention from unemployment as the immediate crisis.

Through it all, the idea remains that the American political system seems to need an extraordinary jolt in order to pull together its fragmented parts and take forceful action. The critical factor is that whenever we have seen such political mobilization, it has always involved more, not less, governmental action. It has involved a stronger, not weaker, federal government. What we are seeing now, under Reagan, is the attempt to mobilize not for the purpose of increased governmental engagement, but for disengagement (that is, on the domestic scene). The policies being pursued seek to return to a normalcy many associate with a more serene, less-regulated, tranquil time. Even White is not sure this is possible. Of the Reagan administration course, he concludes, ". . . whether their navigation is correct remains to be seen."[13]

IV

If the present administration is to achieve its goal of less government, it will have to use the mechanism of strong political leadership. If it persists in its intent to remain strong internationally, as it likely will and should, this will have to be reconciled with a national government that is intended to be limited at home. It is difficult to see how this is possible.

With an economy that is decidedly national and international, it is likely that Americans will continue to hold their *president* accountable for both fiscal and monetary policy. This notwithstanding that he has only partial power over the former and only minimal persuasive influence over the latter. This division, likewise, is not accidental. It has to be understood in the context of an entrenched preference to limit political control over economic matters. The debate over the relative autonomy of the Federal Reserve System will surface from time to time and demonstrate this governmental dilemma.

But the likelihood of concerted action is slim—in the absence of a clearly perceived crisis permitting mobilization politics. And that crisis will have to be definitive enough (namely, threaten enough politically relevant interests) to subordinate the built-in fragmented, centrifugal forces of our institutions. Few legislators need party or president to be elected or re-elected; thus, the individualization of the electoral process and the party decomposition that Walter Dean Burnham and others talk about is likely to continue. The president and Congress will remain on different time clocks with, therefore, different time spans in which to operate. In addition, legislators will continue to seek to protect their constituents (and, therefore, themselves) as long as there are benefits (however slight) to receive and burdens to avoid.

[13] White, *America*, p. 420.

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The American political process has operated essentially the way the constitutional framers intended—slowly and pluralistically. Those framers for the most part were more concerned with constraining and controlling government than with unleashing government. Political leaders who have wanted to move otherwise have had to seize the crisis moment and strike precipitously. Those moments are likely to occur with increasing frequency in the years ahead. There simply will be more occasions for active government economically and internationally. The old normalcy—conditions permitting the luxury of more limited government—cannot be recaptured because those conditions cannot be recreated. Every such exercise of national political leadership inevitably will accrue more power to the national government and, importantly, more public expectations that the leadership *should* exert itself.

In the process, then, Americans may well have to come to terms in their "search" with the seemingly awkward prospect of requiring more while demanding less. They may well find that their major question is not, abstractly, more or less government, but, concretely, who gets more or less from that actively involved government.

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Book Reviews

The Oil Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1980–1990 *by Melvin A. Conant. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 119 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $7.95.*

In a concise and readable presentation, Melvin Conant masterfully chronicles the complexities and confrontations that mark the international oil system. He stresses that policies aimed at securing reliable supplies of oil as reasonable prices must deal with a maze of intertwined economic, political, and military interests. Actions taken by oil producers in the last two decades have perhaps forever removed oil as a commodity largely governed by commercial or economic criteria. Furthermore, important contending claims and interests are pursued by a remarkably diverse array of national, transnational, and domestic actors. As the status of oil as a strategic necessity has grown, the struggle over its control has correspondingly become even more contentious.

Conant chastises American policy-makers for their failure to acknowledge the central role of oil in determining the overall economic and strategic health of the United States and, even more importantly, of the Western alliance. In place of a sensitive and sensible set of programs and priorities, there has been inattention and chaos, with a deleterious impact on relations among the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, potentially frustrating the pursuit of shared economic and strategic objectives.

The Western alliance has been torn by noncomplementary stances, and has demonstrated only halting and largely unsuccessful attempts at concerted action, for example, in creating the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). Bilateral special relationships between some consumer and producer governments aimed at securing preferential access to oil supplies have proliferated since the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Driven by varying degrees of vulnerability (the United States and Great Britain import about half the oil they use, France about 80 percent, and Japan and West Germany 100 percent), the nations of the alliance have been unable or unwilling to promote agreement on a host of issues relating to oil, including concerted Western approaches to military planning in the Middle East region and to the Israeli–Palestinian problem. Indeed, the United States's unqualified support for Israel

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has not only prompted scorn from some Europeans, but obviously jeopardizes enlistment of Middle Eastern powers, according to Conant's scheme, in an anti-Soviet strategic front.

Surely, however, problems in fashioning collaborative policies that must juggle varying national concerns are not unique to relations among oil consumers. Virtually all collective enterprises, whether in the economic or security realm, are plagued by potentially debilitating disagreements. OPEC itself has not been immune to serious friction arising over price setting and, especially, establishing production levels.

Not surprisingly, Conant's remedies focus on the need for allied cooperation and careful preparations in the event of sudden price surges or supply emergencies. His specific suggestions—for example, an American commitment to an adequately supplied Strategic Petroleum Reserve—are reasonable but few in number. For the most part, the prescriptions ventured are vague and highly general, such as the call for "a comprehensive political and security strategy for dealing with developments in the Middle East" (p. 101). Some of the most contentious issues are not adequately addressed, including the proper answer to Palestinian Arab demands for an independent state and the specific circumstances under which military intervention might be a rational response to disruptions in the oil heartland. Understandably, the author's reticence reflects the prodigious difficulties posed by these problems, yet one of his major criticisms of American policy-makers is that the most troublesome problems have not been boldly met with clear positions. More specific guidance from the author along these lines would have improved the book significantly.

This volume clearly outlines the central importance of oil to the strategic and economic postures of the United States and its allies in the decade of the 1980s and beyond. It also does an effective job of meticulously analyzing the absence of a coordinated western response and the likely consequences of further disarray. Unfortunately, Conant's catalog of prescriptions is insufficient to alleviate the discouragingly complex problems.

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Congressional Spending *by Dennis S. Ippolito. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982. 286 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $7.95.*

A budget reform launched with so much promise has failed to satisfy the expectations set for it. After but a few years during which spending and the deficit were curtailed, the federal government is again recklessly spending beyond its means. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 which made the president responsible for the budget has not stemmed the tide of federal profligacy.

This is not the indictment issued by Ippolito, however. He sees Congress as the villain and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as evidence of legislative unwillingness to discipline its spending appetites. Ippolito assumes that Congress is truly free of presidential guile and pressure in controlling the purse strings. He never examines the effects of misleading the escapist presidential forecasts on the ability of Congress to plot responsibly

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the future course of federal spending, nor does he inquire into the budgetary legerdemain used by the White House to show lower spending and deficit levels than actually ensue. Yet since 1975, Congress has been more forthright than the president in projecting budget trends and the economic assumptions on which they are grounded. None of this matters because Ippolito begins and ends with his verdict that Congress is the guilty branch.

Ippolito would do well to reexamine his assumption that the 1974 Act committed Congress to hold down federal spending. The fact is that Congress rejected conservative demands for a biased process that would compel lower spending and opted instead for a process that allows congressional majorities to prescribe any budget outcomes they favor.

The book would benefit, too, from a more comprehensive and balanced treatment of the means by which Congress makes money decisions. Several chapters are devoted to budget resolutions which have no legal effect, but there is less than a single page concerning the appropriations process by which real spending is legislated. The authorization process which is the mainspring of many of the spending pressures within Congress gets less than two pages. While Ippolito finds Congress in default on budget matters, he gives scant attention to the accomplishments of congressional budgeting. He spends pages documenting his case that old entitlements have not been effectively controlled, but provides just a one-line acknowledgement that few entitlements have been enacted since 1975. He rails against Congress for its "sleights of hand" in putting expenditures off-budget, but fails to mention that there were fewer off-budget agencies in 1981 than there were in 1974 when the process was started.

Ippolito's work also would have been more balanced if it had recognized the perverse effects of the nation's economic difficulties on congressional budgetary options. During the period covered by this book, the United States was vexed by high inflation and high unemployment. These economic ills complicated the task of budget control and contributed to higher spending—regardless of congressional preferences. These were not the only exogenous forces at work: high interest rates, an aging population, and soaring health care costs weakened budget control. The budget was unmade more by adverse conditions than it was made by legislative barons.

Ippolito appeals for constitutional constraints on Congress's spending power. By limiting Congress, he exults, "its persistent and serious failure to bring spending under control would finally be solved" (p. 262). This prescription wars against the rest of the book. If Ippolito is right that Congress is hell-bent to spend money, it will not be long before it devises new means to evade constitutional controls. As state experiences have shown, constitutional limits invite off-budget practices and other escapist techniques.

It is not easy to be balanced about budgetary issues. The author has written a book that feeds the prevailing notion that Congress is fiscally bankrupt, but he has not thereby provided a fair treatment of this troubling subject.

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Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir *by John King Fairbank. New York, Harper and Row, 1982. 480 pp. $20.00.*

Here is a thoroughly amusing memoir by a veteran scholar who played a special role as promoter of China studies and pundit. Suffused with wry humor, the book combines nostalgia with scattered observations on Chinese culture and American foreign policy. Frequent quotations from letters, reports, and articles that Fairbank wrote as student, apprentice teacher, wartime expert, and educator-statesman give the book a sense of immediacy.

Fairbank began his China studies almost by chance, after Exeter, Wisconsin, and Harvard, by using his Rhodes scholarship for an initial study of the British-managed Chinese Maritime Customs Service. This kept him "out of any sinological rut" and he approached China "as the West had done in the nineteenth century, largely through British eyes" (p. 19). Nineteenth-century China became his distinctive field of scholarship. Peking in the 1930s gave him footing in the present: he and his bride, the talented Wilma Cannon, were soon absorbed in a wonderfully rich culture and a country beset with problems. The description of four idyllic years in Peking, with travels in north, east, and south China, and the affectionate account of Chinese friends, make delightful reading.

This book offers many insights, for example, the pithy comment on Chinese statecraft: "But there is one striking motif in China's modern history: the demonstration effect of putting away the leader of a potentially troublesome opposition movement" (p. 76). Fairbank cites examples of assassinations of popular leaders under the rule of Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chiang Kai-shek, and the packing off to prison of Wei Jing-sheng, the exponent of democracy during the period of thaw in the People's Republic in 1979. "The formula: wait for a recognized leader to emerge, then knock him off" (p. 76). This reminds us of the recent ghoulish murder of Professor Chen Wen-cheng of Carnegie-Mellon University —apparently a supporter of the Taiwan Independence Movement—after interrogation in 1981 by the Taiwan Garrison Command.

During his stay in wartime Chungking as an American intelligence worker, Fairbank developed a distaste for the Kuomintang because of its repression of Chinese intellectuals. He believes that Chiang Kai-shek began to lose his mandate by 1943. Fairbank also discovered the Left, that is, Chou En-lai's team in Chungking, and found it attractive, as did other China specialists at the time. His bias in favor of the Left is evident still, even though the Chinese Communist Party is as authoritarian and cruel toward dissenters as is the Kuomintang.

The volume sparkles with Fairbank's fun and wit. For example, the author tells of his friend, Sir John Keswick of Jardines, who gave away beautifully bound copies of his book *What I Know about China*, which went through several editions. Its special feature was its lack of print: it consisted entirely of blank pages.

An autobiography is by nature self-centered and may appear vain. Fairbank softens the effect by self-deprecating asides. Yet, of his youth he says, ". . . but I kept my course, always conscious of being unique and potentially superior—a feeling of self-approval which [his mother's] devotion no doubt had inspired" (p. 6). Clearly Fairbank and Harvard were a great combination. He had brilliant students and exhausted himself in pro-

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moting his field. One doubts, however, that he approved of his description on the dust jacket: ". . . a man known and loved as the father of American China studies."

C. MARTIN WILBUR
Columbia University

The Future of US-China Relations *edited by John Bryan Starr. New York, New York University Press, 1981. 270 pp. $25.00.*

China, the Soviet Union and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions of the 1980s *edited by Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1982. 309 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $13.95.*

The Chinese-American rapprochement of the 1970s constituted the most important shift in the world balance of power since World War II. The Soviet Union, as it approached military parity with the United States—or, arguably, superiority over the United States—was obliged to station major forces on the Chinese border, thereby limiting the power it could bring to bear in Europe. The United States, freed from a hostile confrontation with China, could focus its power in Europe or the Middle East. At minimum, the positioning of Soviet forces in Asia to contain China and the freeing of American forces from that assignment meant reasonably assured security for Western Europe, a comfortable margin of deterrence against Soviet attack.

Most of the essayists in the two volumes under review recognize the volatility of China's place in the "strategic triangle" with the United States and the Soviet Union. Writing early in 1980, some worry about China and several fear Soviet action, but there are only hints of the role of Ronald Reagan's America as the destabilizing force.

John Bryan Starr's collection was prepared for the United Nations Association and aimed at the liberal establishment general reader. Its principal failing is a lack of historical perspective. Dorothy Borg, doyenne of students of American-East Asian relations, no sooner educates one flock of specialists on Chinese politics about the need to study more than the previous year to understand the present—or predict the future—than another comes along to relive past errors.

Lynn D. Feintech provides a good, sensible summary of the trade situation circa 1980 and the prospects for the future. If there is a flaw, it is the possibility that she may have underestimated the effect politics will have on the rate at which U.S.-China trade expands. Steven I. Levine stresses Soviet uneasiness about the Chinese-American relationship. He predicts that the Soviets will accelerate their efforts to achieve a position of military strength in Asia and reminds Americans of the need to distinguish between Chinese interests and their own. Bernard K. Gordon notes the increase of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, underlining one of the disadvantages of improved Chinese-American relations. Robert A. Scalapino, the only author whose work appears in both volumes, offers a surprisingly unbalanced presentation of the strategic choices of the United States. He distorts the historical record (especially the policies of Dean Acheson), offers a defense of "quasi-authoritarian [non-communist] governments of the Third World type"

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(p. 166), and warns against reliance on communist nationalism. Only apprehension about the naiveté of his audience can explain the absence of his usual subtlety.

Relief from geopolitics is provided by Joyce K. Kallgren in a superb summary of cultural, scientific, and technological exchanges. She does not gloss over the problems. Amidst the current controversy over arms sales and immigration quotas, Victor H. Li's thoughtful essay on Taiwan's legal status and political future is particularly valuable.

The Stuart and Tow volume is quite different in texture and aimed at a very different audience. It derives from a conference on Sino-Soviet relations held in West Germany in May 1980, supported in part by NATO and the Heritage Foundation. The participants are committed to policy-relevant studies, especially of the sort commissioned by the Pentagon, and seem eager to advise Ronald Reagan. Most striking are the missing participants: Doak Barnett, Harry Harding, Kenneth Lieberthal, Michel Oksenberg, Richard Solomon, William Whitson, and especially Allen Whiting—who probably has no peer as a student of the triangular relations between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union.

The book contains 21 essays and is divided into four parts: "Determinants of Chinese and Soviet Foreign Policy Behavior"; "The Military Dimension: Comparisons and Scenarios"; "Regional Competition Between Beijing and Moscow"; and "Policy Considerations for the West." Some of the authors, like Harold C. Hinton, see China persisting in its refusal of satellite status—and strong enough to prevail. Others, like Jürgen Domes, distrust China, and want us to prepare for a new Sino-Soviet alliance. Still others, like Edward N. Luttwak, expect a Soviet strike against China. Most argue, to the delight of their sponsors, that the Soviet threat is rising and the United States must increase its military power.

Vernon V. Aspaturian makes an interesting point about the stake the Soviet bureaucracy had developed in continuing the Sino-Soviet split, but neglects to indicate in what ways this situation is different from the importance any bureaucracy has placed in any existing policy. Richard Löwenthal is magnificent on the degeneration of the ideological dispute. Articles by Kenneth Hunt and Donald C. Daniel underscore the military weakness of China, and Lawrence Freedman does an excellent job of outlining China's economic weakness. William V. Kennedy throws out a sprightly bit of lunacy, resurrecting Homer Lea (the militarist writer who outraged American audiences early in the twentieth century), and calls for a threat to the Soviet Union in East Asia as a means of compensating for American weakness in the Middle East. Thomas W. Robinson offers a touch of sanity, stressing the balance between China and the Soviet Union and trying with little success to ease the apocalyptic fears of most of his fellow participants. Colin Legum sensibly stresses African determination not to choose sides.

Ultimately, it is Luttwak who offers the most stimulating analysis. He stresses his conception of the Soviet Union as a military empire—an entity which, by its nature, must seek total security. The United States has little to fear because it is useful rather than threatening to the Soviets. It is a declining power and an important source of food and technology—much of which would not be available to the Soviet Union if the United States were destroyed. China, a threat without redeeming features, must be destroyed. Littwak contends that the opportunity to do so without nuclear weapons will come in the 1980s.

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The 30 essays reviewed suggest that the 1980s will not be years of calm in the "strategic triangle." The odds seem to be against friendly relations in any direction—and there are those who predict war. Robinson's vision of rational behavior by the great powers is surely preferable, but these are times when such optimism is understandably scarce.

WARREN I. COHEN
Michigan State University

The International Politics of Surplus Capacity: Competition for Market Shares in the World Recession *edited by Susan Strange and Roger Tooze. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1981. 229 pp. $28.50.*

" 'The management of surplus capacity,' " writes William Diebold in one of the chapters in this book, "does not describe the complex of problems that most Americans [as opposed to Europeans] think they are facing at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Even the *avant-garde* of industrial policy does not think in these terms" (p. 157). My guess is that if Diebold had written this chapter in 1982 rather than in 1980, he would have observed that American and European views are converging on the gravity of the problem of surplus capacity and the ensuing competition for market shares. One can hardly escape indicators of it in certain sectors, even in the United States, during the past year: the renewal of the Multi-Fibre Agreement on textiles and the recent suits by U.S. steel companies and the U.S. government against foreign producers of steel for dumping and subsidized selling. Thus the publication of this book on the international politics of surplus capacity is indeed timely.

The book is tightly edited and sensibly organized. The editors make a cogent argument for an approach to the problem, and international political economy in general, that focuses not only on "regime change" questions (a mode of analysis that has become so popular with American political scientists), but that also examines the values and domestic, transnational, and inter-governmental sources of influence these arrangements reflect and the distribution of costs and benefits they generate. These topics are supplemented by sectoral analyses, when appropriate, as well.

The editors authored the introduction and conclusion, and there are seventeen other essays, varying in length from three to fifteen pages, by other contributors. One section of the book offers perspectives on the problem, another offers analysis of surplus capacity in five different sectors—iron and steel, textiles and clothing, shipping and shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and banking and insurance. Three essays are devoted to discussions of the management of surplus capacity, two to policy options, and another three to prescriptions. Most of the essays are very informative and some are even intellectually provocative, such as Victoria Curzon Price's chapter on recession and the world economic order.

In a book of such varied content, one gets more of an introduction to the topic and its various subleties than general conclusions. Nevertheless, the editors do bring out a few, the main one being that the problem of surplus capacity is economic and also political. As they rightly suggest, leaving the problem to the market to sort out has consequences that are not neutral. The essay points also to the unfortunate conclusion that the management

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of surplus capacity is no easy task—not for the firm or the sector affected, the individual national governments, or the international community.

As the essays by Loukas Tsoukalis and Antonio da Silva Ferreira, and Steven J. Warnecke point out, political units have tried to save affected sectors by encouraging rationalization, providing for various types of adjustment assistance, and by offering loans at low interest rates, among other things. When these measures don't work, various types of protectionist measures are employed from quotas to trigger price mechanisms to orderly marketing arrangements. These may have the unfelicitous result of cutting back world trade in general, placing the burden of adjustment on politically weaker states that have more efficient producers, and further politicizing trade and economic matters. They also may not cure the problems of the affected sector.

Kazuo Nakazawa and Richard Jolly offer different prescriptions in their essays. Instead of market-sharing arrangements, they call for an end to job-defensive measures and suggest international Keynesian solutions (à la the Brandt Commission recommendations). To wit, they suggest that Northern governments should stimulate effective demand and growth in the Southern hemisphere by resource transfers and by allowing the newly industrializing countries to realize their comparative advantage in certain sectors by reducing trade barriers in the North. The North would consequently have a market for some of its surplus goods, and an incentive for technological innovation and a different deployment of resources at home. In the long run, they suggest, the world will be much better off.

Aside from the current unpopularity of Keynesian policies, the problem is, of course, political. As Keynes himself pointed out, in the long-run we are all dead. In the short-run, it is much more politically expedient, although perhaps less economically rational, for the North to pass on the burden of adjustment to the Third World or to each other. In the medium-term, we are all worse off. It is not only the professional Cassandras who have raised the possibility that protectionist and job-saving measures like these, coupled with the bizarre monetary policies of the past four years, could produce another worldwide depression.

In sum, this is a stimulating book for professors and practitioners alike and should be required reading for students in this field.

DEBRA L. MILLER
Barnard College, Columbia University

Scientists under Hitler: Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich

by Alan D. Beyerchen. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1981. 287 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $8.95.

This aptly titled analytical narrative will be of intense value to specialists and of considerable appeal to more general students of political science, of the history of science, of physics and mathematics, and of behavior under stress. It is a perceptive, dispassionate, thoughtful, and thorough study of a unique chapter of human experience and depravity. It is marked by dedicated scholarship, orderly presentation, and clear and felicitous writing. Admirable notes, bibliography, index, and a rewarding selection of photographs are

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also provided. Though severely scholarly and precise in most references and reports of interviews, piquancy is added by an occasional leavening of hearsay (for example, p. 43 and its note 16).

The great years of German physics are discussed, from 1910 through a peak in 1933 and the subsequent decline. Emphasis is on the 1930–45 period, when, under multiple pressures including the Depression and the classic inflationary crescendo which rendered the currency worthless and wiped out many people's savings, the democratic and internationally oriented Weimar Republic fell. Hitler, without effectual resistance, then seized control of Germany, leading to its destruction and the slaughter of 6,000,000 Jews and other civilians in the European Holocaust.

Beyerchen concludes that the vast majority of German physicists were neither pro-Nazi nor anti-Nazi. Their foremost concern was self-preservation. With a few exceptions (notably Heisenberg and von Laue), non-Jewish scientists who were not driven out pursued a policy of what Joseph Haberer called "prudential acquiescence." Leo Szilard reached the conclusion in 1931, as he put it in his *Reminiscences*, "that Hitler would get into power, not because the forces of the Nazi revolution were so strong, but rather because I thought that there would be no resistance whatever."

Professional and political ambitions and differences among physicists and other academicians, and between pure and applied scientists and mathematicians, are effectively portrayed. The rise and collapse of a small school of "Aryan physics" is described at length. Arrogance and other causes of the surprisingly limited progress toward atomic weaponry are throughtfully presented.

Albert Einstein is a central figure in the extensive dramatis personae. The crucial importance of his scientific work was widely recognized early in his career. He was anathema to the Nazis because, apart from his Jewishness, he was a theoretician rather than an experimentalist, a "pacifist" and an internationalist. Einstein's "rachmones" (human kindness) and early concern for world peace persisted, intensified no doubt by his role in the initiation of the atomic weapons program. On 6 June 1947, this reviewer visited him, responsive to his request to Secretary of State George Marshall, to hear, discuss, and transmit his views and program. Einstein believed that the world was heading for atomic war, after surprise attack, since the Soviets would soon break the U.S. monopoly; that "the United Nations has been ineffectual"; and that destruction of civilization within "say, two to ten years" could be averted only through bipartisan U.S. leadership for creation of a world government to which military power should be transferred.

Lessons emerge from this book for us in the United States today. Among them are to protect education from political pressures and to support basic science as well as promising young scientists. Further, independent science and technology advice must reach the presidential level of the federal government. Inflation must be resisted. It is the Devil's pervasive poison, encouraging hedonism, impoverishing people, and undermining governments. And finally, wishful thinking is popular and lethal; personal courage is rare and should be rewarded; "prudential acquiescence" facilitates the loss of freedom, the rise of tyrants, and the fall of nations. A word to the wise.

WILLIAM T. GOLDEN
New York City

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Governing America: An Insider's Report from the White House and the Cabinet *by Joseph A. Califano, Jr. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981. 474 pp. $16.95.*

In this memoir of his service as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in President Carter's cabinet, ex-Secretary Joseph Califano promises to tell "what governing is really like, how interest groups maneuver, how political deals are made and broken, how presidents make decisions, what it is like for a Cabinet officer to deal with the White House, the Congress and the media. . . ." (p. 12). He keeps his promise in a lively, thoughtful, and candid narrative, one of the most revealing reports on the inner workings of the government in modern times.

In doing so, Califano fires the first salvos in the battle of words over why the Carter administration failed. Other memoirs now in preparation will answer him—Jody Powell's for one, and ultimately President Carter's own. They will have much to answer, for Califano draws a devastating portrait of White House ineptitude, centering on the president himself. Carter emerges from these pages as a well-meaning, deeply religious man, but one simply out of his depth. He came to office in "appalling ignorance" of Washington (Carter's words, as quoted on p. 417) and overcompensated by burying himself in details. He lacked passion for liberal causes even when he embraced them, and consequently vacillated and retreated. Carter was often petulant and petty, and Califano illumines such weaknesses by occasional vivid flashbacks to his earlier White House boss, Lyndon Johnson.

The dramatic climax of the book is, of course, Carter's abrupt dismissal of Califano in July 1979 after 30 months of service. In a poignant final chapter, "Coming Apart," the author details the unraveling of the Carter administration during that summer, portraying a beleaguered president who had clearly lost his grip on the country and desperately sought to regain leadership through a clumsy purge of his Cabinet. In Califano's case, Carter explained to him that friction between the secretary and some members of the White House staff (among them Powell and Hamilton Jordan) forced the president to choose, and he stuck with his little circle of Georgia friends (pp. 434–35).

White House–Cabinet friction is one of the themes running through the chapters on specific issues—abortion, anti-smoking, university integration, hospital cost control, the separate Department of Education, welfare reform, and social security. Another theme is the ordeal of getting legislation through Congress where single-interest groups hold sway. It was an unpropitious time for reformers to advance bold schemes, but Califano—reared by the Great Society—did so and usually lost. Sometimes he ended in defeatism. "I doubt that we have the political independence and integrity in the Congress to enact a sound national health plan," he writes, because of "the ability of the special interests to manipulate the legislative process" (p. 210). But he offers no panacea for reforming Congress or otherwise setting things right.

Califano recalls events with a photographic memory. He remembers where people sat in meetings, even the colors of their chairs. The chapters are packed with dialogue, within quotation marks, complete with mid-sentence interruptions. Unfortunately, however, the reader is not told when and how the dialogue was written down. Surely the Secretary did not carry a tape recorder to cabinet meetings. Did he record the quotations immediately afterward? Or did he reconstruct the conversations from memory, two to four years af-

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terward? The reader is left uneasy, even though the quotations sound plausible and the writing is restrained enough to carry conviction.

Like any memoir, the work is author-centered, and Califano's total recall will have to be supplemented by the perhaps partial recall of others to round out the story of policy-making in the Carter years. For writers of more balanced history, however, this book offers fascinating insights and serves as a superb starting point.

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
The Brookings Institution

American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony *by Samuel P. Huntington. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 303 pp. $15.00.*

In this stimulating analysis, Huntington explores the tension between the real and the ideal in the American political system. The American creed, which he defines as a set of beliefs in liberty, individualism, equality, and distrust of government, is the ideal. The actual political institutions, with their inevitable restraints on freedom, create what he calls the "IvI" gap (ideals versus institutions), the difference between what ought to be and what is. Americans adjust to this tension in four ways, Huntington contends: by moralistic reform, by cynicism, by complacency, and by hyprocrisy. He is primarily concerned with the first response. Every 60 to 70 years, the American people try to close the IvI gap in outbursts that Huntington labels periods of "creedal passion." The four reform eras—the American Revolution, the Jacksonian period, the Progressive Movement, and the political rebellion of the sixties and early seventies (the S&S years in Huntington's jargon)—reflect attempts to make American political institutions conform to the liberal creed. Despite some limited successes, all such periods end finally in a reversion to complacency, cynicism, and hypocrisy.

Huntington's analysis offers many valuable insights. He recognizes the close connection between religion and politics. Locating the source of creedal passion in the seventeenth-century Puritan Revolution in England, he shows that the themes of individualism and distrust of authority recur in America in the four later reform outbursts. His cyclical analysis also helps put the confusing political developments of the sixties and seventies into a broader perspective. When the protesters of this era are viewed as heirs of Jefferson, Jackson, and LaFollette, struggling for such historic American concerns as limiting the power of government and extending the participation of individuals in political decisions, they no longer seem so radical nor so bizarre.

The book also explains the fascinating relationship between political reform at home and American power abroad. The characteristic American stress on freedom and equality leads to a double standard by which both American and foreign observers judge U.S. foreign policy on far higher moral grounds than the diplomacy of any other nation. Yet Huntington argues persuasively that the extension of liberty abroad, as shown by the post-World War II conversion of Germany and Japan to democracy, is primarily the product of American power, not idealism.

For all its virtues, Huntington's analysis leaves something to be desired. The most glar-

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ing defect is the failure to account for the New Deal. It is not enough to dismiss Franklin D. Roosevelt's program in the 1930s as a purely pragmatic response to an economic situation, nor to portray it as a class struggle between the rich and the poor in the European political tradition. As William Leuchtenburg has pointed out, the New Deal was both a recovery and a reform movement, and its architects, far from being pragmatists, were men and women of deep ideological conviction who tried to carry out significant changes in the American political system. Like the other reformers Huntington describes, they did not fully close the gap between ideals and institutions but did enact reforms that have had a profound impact on American life ever since. The New Deal simply does not fit Huntington's formula—it occurred during a period of depression, it was not self-consciously moralistic, and it welcomed government activity. Rather than abandon his theory, Huntington has chosen to ignore the New Deal, a curious choice which casts doubt on the validity of his whole scheme. The result is a thoughtful, provocative, but flawed analysis of American politics.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas, Austin

History of the Idea of Progress *by Robert Nisbet. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 370 pp. $7.95.*

This superb work is bound to supersede J. B. Bury's classic study, *The Idea of Progress*, published half a century ago. It surely has a much wider scope. Bury argued that the idea of progress was alien to the mind of classical antiquity as well as medieval Christianity, while Nisbet demonstrates persuasively that in classical antiquity the notion of progress existed side by side with ideas of degeneration from a Golden Age, together with conceptions that stressed the recurrent cyclical character of human history. It can be found even in Hesiod and surely in some of the sophists as well as in Plato and Aristotle. In medieval Christianity, likewise, the idea of progress can be discerned in some of its major thinkers, whether they write in the orthodox tradition of St. Augustine or in the heterodox tradition of Joachim de Fiore.

Nisbet is at pains to show that the Enlightenment built on the millenarianism of Judeo-Christian thought. It secularized this thought by planting the Golden Age firmly on the earth and its future. What is distinctive of the period from 1750 to 1900, Nisbet argues, is that the theme of progress, which hitherto was only one among several views of history, became the dominant idea. This is not to say that there were not centrally important thinkers who rejected the notion of progress in the nineteenth century. One thinks of Nietzsche and Burckhardt, or Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer. But these were minority voices almost drowned out by the upholders of progress who preempted most of the intellectual scene.

Nisbet contends that several major premises can be found in the idea of progress from the Greeks to our times: belief in the value of the past and of Western civilization; belief in the worthiness of economic and technological growth; faith in scientific and scholarly knowledge based on reason; and belief in the intrinsic importance and worth of life on

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earth. All these major premises, Nisbet argues, have been challenged in the twentieth century. As a result, the idea of progress increasingly has been met by doubt, disillusionment, and hostility. Nisbet finds the current assault on the notion of progress perturbing since without this guiding idea human existence becomes deprived of meaning. He argues, not entirely persuasively, that in the past the idea of progress has been closely linked and dependent upon religion or on intellectual constructions derived from religion, and he seems to believe that a resurgence of the idea of progress can only be expected if and when the Western world experiences a revival of religious thought. He hints, tentatively, in the words of Yeats that, "Surely some revelation is at hand." I must confess that this sounds to me like whistling in the dark. I think it much more probable that a revival of the idea of progress will have secular roots. Such issues are tangential to the bulk of this book, however, which is largely devoted to a painstaking account of the importance of the idea of progress in a great variety of systems of thought.

One final remark seems in order. Some readers have expressed astonishment that Nisbet, who in an earlier work, *Social Change and History*, was highly critical of evolutionary and related trends in contemporary social science, has now taken up cudgels in defense of the notion of progress. Yet there is no contradiction here. The idea of progress has indeed often been coupled with evolutionary thought, but that has obviously not been the case before the age of modernity when the notion of progress was largely rooted in other than scientific ideas. Hence, it is not inconsistent to defend the idea of progress even while rejecting an evolutionary conception. It nevertheless gives one a peculiar pleasure to welcome a conservative thinker such as Nisbet into the ranks of the defenders of progress.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

The Evolution of American Electoral Systems *by Paul Kleppner et al. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 279 pp. $29.95.*

The literature on voter realignments and party systems offers a fascinating example of the beneficial union of two disciplines. Historians and political scientists have expended considerable energy fleshing out a theory of electoral change introduced by V. O. Key in his 1955 article on "critical elections." The results have been impressive: Critical election theory has provided the framework for studying American electoral behavior from the early years of the Republic to the current Reagan "Renaissance."

The book under review, a collection of essays written by six distinguished scholars, deserves the serious attention of students of American political history. Connoisseurs of empirical historical research, however, might well be advised to skip the introductory chapter by Paul Kleppner. The party system perspective is couched in the exceedingly narrow terms of mere shifts in the partisan vote. A typology of elections is then developed which cannot accommodate "secular" change in voting trends. Since voting returns are not calculated on the basis of all potential voters, differential rates of turnout are excluded from analyses of electoral change. Discontinuity variables are used to detect re-

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alignments when other statistical devices are clearly superior, and the results are not displayed in a manner that allows readers to evaluate them. Finally, Kleppner settles for indirect signs of "party-structured outcomes" when it would have been possible to test directly for them using ecological regressions.

The authors are at their best describing the characteristics of each of the five "electoral party eras" into which critical election theory has traditionally divided the span of U.S. political history. In a well-crafted, state-by-state analysis of early national politics, Ronald P. Formisano demonstrates convincingly that no full-fledged party system arose between 1796 and 1824. The Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties had no life of their own; rather they were often ad hoc organizations mobilized into action by issue-conscious elites. In a superb synthesis of the literature on the second party system, William G. Shade stresses the acceptance of using parties in a "pluralistic" and rapidly growing nation as instruments of interest aggregation. He finds that the development of state and federal legislative parties and the nature of their leadership reflected two phases of electoral stability before and after 1836. Paul Kleppner deftly reconstructs the *Weltanschauung* of the Republican party in his discussion of party loyalty and ethno-cultural conflict in the second half of the nineteenth century. He integrates the issues of anti-slavery, race, and Reconstruction into his overall interpretation to a greater degree than in his larger study of this period. Walter Dean Burnham recounts the developments that overshadowed the magnitude of electoral shifts that occurred in 1896: attacks by elites on the power of parties and politicians, changes in the "electoral rules of the game," growth of the one party system, and declines in party loyalty and turnout—all of which brought the political system into alignment with the dominant faith in industrial progress. In a well-researched and speculative essay describing the "last party system," Richard Jensen argues that although the New Deal realignment endured because of the ability of Democratic patronage machines to mobilize lower income groups, the long-term forces of party decomposition were accelerated after 1960 by a loss of faith in government and by the inability of the two major parties to accommodate themselves to value conflicts between "moderns" and "postmoderns."

In a concluding chapter, Samuel P. Hays suggests that future research should identify the relationship between stages in party development and changes in the larger society. Many will argue, however, that critical election theory is flawed precisely because it has failed this task: It has neither explained what circumstances cause voters to change their behavior nor made clear the linkages connecting voter choice with changing institutional restraints. The volume does present an integrated panorama of American electoral history period by period, according to critical election theory, but it does not present an integrated conceptualization of partisan realignment and, as a consequence, will disappoint some readers.

DALE BAUM
Texas A & M University

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Public Duties: The Moral Obligations of Government Officials *edited by Joel L. Fleishman, Lance Liebman, and Mark H. Moore. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 316 pp. $22.50.*

That making choices between conflicting values, loyalties, and pressures is the very stuff of work in the public sector seems to be the starting point for this collection of twelve essays. As the presidential appointee having statutory responsibility for implementation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (ironically, a law that lacks any congressional findings or declarations of intent), I want to applaud this effort to accord to normative analyses of public policy the attention usually reserved for economic or political assessments.

Except for Lance Liebman's "Legislating Morality in the Proposed CIA Charter" and Dennis F. Thompson's examination of the fiscal crisis of New York City, these essays focus generally on the dilemmas of individual public officials who strive to reconcile their official actions with maintenance of their personal moral standards. Douglas T. Yates, Jr., points out usefully that this exercise will vary among different government jobs and programs. Yates concentrates on federal appointive officials, while Mark H. Moore considers bureaucrats at several levels of government. Joel Fleishman focuses on legislators at all levels of government. Bruce L. Payne undertakes the more general topic of the "character" of public officials, discussed in terms of the conduct of Vice President Spiro Agnew and Attorney General Elliot Richardson prior to the former's resignation. None of these essays takes up the special ethical issues encountered by judges, appointed or elected.

By emphasizing the circumstances of individual public officials, these authors skirt questions about the foreseeable and recurrent patterns or structures of ethical problems. Systematic managerial approaches to improving the level of ethical conduct by public officials do not, therefore, make up the core of the prescriptions in these essays, nor do those laws and regulations that purport to deal directly with ethical matters. "A dominant theme in these essays is renunciation of the extreme version of legalism. The authors are dismayed to discover that ethical impulses, inevitably provoked by official errors and outrages, have led to procedural innovations that hinder and sometimes prevent effective governance" (p. viii). At this time of dwindling public esteem for government, these authors should go beyond renunciation to explain how the new governmental process laws —open meetings, freedom of information, and financial disclosure—have failed their major test of assisting in the restoration of the public trust. For myself, I have to say that the record is not quite so one-sided as these editors suggest. It has been our experience at the Office of Government Ethics that the older conflict-of-interest laws, although not even cited in these essays, are the present substantive laws on ethical matters and do confront most directly several recurrent ethical problems that surely could be illuminated by closer scholarly review.

This collection of essays establishes an agenda for university study by future public officials. The only sure route to an improved level of ethical governance begins in the classroom with work on questions of moral reasoning and analyses of accounts of specific ethical problems encountered in the public sector. For now, however, public sector newcomers and incumbents alike need training sessions, based on case studies, which emphasize the conflict of interest laws and regulations. It certainly may be true, as Fleishman says,

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that "obedience to law is a threshold qualification, not a measure of attainment" (p. 63), but I have learned that achieving compliance with the laws for which our office is responsible frequently requires acute understanding of potential conflicts as well as personal ethical courage in abiding by appropriate individual standards of conduct. Flagrant cases of noncompliance do, of course, result in prosecution. Incidentally, the same Faculty Study Group on the Moral Obligations of Public Officials that met for two years under the auspices of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University to develop the present collection of essays will soon release a companion book of case studies.

J. JACKSON WALTER
U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Energy and the National Defense *by Howard Bucknell III. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1981. 235 pp. $19.50.*

Over the past few years, we have been treated to several sober but sanguine accounts of our energy future, which taken together stress reliance on conservation and renewable resources to propel the United States intact to the twenty-first century. After revolution in Iran and invasion in Afghanistan, political scientist Howard Bucknell III offers a starker vision of things perhaps sooner to come. Unless their energy problems are attacked squarely within the next ten years, Bucknell contends that Americans will jeopardize the safety of their nation. In the domestic arena, a stifled economy, massive unemployment, even violence and revolution may await us. The international arena could be equally grim: unacceptable American vulnerability; imperiled western alliances; "energy wars" for oil in the Middle East or western hemisphere.

Faced with that outlook, Bucknell argues for mastery, though his illuminating account of the politics of making energy law indicates the powerful persistence of drift. His solutions, like his research, present little unavailable in public documents, but he performs the useful services of compressing this material into readable form and of surveying the state of affairs. Conservation and alternative energy sources, particularly synthetic "mobility" fuels, he concludes, must be promoted immediately, vigorously, and simultaneously. Uncertainty over prospects, information, and costs is one impediment; public confusion, another. These, together with a timid legislature, a crippled presidency, and the inertia of an oil-intensive society, have so far produced an inchoate energy policy, whose formulators are only "beginning to appreciate" the problem (p. 187).

With the world awash in oil and American demand and imports declining, Bucknell's message may seem anachronistic, even alarmist. To some it may also be irrelevant, assuming as it does that the petroleum base of industrial nations is bound to run out. At least one school of thought, articulated best by M. A. Adelman, has argued that investment will continue to produce oil. Bucknell rejects this tight economic argument, stressing instead the practical inevitability of exhaustion. In the United States, where oil imports make up the difference between production and demand, such dependence may have disastrous consequences, especially if, as Bucknell suggests, the time for changing to

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new energy is shorter than imagined. Proceeding from that premise, he posits a "worst case" analysis of the dangers of American reliance on foreign oil.

The scenario is chilling, if not entirely convincing. A sine qua non of his "energy wars," for example, is "that the Soviet Union might attempt to assume *de facto* control of Middle Eastern oil distribution," with the Afghanistan invasion conceivably a first thrust toward the Persian Gulf (pp. xiii–xiv). However arguable such speculation may have been, it seems less tenable now. Even his more plausible expectation of rapidly growing Russian influence in the Middle East must be tempered by greater appreciation of the beleaguered Soviet economy and of Arab nationalism. Furthermore, Bucknell's program requires a receptive polity and a generous economy, together with an expanding bureaucracy to manage it. None appears soon likely to materialize.

Even so, this book is a helpful corrective to current denials of an energy crisis. Despite declines in national demand and oil imports, energy remains a dangerous, unresolved problem. Bucknell has speculated about the causes. Among the strengths of his work are its interdisciplinary approach, its willingness to examine other viewpoints, its emphasis on the complexities of fashioning energy policy, and its recognition of the need for simultaneous pursuit of conservation and new sources of power. Provocative and unsettling, Bucknell raises hard questions about tomorrow, which, if he is to be believed, require action today.

MICHAEL B. STOFF
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Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics *edited by Richard K. Betts. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1981. 612 pp. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $15.95.*

Robert Benchley once dismissed an exceedingly long book on aquatic mammals with the one liner: "This book tells me more about seals than I wish to know." The initial temptation is to do the same with this 612-page opus on cruise missiles; it covers, often repetitively, almost every aspect of the technology, politics, and possible modes and purposes of deployment of this weapons system. But to be fair, it must be acknowledged that most of the contributions are of a high order; they are carefully researched, well-argued and clearly written.

Of particular interest to this reviewer is the chapter by Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden on the domestic politics of cruise missile development. The authors challenge the notion that the arms race is inexorably driven by technological imperatives. They argue that technology is a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain weapons development and acquisition. In the case of cruise missiles they document that each of the services opposed its development for parochial reasons of its own. It took frequent high-level political intervention to begin and then sustain the weapons' development—intervention motivated by expectations that cruise missiles would be chief and unconstrained by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT).

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Another chapter that deserves special mention is Bruce Bennett and James Foster's debunking of the strategic merits of the cruise missile. Based on what appears to be a careful and sound quantitative analysis of the expected pre-launch survivability of the weapon and of its ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, they conclude that there are numerous potential constraints affecting the use of cruise missiles. To be effective against hard targets, pre-launch survivability and penetrability would have to be high while the missile's circular error of probability (CEP) would have to be extremely small. Even if these characteristics were achieved—something that is far from apparent at the moment—the lengthy flight time of cruise missiles makes them useless against time urgent targets like missile silos. Against other hard targets, cruise missiles are still less cost effective than MIRVed ballistic missiles.

Use of cruise missiles against soft military targets is also limited to the extent that such targets are mobile or movable. In the last resort, the weapon may only be effective against countervalue, that is, urban-industrial, targets. Even here there are problems because most American targeting scenarios call for the destruction of cities only as a last resort. This puts a premium on pre-launch survivability, a serious drawback to air- and ground-launched cruise missiles. Finally, Bennett and Foster ask, if cruise missiles are to be used for city busting, what is the purpose of nuclear submarine missile force, an existing force admirably suited to this purpose?

The cruise missile may be yet another weapon system in search of a mission. This is hinted at by Richard Betts in his introduction where he suggests that cruise missiles evolved without any well-defined concept of their need. In part, this was because research and development operated independently of the policy-making process as is most often the case with American weapons acquisition programs. In the conclusion to the book, Betts ponders the likelihood that while cruise missiles may be of limited strategic value, they may nevertheless be as destabilizing as any other counterforce weapon if the Soviets attribute some first strike capability to them, as indeed they seem to do. What should be done with this strategic white elephant? Initially, as we have observed, the cruise missile program required political intervention to keep it alive and to speed it up. Today, Betts suggests, that same intervention may be required to slow the program down in order to minimize its political effects upon both the Soviet Union and our NATO allies.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
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Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character *by Fawn M. Brodie. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1981. 574 pp. $18.95.*

A situation often confronting professors is how to evaluate term papers that demonstrate extensive research but misapply the data so meticulously gathered. This is the situation in evaluating this book. Brodie has done an excellent job collecting the data from primary as well as secondary sources. Indeed, this is by far the most exhaustive biography on Nixon's early years. Its value, however, as a source for additional knowledge on Nixon's early years is counterbalanced by the author's attempt to turn the data into a psychobiography.

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The essential requirement of a psychobiography is the explicit use of a given personality theory, usually Freudian or neo-Freudian, in explaining a person's behavior patterns. This is what Brodie attempted to do, but her use of the psychoanalytic framework leaves something to be desired.

One of Brodie's major themes, for example, is the role of "unnecessary lies" in Nixon's life. She discusses lying as pathology and as a way of life and paints a picture of Nixon as a compulsive liar who would make unnecessary false statements that could be easily proven as false. This approach might have been valid had she remained consistent, but she did not. Instead she also accuses Nixon of being an opportunistic liar and herein lies the problem. Part of the time Brodie discusses Nixon's lying as having, in the Freudian tradition, an unconscious motivation. On the other hand, she also accuses Nixon of lying for political benefit, thus indicating a conscious motive. She goes further by claiming that Nixon enjoyed his lying. If I remember my Freud correctly, one never gets pleasure out of compulsive behavior. It seems Brodie wanted to have her cake and eat it, too, especially when one considers the type of evidence offered to support her thesis of unnecessary compulsive lies.

Among these are the following two examples: In the "Checkers" speech he called his wife Patricia Ryan and said she was born on St. Patrick's day. The truth is her given name is Thelma Catherine Ryan and she was born on the sixteenth, not the seventeenth, of March. On a trip to France, Nixon claimed he majored in French; he actually majored in history. Were these compulsive lies or conscious attempts by a skillful politician to gain a political advantage? Or was Nixon using a first name his wife preferred? Is every misstatement a conscious or unconscious lie? If so, one wonders what Brodie would do with the multitude of misstatements of our current president.

The real problem with this book is that the author's dislike for Nixon shows through her claim of objectivity, particularly in her use of "loaded" terms. She refers to Nixon's memoirs as "a masterful study in omissions and half-truth" (p. 18). (Note the word "masterful" which indicates a conscious motive.) She labels Nixon's senatorial secret fund a "slush fund" on the "fringes of political graft" (p. 280), even though she admits it was legally acquired. She accuses Nixon of writing "deceptively" about the Hughes loan to his brother Harold (p. 438). (Again note the world "deceptively," implying a conscious motive.) Indeed, she makes her case extreme by using a reference from *Six Crises* in which Nixon applauded his wife's handling of the press during the period of Eisenhower's heart attack (she told the press he wasn't home). Brodie accuses him of lauding his wife for "her skill in deceiving the press" (p. 141).

Brodie sets up a double standard. She talks about Nixon's "slush fund" but excuses Stevenson's use of a secret fund of his own. She calls Lyndon Johnson's lying "lying to delight" while condemning Nixon's lying as "delight in lying" (p. 26). Although I can understand her allusion to the Texas Tall Tale, I don't think that can be used to explain away all of Johnson's misstatements.

It would be remiss, however, not to mention some very good points made in this book. The theme of survival without love is a good one. Her emphasis on Nixon's life-long identity crisis is also a point well taken. It is too bad that Brodie let her feelings interfere with her objectivity. While reading this book, I was struck by the difference between it and her earlier work on Jefferson, a much more objective psychobiography. After finishing the

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Nixon book, I had an urge to demand that psychobiographers be barred from writing about people they dislike. While this would create a huge gap in the literature, it would do wonders for the reputation of psychobiography.

J. PHILIPP ROSENBERG
Memphis State University

Press, Party, and Presidency *by Richard L. Rubin. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1982. 246 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $6.95.*

Rubin's extended essay on the relationships among press, party, and presidency at various points in American history draws upon the insights of E. E. Schattschneider, Richard Neustadt, Donald Matthews, and others to argue that the press has accelerated the decline of political parties in America. He further argues that the press has assumed certain functions previously performed by party—circulating political intelligence, mediating between presidential candidates and the party rank-and-file in the nominating process, assessing the prospects for success of their candidacies and thereby affecting those prospects, and channeling demands from publics to policy-makers. Assumption of these tasks by the press has had deleterious consequences for governance in the United States, increasing the volume of demands on the federal government and the rapidity (and heat) with which they are transmitted, while at the same time weakening the president's ability to respond by changing public policy.

In America's formative era, much of the press became dependent upon patronage from political leaders, both for financial well-being and for the very freedom to publish. Newspapers formed close attachments to various political factions in the cabinet and the Congress, as well as to the president. Partisan links among newspapers enabled factions in Washington to reach out along those networks to local notables across the country. In depicting the press as partners with party and president in this period, Rubin may exaggerate the degree to which patronage of the press strengthened the hand of the president in relation to his rivals in cabinet, while perhaps understating the importance that the press took on for a national political elite quite removed from the rest of the country in satisfying its need for popular legitimation. The press, in effect, stood in the people's place.

Rubin shows how the Jacksonian revolution exploited the partisan press to invigorate the presidency by establishing a more direct electoral connection with the organization of a political party outside the Congress in the country at large. The partisan press helped mobilize the electorate, partly through an increase in the quantity and velocity of political communication circulating throughout the country and partly through the incivility of its rhetoric. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Rubin continues, technological change, economic concentration, and new market strategies gave the press a more secure financial base, freeing it from its earlier dependence upon party. As press partisanship declined and its content turned away from politics toward "human interest" stories, the press contributed to political fragmentation in the nation, the localization of politics, and the dispersal of power.

Today television, by nationalizing and politicizing news content, has increased the

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speed with which political information is transmitted to a mass audience. Yet television newscasting, in adhering to conventions of fairness or balance and reflecting the Progressives' distrust of political party, tends to promulgate anti-partisan views of politics, a tendency most pronounced in its depicting the primary process as the genuinely democratic way of nominating presidents. The effect, says Rubin, has been to grease the downward slide of parties in the political process. The bureaucratic specialization of the print press, he might have added, facilitates dissemination of demands by non-party groups in the polity.

One consequence of the new politics has been a succession of one-term presidents, each enjoying only brief moments of political effectiveness. The author traces the weakened presidency to an erosion of what Neustadt calls "public prestige," the perception in the eyes of Washingtonians of how their publics—and the president's—are likely to react to the president's acts in office. (It is often confused with popularity, as measured by the president's approval or disapproval rating in the Gallup poll.) Without a stable base for public prestige in party loyalty, presidential popularity has become very volatile.

More broadly, presidents today suffer from the lack of correspondence among the coalition they need for getting the nomination, the coalition they need for gaining election, and the coalition they need for governing, once in office. One possible response to this new political environment is the traditional favorite of political science: a disciplined and responsible party government. That was, more or less, the response of the Reaganauts, who ran for election on a set of national themes with centralized financing. The election of 1980 was the triumph of party organization, not of single-issue groups.

Rubin's book, in directing attention away from the direct political effects of the news media and toward their indirect effects, especially on institutions, addresses a significant set of questions, propounds a concisely and provocatively stated thesis, and performs a service for those who teach, study, and practice American politics in the 1980s.

LEON V. SIGAL
The Brookings Institution

Fear of Fear: A Survey of Terrorist Operations and Controls in Open Societies *by John B. Wolf. New York, Plenum Press, 1981. 235 pp. $22.00.*

Wolf's opening statement reads, "Terrorism, when employed on an international . . . scale, is intended to convince major world powers that there is a real and urgent need for them to correct the conditions responsible for its utilization" (p. 3). This may have been true of the initial motivation of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorism, but in fact very little contemporary terrorism can be explained in this way. Much originates from other motives including ideology, revenge, hatred, and factional rivalries. Wolf does not adequately differentiate terrorism from other modes of conflict and fails to provide an account of the main types of terrorism and terrorist movement.

Despite the author's confident assertion that there is a "global terrorist coalition" he is not convincing on this aspect of his subject and does not draw on the wide range of foreign press reports that other writers, such as Claire Sterling, have sifted through. More-

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over, there are some basic factual errors. We are told that Sandinista guerrillas from Nicaragua were training "at Palestinian commando bases in Jordan" in spring of 1972 (p. 7). But the PLO had already been ruthlessly driven out of Jordan in autumn 1970. The Irish Republican Army's gunrunning ship mentioned as having been intercepted off the Irish coast in 1971 (p. 11) was actually intercepted on 29 March 1973.

Wolf's most insistent theme is "that American law-enforcement agencies lack a well-developed and co-ordinated program to meet the challenge posed by terrorism . . ." Yet although he argues that the Americans "should, perhaps, adopt the British solution to this threat" (p. 52), his observations on the British response are extremely cursory. He alludes to the British Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (1974), but does not deal with its main provisions and effects. Misleadingly, he also mentions the British debate about whether identity cards should be introduced without making clear that this was not included in the 1974 Act. The section on Britain (pp. 109–12) contains no reference to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (1973), the Diplock courts, or internment. Wolf's treatment of France, Spain, Italy, and West Germany is similarly sketchy.

The most provocative chapter deals with adapting prison systems to deal with terrorists. It suggests a wide range of security measures to protect the lives of inmates and staff and to defeat the efforts of terrorists to use the prisons as bases for organizing terrorism. Wolf includes a valuable recommendation for additional education for prison staff "in the area of political ideology, sociology, and psychology for the purpose of understanding and countering the spread of revolutionary propaganda among inmates" (p. 69). One original proposal, however, is not enough to justify recommending this expensive book.

Most of the other aspects of anti-terrorist policy Wolf mentions have already been dealt with more effectively in other well-known works which are not even included in his bibliography. A final disappointment is that the promised investigation of the abortive American rescue mission in Iran never materializes. Wolf clearly has a good background knowledge of American terrorism, so often neglected or underestimated, and of U.S. police needs and methods. Sadly, this book wastes his opportunities.

PAUL WILKINSON
University of Aberdeen

The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 *by Bruce Cumings. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 606 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $14.50.*

This is a major restatement of both the causes of the Korean War and the role which postwar Korea played in the development of the Cold War. The present volume deals with the pre-1945 setting for and the 1945–47 formative period of the American Occupation, while the projected second volume will carry the story up to 1950. Cumings argues that the Korean War was not a thunderclap out of nowhere in June 1950, but rather had roots deep within the traditional and colonial history of Korea and within the wartime and immediate postwar Korean policy of the United States.

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In the first part of the book, Cumings presents a fine synopsis of the traditional social structure of Korea and the effects of 35 years of Japanese colonial rule. The left–right split which emerged after the Japanese surrender had its genesis in the civil issues of the colonial period, which left Korea "ripe for revolution in 1945 . . . land conditions and relationships, especially in the south, augured revolution" (p. xxvii). Part two traces the American Occupation through its first two years. The conflicts of this period continued to be fundamentally civil and revolutionary, and the two powers more or less chose sides in the domestic struggle in Korea. American Occupation policies from the beginning tilted sharply toward the Korean Right and set the stage for the rightist autocracy which emerged in 1947. Part three is an extended discussion of the suppression of Leftist radicalism in the South by the American Occupation forces in the first year of occupation.

Postwar developments in Korea are also dealt with in their international dimension as a facet of the emerging Cold War. There was a dichotomy in American Occupation policy between the liberal internationalism of Roosevelt and the State Department and the exclusivist nationalism and containment of the American Occupation forces in Korea. The death of Roosevelt *did* make a difference, for it left internationalist forces in America in disarray, while the Occupation gave the nationalists an outlet and Truman gave them a sympathetic hearing. Also, the American Occupation was wracked by a tension between liberation and punitive occupation. The visceral anti-Communism of the Occupation forces militated a rigid policy of suppressing radicalism and the Left. This undermined the reformist edge of liberal internationalism in Korea and, ironically, Korea ended up getting "the occupation designed for Japan" (p. 128).

This is a masterful study. It is thoroughly researched, painstakingly documented, and beautifully produced. Specific points of criticism are few and come across as picayune beside the very impressive accomplishment of the book itself. A simple map of Korea with cities, provinces, and railroads would have been most useful, and additional rosters for the Korean Provisional Government, the Korean Democratic Party, and the Korean Communist Party like that for the Korean People's Republic, would have helped reduce the confusion caused by a forbidding plethora of Korean names. The only substantive qualm, however, is ideological in nature. The American Occupation is portrayed as relentlessly sloppy and culturally insensitive, while the Soviet Occupation in the North is depicted, by contrast, as circumspect and tolerant, or perhaps just lucky. The short chapter on the Soviet Occupation in the North is both too late (second from the end) and too brief to allay skepticism. Cumings's thesis that it was the American Occupation forces which undermined Soviet–American cooperation in Korea will prove highly provocative, and much of that debate will revolve around how much of his thesis is refracted through his ideological proclivities. Nevertheless, this work places Korea at the cutting edge of the Cold War. It is a deeply disturbing and thought-provoking study.

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The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy *by Lawrence Freedman. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981. 473 pp. $35.00.*

Freedman's history of theories and policies concerning nuclear weapons is thorough, judicious, and objective. It serves as a fine introduction to the subject or a useful aid to a graduate student trying to learn the field. But the book has the vices of its virtues: because it covers so many subjects and such a long period of time, it cannot go into much detail, and because it recounts so many events and arguments, it is more descriptive than analytical. It does not break new ground and will not tell specialists in the field much that they did not know already, although it may remind them of some things they have forgotten. It concentrates on how doctrines developed and does not try to explain why they developed as they did. Partly for this reason, the book does not provide either predictions about how strategy may develop in the future or—a more troubling deficiency—the analytic tools with which one might try to estimate future developments.

The main strengths of the work are its comprehensiveness and even-handedness. Few significant aspects of strategic thinking over the past 35 years are omitted. Particularly welcome to Americans will be the coverage of European thinkers, who are usually given short shrift in American accounts. The treatment of Soviet thought, while brief, is cogent and to the point. Freedman has no axes to grind, which is unusual in this controversial area. He presents careful criticisms of all the theories and notes both the advantages and drawbacks of proposed policies. Neither hawks nor doves will have reason to feel that their views have been short-changed or distorted.

One obvious question remains unanswered, and not even squarely faced, after four hundred pages of text: What are the relationships between the strategic thinking and writing of the analysts, on the one hand, and the policies of various governments on the other? If one has influenced the other, which is cause and which is effect? Are both analyses and U.S. policy the products of an "American approach"? Have both theory and policy been largely determined by external events? Obviously no simple and definitive answers are possible, but even an "internal history" of strategic thinking would be strengthened by providing some guidance about them. The book also suffers from a lack of emphasis and does not stress recurring themes. The largely chronological approach ensures that little will be omitted, but it does not highlight turning points or problems which reappear under slightly different guises in various eras.

Even with its imperfections, Freedman's book is an extremely useful guide to strategic thought which will remain one of the standard works on the subject. It would be nicely complemented by the publication of James King's manuscript "The New Strategy," to which Freedman refers, a study which is less comprehensive but more analytical than Freedman's.

ROBERT JERVIS
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The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene *edited by Richard H. Solomon. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1981. 323 pp. Cloth, $13.95; paper, $5.95.*

How important an actor is China in global politics and what place does the Sino-American relationship have in the foreign policies of the People's Republic and the United States? These are the questions addressed by the nine essays in this volume from a Council on Foreign Relations–American Assembly conference held in March 1981. To the extent that one can extract a single answer from a diverse set of chapters, it is that China remains a regional actor with limited power and that the Sino-American relationship is of lesser significance than some of the China enthusiasts of a few years ago made it out to be. This new sobriety, while it may be in part another small swing of the oscillating relations between the United States and China, is perhaps a better basis on which to institutionalize the relationship, the process suggested by Michel Oksenberg in his chapter on the domestic political sources of Peking's and Washington's policies toward each other.

The volume begins with an American orientation, but quickly moves onto analyses of China's international relations from both regional and functional perspectives. The book might better be read backwards since the last three essays by Robert A. Scalapino, Lucian W. Pye, and Harry Harding on Chinese relations with Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Third World, respectively, are the most substantive and informative of the set. Scalapino concludes his succinct and impressive survey with the suggestion that the United States aid China's economic development in order to build Asian stability but refrain from seeking a military entente because it might make our friends and allies as unhappy as our adversaries in Moscow. Unlike many China scholars, Scalapino is unafraid to call Taiwan a state, rather than a province as Peking insists, in his discussion of PRC–Taiwan relations. Pye's characteristically puckish and provocative essay includes a superb section on Sino-Vietnamese relations that sheds light on China's motives for seeking Sino-American normalization in 1978. He implies that the Carter administration did less well in the negotiations towards that goal than it might have or than Oksenberg's interesting but partially self-serving essay claims it did. (Oksenberg was Carter's China specialist on the National Security Council.) Harry Harding's careful review of China's Third World relations sketches the costs and benefits of Peking's construction of an anti-Soviet global united front as the essence of its foreign policy, although the PRC has shifted back toward a more pro-Third World stance in the past year.

Unfortunately, the essays by Strobe Talbott, William G. Hyland, and William E. Griffith on the strategic dimensions of U.S.-PRC relations, Sino-Soviet relations, and China and Europe, respectively, are of considerably less interest. Griffith's chapter is a bit too glib while Talbott and Hyland merely repeat the conventional wisdom in a superficial way.

Like all too many works of this genre, the volume suffers from the unequal dedication of its multiple contributors. Solomon's introductory essay nicely sets forth the book's themes, but his editorial hand has rested a little too lightly on his fellow authors. After reading the other essays one must return to his first chapter for want of a proper conclusion. Despite these shortcomings, it is a very useful collection that addresses the central issues in current U.S.-China relations and provides broad contexts for prudent choice of

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policy. The paperback edition should find its way into many classrooms where U.S. foreign policy and East Asian international relations are being taught.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, & Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan *by Ray S. Cline. Washington, D.C., Acropolis Books, 1981. 351 pp. $12.50.*

This is a partisan argument for the strengthening of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the lines put forward by the Reagan administration. It is a scholarly, level-headed, reasonable argument, carefully and modestly advanced, maintaining the high quality we have come to expect from Cline, a career CIA officer, once deputy director, and author of a number of widely-praised works on intelligence. But it is nevertheless partisan and argumentative.

The book surveys the history of central intelligence, from its birth as the Office of Strategic Services in World War II to the 1980s. Most of it has already been published under a different title—*Secrets, Spies and Scholars*—and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this new edition, which takes a cursory glance at Carter and the CIA and a rather long look at the proposed Reagan changes, was hurried off the presses to provide intellectual and political justification for the latter.

Cline's earlier book on the CIA is well known and thus, although it takes up 90 percent of the new edition, need not be discussed here. What is of interest is Cline's treatment of the CIA under Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Ford started the agency on the road to recovery from the various debacles of the early seventies, especially by the appointment of George Bush as director, with a resulting "rise in moral and renewed effectiveness" (p. 269), only to have his reforms cut short by Carter. Cline charges that Carter had little understanding of intelligence problems and, "a novice in government," he "quickly fell under the influence of Vice President Mondale. . . . Unhappily, Mondale's views on the CIA . . . were quite negative" (p. 269). The result was four years of a hamstrung CIA, almost fatally weakened in its attempts to act or analyze.

By contrast, "the prospect for revival under . . . the Reagan-Bush-Casey team is almost a miracle" (p. 309). Morale is up because of Reagan's proposals to loosen the bonds that restrict the CIA's ability to act and to collect information, and because the new head of the CIA, "Bill" Casey, has impressive "professional and political qualifications" (p. 311) and is dedicated to his job. Cline gives his enthusiastic support to the "Reagan agenda" for the CIA, which he argues will enable the United States "to protect its own secrets and find out those of others," which is crucial if the country "is to survive and prosper" (p. 325).

Cline has suggestions of his own. He advocates making the director a Cabinet member. He wants the CIA involved in "the process of policy planning and decision-making" (p. 317), and thinks the "popular image of intelligence" must be changed to show that "most of the work is neither illegal nor immoral" (p. 322). To that end, he would change

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the name of the agency: "Many of CIA's liabilities are no fault of its own," he writes, "but realism suggests we might do better with a new label" (p. 322).

Of more interest to scholars is Cline's suggestion that the nation make a better utilization of the research and analysis work done by the CIA. He believes that one-half to three-quarters of the reports prepared by the CIA could safely be made available to Congress and the scholarly community, which would "improve legislative understanding of international issues" and would greatly benefit "university scholars, journalists, and citizens who need objective facts to guide them in thinking about . . . international developments" (p. 323).

Cline concludes with an affirmation of faith: "It ought to be possible to persuade Congress . . . that this nation needs the best national intelligence system that can be devised . . . I believe that Reagan, Bush, and Casey can carry out this necessary task" (p. 325).

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
University of New Orleans

The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From "Solo" to Memphis *by David J. Garrow. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1981. 320 pp. $15.95.*

This book has two purposes. The author not only purports to explain why the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursued Martin Luther King, Jr., but also builds on his analysis to offer an interpretation of why the FBI was so preoccupied with domestic political intelligence. Relying chiefly on recently declassified FBI files and interviews with former Bureau officials and veterans of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, Garrow has compiled a richly-detailed account of the FBI's efforts to discredit Dr. King and to influence the politics of civil rights. His explanation of the Bureau's behavior, however, is neither original nor convincing.

Documenting three distinct phases of the King probe, Garrow nonetheless provides little evidence for his contention that the motives of senior Bureau officials changed abruptly during each phase. Instead, he subscribes to several themes outlined in Richard Hofstadter's impressionistic essay on the "Paranoid Style in American Politics." Having learned in 1962 that King was relying for advice on a man named during the 1950s by a prized Bureau informant as having been active in Communist party financial affairs, the FBI escalated its surveillance of King. During this phase of the investigation, according to Garrow, FBI officials were motivated by the honest fear that King's confidant, Stanley Levison, was a Communist agent. Although the FBI failed to uncover a single piece of supporting evidence despite nearly six years of round-the-clock electronic surveillance, Garrow assumes that the proponents of the paranoid style within the Bureau simply interpreted their failure as a sign that they were dealing with a very sophisticated agent.

Bureau officials certainly sought evidence of Communist infiltration of the civil rights movement. The purpose of all the wiretaps and bugs, however, was much broader. The FBI routinely collected and disseminated derogatory political and personal information on dissidents. In the King case, the FBI drew a blank on the Levison-Moscow connection. But the electronic surveillance did uncover some startling facts about King's personal life.

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During this next phase of the investigation in 1964–65, then, the Bureau largely ignored Levison and set out to destroy King as a national leader. To explain this as a fundamental change in motives rather than simply a change in tactics, Garrow contends that William C. Sullivan, the FBI official who guided the Bureau's efforts, was dominated by "a Puritanism on matters of personal conduct and sexual behavior that stemmed from his own rural New England background." J. Edgar Hoover acquiesced in Sullivan's search and destroy mission, Garrow adds, because he enjoyed using the tapes to entertain his fellow voyeurs in high places.

Garrow ultimately attempts to make sense out of the King case and, indeed, the entire history of the Bureau's domestic intelligence gathering operations by presenting the FBI as a representative American institution. Bureau officials were simply dominated by nativistic, xenophobic, and ethnocentric qualities which had long been present in American popular culture, and FBI target selection was identical to what "much" of American society would have chosen if only given the chance. The problem with this analysis, as FBI files dating back to the New Deal years reveal, is that senior Bureau officials did not consider themselves mere guardians of the dominant political culture. Garrow is correct in dismissing such popular explanations of past abuses as the inevitable consequence of the cult of personality that J. Edgar Hoover nourished. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a step forward to interpret Hoover's FBI as a hodgepodge of Puritans, voyeurs, and zealots searching for phantom conspiracies rather than a disciplined, resourceful, and highly motivated political elite with an impressive record of influencing national politics and shaping public opinion.

KENNETH O'REILLY
Marquette University

The Political Involvement of Adolescents *by Roberta S. Sigel and Marilyn B. Hoskin. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1981. 353 pp. $25.00.*

Sigel and Hoskin's recent study provides us with a more detailed map of the political world of the adolescent than we have had before. In so doing, they not only enlarge our understanding of the process by which citizenship is acquired, they also invite us to think more comprehensively about the nature of political involvement.

One of the strengths of this work is the care taken by the authors to elaborate the conceptual underpinnings of their empirical investigation, especially their understanding of political involvement. Their notion of political involvement is an encompassing one. They discuss what they call the cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions of involvement; that is, what people know, how they feel, and what they do with respect to the political system. Furthermore, their concept of the behavioral component includes not only conventional activities such as writing letters to government officials, but unconventional ones such as participating in demonstrations as well. Using the results of both open-ended personal interviews and paper-and-pencil questionnaires administered in the spring of 1974 to 1,000 graduating seniors from randomly selected Pennsylvania high

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schools, they find that these concepts are, indeed, separable but related aspects of adolescent political involvement.

The timing of their study is particularly propitious. Since the data were collected on the eve of the Nixon resignation, Sigel and Hoskin are able to delineate the responses of young people to Watergate. It is noteworthy that the reactions of the young in many ways paralleled those of adults. It will be interesting to see if these events form the kernel of the political consciousness of the generation that came of political age during the seventies in the way that the depression of the thirties and McCarthyism of the fifties became central to the political worlds of earlier generations.

What is frustrating about Sigel and Hoskin's study is that they lack a comparative reference point on which to moor their findings. When they point out, for example, that no more than 53 percent of their adolescent respondents could answer correctly more than half of a list of 14 factual questions about American government, one is unsure how to evaluate this half-full glass. Had we been provided with some basis for comparison—the figures for American adults, for high school seniors in the fifties, or for young people abroad—their results would have been more meaningful. If they follow up their study in a decade, it will be fascinating to see what changes have taken place. Without such a comparative anchor, however, the reader is cast adrift. In spite of this reservation, I recommend this volume to any student of the process of political learning.

KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
Boston College

Environmental Mediation: The Search for Consensus *edited by Laura M. Lake. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980. 233 pp. $22.00.*

Mediation techniques are receiving attention these days and there is increasing experimentation in a variety of contexts. This volume, edited by Laura Lake, who also authored five of the nine chapters, is an attempt to examine mediation in environmental decision-making. Lake states that the *objective* of the book is to examine how "policy implementation at the local and regional level affects intergovernmental relations, institutional authority, and local interest group behavior" (p. 3). In recent years states have come to take a more significant role in the carrying out of federal laws and regulations. The first three chapters establish the rationale for mediation in environmental issues, and the remaining six chapters are illustrative case studies.

While the judicial system has become generally overburdened, courts have been asked to take on a greater role in environmental matters, adjudicating both substantive and procedural conflicts. Lake, however, contends that adversarial postures and judicial review should be supplanted by a consensus-building process that would restore legitimacy to administrative action.

Although environmental litigants have used the courts as a place of last resort, thereby acquiring visibility and legitimacy, Lake explains that litigation isn't always the best strategy for environmentalists, because of such factors as financial cost, lack of focus on substantive issues, and a shortage of qualified lawyers. Lake further demonstrates that until

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recently, the courts took on substantive rather than legal disputes and that such judicial review diminished administrative authority and direction. She suggests that the pluralist system has not rewarded environmentalists, although it works well for interests having the power to control the management of conflicts.

Lake makes an important point in noting that mediation is not appropriate where conflict has not yet emerged (p. 72). Issues may need redefinition and the active involvement of committed, public-oriented interest groups before any compromise can be negotiated. To offer mediation too early is to discourage conciliation in disputes. It places the issue in the context of a political subterfuge where interests are coopted even before the game has started. For example, the issue may not be a choice between a coal-fired or a nuclear power plant, but rather, whether a power plant is needed at all; why those are the two choices presented by utility companies and who makes decisions and in whose interests are questions that may never surface. Mediation and its associated techniques may presume a consensus by assuming all parties are equal. Lake recognizes this problem by noting that the success of any mediation process requires that all relevant groups be adequately represented (p. 65).

Chapter 6 deals with an experiment in conflict reduction with the expressed goal of "involving the public in programmatic decision-making" during the pre-planning stage (p. 147). Building into the decision-making process additional sources of information might produce a greater level of agreement with better decisions as perceived by the participants. Lake notes that this process "leaves the participants with feelings of political efficacy. . ." (p. 148). Environmental interest groups need a real measure of influence, however; participation is not sufficient.

The problem of maintaining neutrality in project evaluation is illustrated in Chapter 7 by Lake. A University of California, Los Angeles dispute-avoidance project was designed to examine the impact of "conventional and innovative technologies" with the objective of suggesting a research and development strategy (p. 150).

"Clean" coal was considered as one example in this evaluation. The phrase implies that technology exists to burn coal without harmful pollutants being emitted into the atmosphere and that this is an option which will comply with federal environmental standards. The problem turns on the word "clean." While certain amounts of sulfur can be removed from coal prior to and during the combustion process, carcinogenic substances like dioxins and benzopyrenes still enter the atmosphere. Federal air quality standards exist for sulfur dioxide emissions but not these other pollutants (including sulfates which contribute to acid rain); this makes coal a questionable alternative. In this case, our level of information is low and technology must still be discovered to make coal "clean." The point is that all choices involve value preferences and adding the adjective "clean" to coal confuses our ability to choose.

The other cases in the volume concern energy facility siting (Lake), New England coal conversion (Peter Clark), computer assistance (Donald Strauss), and the Westside Highway dispute in New York City (Lake). The major strength in these case studies is the opening of the political process through education before decisions are made, perhaps making mediation unnecessary.

The volume is a welcome journey into an old field—mediation which in the past has been used for resolving disputes of a personal and family nature, labor-management con-

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flicts, and other social conflicts. There are some areas more amenable to mediation than others. One must exercise caution with environmental (political) issues and not presume that mediation is always the appropriate avenue. The fact that a volume has been devoted to the subject indicates that the environment is a continuing and critical interest and recognizes that so far government institutions have proved less than adequate. Lake's study provides an informative and worthy exploration of the prospects of mediation and makes a valuable contribution to the study of environmental issues.

REGINA AXELROD
Adelphi University

U.S. v. Crime in the Streets *by Thomas E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1981. 212 pp. $17.50.*

This book charts the rise and fall of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which was created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968. Because of its breadth, it makes a contribution to the "bill becomes a law" tradition. It places the 1968 Act in historical perspective by recounting the ways crime emerged as a salient *national* issue in the 1964 election and the manner in which this sentiment was translated into a legislative agenda and action. It describes President Johnson's legislative proposal for one more Great Society categorical grant program and the proposal's transformation by Congress into the first major block grant program. It tracks continued presidential interest and congressional oversight and amendments and describes the LEAA's effective end. Given its scope, this book will be a valuable reference on the history of the national policy on crime during the 1960s and 1970s.

As implied in their title and in discussions throughout the book, the authors develop their thesis that the "war on crime" was a failure. Yet curiously—perhaps because it was so obvious to so many people—the authors never make the notion of failure, the metaphor of war, or the rhetoric that accompanied it sufficiently problematic. The result is a confusing and over-determined explanation of "what went wrong." At times the authors identify lack of goals, lack of leadership, inadequate planning, and weak evaluation as causes of failure. Yet simultaneously they acknowledge that LEAA's goal to reduce crime was unrealistic because we don't know how to curb crime. If this latter observation is correct and if this was the standard for success, LEAA's failure was ordained from the outset. Thus, discussions of problems of leadership, multiple goals, mismanagement, and the like simply serve to mask those issues which would have loomed larger had the authors probed the meaning and implications of the war metaphor.

The authors are at their best in describing policy formulation; they provide rich details of the legislative history of the 1968 Act and the series of amendments that followed it. However, their examination of *implementation* is disappointing. The central feature of the Act was the requirement that states create planning agencies (SPAs) as a condition for receiving federal funds, and subsequently these agencies administered the bulk of federal funds provided by LEAA. Yet this book is almost entirely about activities in Washington.

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This focus on national officials with only occasional and at times gratuitous observations about state efforts gives a curious imbalance to the study. For instance, it leads the authors to inflate the power of national LEAA officials, over-emphasize mismanagement, and over-state the magnitude and significance of LEAA's manipulation by the Nixon administration. Here one wishes the authors had taken the war metaphor more literally and provided detailed reporting from the trenches, that is, from the states, where 85 percent of the action grant funds were spent.

Not long ago, Herbert Kaufman asked rhetorically, "Are government organizations immortal?" and then went on to explore why they are. Yet here the authors report on a program that died despite a huge interest group which benefited from its largess and in spite of crime remaining a salient public issue. Although a more thorough discussion of the demise of the LEAA would have been desirable, the authors do a considerable service by recounting its history and by documenting that its demise clearly preceded the austerity moves introduced by the Reagan administration.

In one sense this anatomy of LEAA is discouraging, for it tells the story of one more policy failure. Nevertheless, it is also encouraging for we see a political process with all its flaws respond to and eliminate an unacceptable policy, despite its rhetorical appeal.

MALCOLM M. FEELEY
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Toward The Second Decade: The Impact of the Women's Movement on American Institutions *edited by Betty Justice and Renate Pore. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 242 pp. $27.50.*

The book is composed of sixteen speeches delivered at a 1978 conference at West Virginia University. The composite effort demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses so frequently entailed in such projects. Among its strengths should be counted the valiant attempt both to adhere to a unifying theme—the impact of the women's movement—and to span a wide range of topics, from art to health to law. One might have wished for more concentration on the impact of the movement on American official institutions, such as the bureaucracy, academia, and the corporate world, but there is no denying that "institutions" such as the theatre and literature also have exerted pervasive influence.

The collected essays, unfortunately, are astonishingly uneven in quality, so uneven that it is unclear who the designated audience of the book is meant to be. (The conference itself had faculty, students, and community people for its audience.) Some of the essays strike this reviewer as nothing more serious than off-the-cuff remarks made by an invited guest who was unwilling (or unable) to prepare a thoughtful piece on her (no men are included) chosen topic. At best some constitute recollections or reminiscences of "how I got started in such and such an enterprise and why it is an important enterprise," as, for example, the chapters by Maryat Lee and Corinne Jacker. A few other pieces direct us to important developments, such as women's entry into dentistry by Nancy Reynolds and into medicine by Ruth M. Phillips, but are handled in much too cursory a fashion.

A few chapters are so elementary that they turn off the serious reader and probably do

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not do much for the uninitiated lay reader either. For example, the Verheyden-Hilliard one goes over all too familiar ground in its indictment of the public schools' discriminatory socialization of girls. Her observations are certainly correct, but new material was needed to go beyond what is well known by now. Similarly the Burnett chapter is the type of fairly elementary psychology dispensed widely these days in syndicated magazine columns and on television. In writing about continuing education, Robertson spends much too much space describing Erikson's eight stages of human psychological development—also quite well known by now—and not nearly enough on formulating new insights and assessments for so vital an undertaking as continuing education. Fortunately, few chapters are purely subjective or polemic. Only Mary Dunlap's essay must be so characterized. Instead of analyzing the demographic, political, economic, psychological, and other sources of resistance to the women's movement and to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), she engages in polemics and occasional name-calling ("reactionary" p. 165; "lies" p. 166). What a missed opportunity, since this is a topic that cried for scholarly treatment.

Several essays, however, are very well done, even excellent. Nancy Datan's analysis of the aging woman in American feminism is a short piece which opens interesting vistas. Two chapters covering very different topics represent scholarship at its best. First, Pauline Bart and Ellen Perlmutter's discussion of menopause is a first-rate review and analysis of the literature on the topic. Their comments on the contribution made by cultures are insightful and could easily be applied to other phenomena as well. Second, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's account of the litigations of the 1970s is a lucid and fascinating analysis of the strategies and legal evidence employed to promote the principle of constitutional sex equality before a frequently unsympathetic judiciary. For the political scientist her contribution constitutes the highlight of the book.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

Women in Law *by Cynthia Fuchs Epstein. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 438 pp. $18.50.*

Writing a book that will appeal to different audiences is not an easy task, nor is deciding to what audience(s) a book should be directed. The problem with Epstein's book is that the audience question apparently was never resolved. Although Epstein's purpose was to analyze "the changing role of women in the legal profession" (p. 387) and to develop the theme of "the virtual exclusion of women from the [legal] profession to their entry into even the most prestigious and elite domains of law" (p. 265), it is not clear whether the analysis is for the benefit of pre-law students, the women's movement, introductory sociology students, graduate students or researchers in the behavioral sciences, policy-makers, law firms, law professors and deans, or all of the above. Glimpses of Epstein's dilemma in determining the audience may be found both in her concluding chapter and in the appendix discussion of the methodology used in constructing the book. For example, in the former Epstein states: "This study has shown how women have succeeded in mak-

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ing their way into the legal profession, despite the fact that they were not wanted, and how their presence has brought change to them and to the profession as a whole" (p. 380). Having thus strongly suggested that perhaps female pre-law students, the women's movement, law firms, and law school professors and deans may have been the intended audience, Epstein hastens to add: "But it will not have fully accomplished its purpose if it does not alert sociologists, policy-makers, and informed readers to certain sociological findings" (p. 380). Here Epstein suggests that her audience is meant to be at least introductory sociology students and policy-makers, if not also graduate students and researchers in the behavioral sciences.

In addition to the troubling audience problem, the book errs in other areas: the tendency of Epstein's research to focus not on women in law in general but primarily on New York women in law, her superficial treatment of certain issues, and her failure to cite some literature pertinent to her analysis. Nevertheless, this is a book that deserves attention because of its insight into what prompted certain women to choose law as a profession, and the difficult journey to become and remain practicing lawyers.

One of Epstein's best chapters is "Women in the Legal Establishment: Wall Street and the Large Corporate Firms" (pp. 175–218) in which she discusses how some women "cracked" big law firms in New York City, the kinds of specialties "open" to women in these firms, and the steps which apparently must be taken if a woman expects to become a partner in a law firm. Also of value is the discussion of "Feminist Law Firms and Feminist Law Practice" (pp. 130–61). In contrast, the chapters on "Government Practice" (pp. 112–19) and "Benchmarks: Women in the Judiciary" (pp. 237–46) are quite superficial.

Disconcerting, too, is the sometimes uneven quality of the book reflecting either hasty or incomplete research, as well as the tendency to perpetuate certain myths. For example, to prove that "there has always been a tighter rein on women than on men" (p. 35), Epstein states that: "Some of the New York City women did not apply to Columbia University because it was distant from Brooklyn and the Bronx, where many of their families lived" (p. 35). The same could also be said for some males who lived in Brooklyn. The discussion of Jessie Bernard's and Matina Horner's work on "fear of success" (pp. 38ff) is superficial, and in her exposition of patronage in the chapter on women in the judiciary, Epstein apparently overlooks Martin and Susan Tolchin's primary work on the subject. In her chapter on "Husbands, Wives, and Lovers" (pp. 329–57) Epstein perpetuates the pathological view of Black families in which a wife "outranks" her husband. "But this rank disparity has been regarded by both whites and blacks as social pathology. Sociologists like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and black leaders such as Stokeley Carmichael have intimated that it would be best for black women to stand behind black men" (p. 346). Here Epstein ignores the scholarship of sociologists who have devoted considerable attention to the Black family: Andrew Billingsley, Robert Hill, Joyce Ladner, and Robert Staples. Even more astounding is her apparent failure to note that Stokeley Carmichael changed his views long ago. Despite these deficiencies, the volume merits attention.

INEZ SMITH REID
Washington, D.C.

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Women, Work and Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value *edited by Donald J. Treiman and Heidi I. Hartmann. Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1981. 136 pp. $8.75.*

This little book provides an extremely precise and well-written summary of all the relevant aspects of the pay equity issue that is thoroughly accessible to the non-economist. More importantly, however, it goes beyond a simple review of the literature to the presentation of at least some tentative approaches to the achievement of greater pay equity within the firm.

The book was prompted by a request to the National Research Council (NRC) to examine the issues involved in a "comparable worth" concept of job compensation. This request led to the creation by the NRC of a Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis that included members with a wide range of academic specialities and/or corporate experience. The main report represents the consensus reached by the Committee, but the book also includes some supplementary statements made by individual committee members.

The issue of "comparable worth" is being raised more and more frequently in grievances and legal suits. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 requires equal pay for men and women doing *equal work* but there is no language currently in U.S. law that requires equal pay for work of *equal value*, despite a fairly general endorsement of this concept abroad (p. 6). Thus, the Committee's job consisted first of establishing the extent women suffer from wage discrimination resulting from lower pay for jobs which, although not the same as the ones men hold because of substantial job and occupational segregation, are nonetheless of comparable worth from the employer's perspective.

The volume reviews the relevant economic literature including both capital and institutional approaches, resulting in the now familiar conclusion that sex differentials in wages are only partially due to differences in productivity-related personal characteristics such as education and training. A large part of the remaining wage differentials between the sexes can be explained by occupational and job segregation whereby women are concentrated in jobs with lower pay.

After this review of the literature, the Committee chose to focus on only one aspect of wage differentials, namely, those that develop within a firm because of the institutionalization of market inequities undervaluing work done by women. The Committee does not address the issue of inequality in *access* to particular jobs and to opportunities for career advancement—another major source of pay differentials—but this was not part of their original charge from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Committee's concerns were the practical ones of identifying the problems with existing job evaluation schemes and recommending some modifications to the conventional job evaluation approach. The problem here, however, is that within the sector of the economy where pay scales are based on administrative rules (and 50 percent of the U.S. work force is employed by large-scale employers, p. 45), many alternative wage setting approaches are used and only certain types could be reviewed, a fact which prompted a minority report by one member of the Committee.

The report points out that in many current job evaluation schemes, job attributes are weighted for the purpose of establishing internal pay scales by their relative compensation

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in the market place. Thus, wage discrimination is perpetuated. Bias can also be introduced in the way tasks are described and attributes assigned. The Committee proposes with appropriate caveats several statistical approaches for overcoming these problems which should keep labor economists employed for years to come both in the courtroom and in corporate personnel departments.

It is hoped that the book's practical concerns, directed towards the proper diagnosis of wage discrimination and its cure within the wage setting policies of individual firms, will prompt the refinement of job evaluation techniques and statistical analysis. These could bring the concept of comparable worth from the realm of theory to practical reality.

CYNTHIA B. LLOYD
United Nations

America's Struggle Against Poverty: 1900–1980 *by James T. Patterson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 268 pp. $17.50.*

The title of this first-rate book is, unfortunately, something of a misnomer. As the author himself points out, he is essentially concerned with showing "how popular views of poverty, prescriptions of reformers, and governmental programs have affected poor Americans" (p. vii). Moreover, he focuses mainly on the period 1930–1980, with about three-fifths of the text dealing with the 1960s and 1970s. Although somewhat fragmented, this book is a splendid introduction to and review of attitudes in the United States towards the poor and of efforts to ameliorate their condition.

Happily, the author is not one of those whom Allan Nevins would have characterized as being part of the "Dr. Dry-As-Dust school." Patterson treats his subject with verve, energy, and considerable style; he is perceptive and incisive and has a clearly stated point of view that is not polemical. The subject, which all too often has proved to be boring or politicized, is handled with distinction and authority by Patterson.

The author recognizes that, the energetic efforts of social reformers notwithstanding, it was the trauma occasioned by the horrendous effects of the Great Depression that resulted in the institution of state concern with the welfare of the underprivileged. In effect, this welfare state came into being in the 1930s because government was the court of last resort, all other avenues having been explored and found to lead nowhere. Poverty was not part of the American Dream, and the general assumption was that public welfare was "a wasteful handout"—for ultimately prosperity in one form or another would reach all citizens.

The highly publicized "rediscovery" of poverty in the 1960s did not end the general currency of such beliefs, but it did lead to a "virtual revolution" in the definition and distribution of welfare. However one may judge Patterson's explanations of this revolution (and despite his persuasiveness and adroit use of a wide variety of sources, I am still not certain that he is totally on target), there is no gainsaying that the "1960s and early 1970s were years that facilitated aid to those in need. Those were years of peaceful revolution in welfare" (p. 184).

In view of developments on the local, state, and federal levels in recent years, it is also

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not really possible to take issue with Patterson's less than sanguine conclusions about the future of the welfare state in the 1980s in America. Patterson is pessimistic and discouraged about that future, and I believe with good reason. There certainly can be no doubt that "inhospitable opinions about the poor" remain among "the most durable features of America's experience with poverty and welfare since 1900" (p. 209).

It is possible to take issue with the author here and there. For example, one could ask why he paid almost no attention to the active and occasionally effective radical and self-help unemployed groups of the early 1930s. One may also ponder on the blurring from time to time of the distinctions between class and race when Patterson discusses the poor in more recent times. Yet such questions are really quibbles rather than flaws. The book, despite its misleading title, is a well-researched, well-written, well-argued, and well-intentioned monograph. No one with any interest in the subject can afford to ignore it. And anyone concerned with recent American social history should pay attention to it.

DANIEL J. LEAB
Seton Hall University

Social Security Financing *edited by Felicity Skidmore. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 295 pp. $30.00.*

Job and Income Security for Unemployed Workers: Some New Directions *by Saul J. Blaustein. Kalamazoo, Mich., W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1981. 127 pp. Cloth, $7.00; paper, $5.00.*

Ours is an advanced industrial economy characterized by slow growth, high unemployment, inflation, low productivity, and major demographic shifts. The problems that will be encountered in financing Social Security Old Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI) over the next several decades epitomize all of these macro and micro problems. We are, according to Kenneth Prewitt in the Skidmore volume, in a state of "double digit anxiety" (p. 279). Moreover, there appears to be a woeful lack of understanding on the part of the citizenry and the interest groups that represent them concerning the intricacies of OASI financing. This is accompanied by a growing distrust of the ability of public decision-makers either to spell out the appropriate options or to reach viable solutions. The President's National Commission on Social Security Reform, appointed in the fall of 1981, faces a formidable task.

Skidmore's volume is an outgrowth of a conference sponsored by Mathematica Policy Research in the spring of 1980, but that does not mean that the conference papers are dated. Two years later the issues raised here are even more significant. As conference volumes go, this one gets very high marks. Skidmore opens with a 19-page overview of the symposium that reflects not only a summary of the major issues raised in the papers and by the assigned discussants, but extends to a survey of the views of other conference participants. This is followed by Marilyn E. Manser on historical and political issues in OASI financing, George F. Break on economic effects, Richard A. Musgrave on financing options, and Charles E. McClure's paper on the Value Added Tax (VAT). The final contri-

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butions, both by non-economists, are Peter N. Stearn's interest group analysis of attitudes toward OASI financing, and an examination of public attitudes as revealed in opinion polls by D. Garth Taylor. Excellent critique by assigned discussants follows each of the papers.

The conference participants agreed on some points: The manipulation of Social Security taxes and benefits is an inferior instrument for altering savings rates. There is reasonably strong evidence that the system is work-disincentive for retirees, although some research on this point would be useful. The system is mildly redistributive. There is no political agreement as to the goals and purposes of Social Security. The present mixture of contributory annuities and welfare is troublesome; the incidence of Social Security taxes is unclear; and the "retirement contract" is unspecified. Retiree benefits should be indexed to working-force nominal wage rates, not to the Consumer Price Index. Interest groups that have traditionally supported OASI are not in the forefront with proposals for change whereas public attitudes, as revealed in opinion polls, are phlegmatic. In short, the conference was in agreement that this is ". . . a multidimensional entity of unusual complexity" (Break, p. 45).

On other major issues the conference participants could not agree, even on the degree of uncertainty. Joseph A. Pechman advanced the optimistic view that constant replacement ratios could be retained by future increases in payroll taxes, now well below rates found in European countries. Others were less sanguine about future viability, threatened in their view by intergenerational conflict. There was little agreement on the extent to which general revenues should supplement the OASI trust funds and sharp disagreement on the view expressed by Break that VAT should substitute for payroll taxes.

The basic disagreements among careful and thoughtful analysts of Social Security financing is most disturbing. If this is a "political time-bomb" (Diamond, p. 166), then we are, indeed, ". . . woefully unprepared for the debate on the future of Social Security" (Marmor, p. 228).

The last Carter budget for fiscal 1982 proposed budget authority of $11.3 billion for training and employment. This was cut back by the Reconciliation Act of 1981 to $3.9 billion. The current administration proposed a further cutback for fiscal 1983 to $2.9 billion. Although Congress is not likely to accept all of this, it is very likely to accept a major part of the administration's proposals.

Saul J. Blaustein, senior staff economist with the Upjohn Institute, has the misfortune of proposing a substantially expanded role for the federal government in assisting the unemployed at a time when the federal role is contracting. His proposals for a Job Security System (JSS) make great good sense, particularly if economic recovery could improve employment prospects. The author would restructure the multitudinous employment training and welfare-related programs that have developed over the past 20 years. Income support for those who are not in and will not enter the labor market is outside the JSS proposal. The thrust of the scheme is to rationalize training, job search, and placement for the unemployed and the under-employed.

This rationalization would be accomplished by creating a three-tier system. Each tier would have a duration of 13 weeks. The first tier would be directed at workers with experience who have been laid off. They would be supported by conventional unemployment

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insurance and if re-employment prospects were dim, a job search plan would be developed for each worker. The first tier would be financed by state employer payroll taxes.

The second tier would place major emphasis on training and job search plans with income support financed jointly by the federal and state governments. Tier 3 is directed to the long-term unemployed with increased emphasis on training and would be financed solely by federal payroll taxes or general fund revenue. After 39 weeks, the unemployed would move to welfare rolls, or if remaining in JSS, required to job-search week by week. A new federally financed Unemployment Assistance program would support post-third-tier job seekers. The State Employment Services would be very greatly strengthened.

Social Security financing is on the national agenda, whether or not we are prepared for the debate. Unemployment compensation should be on the agenda but is not. There are other programs, related to these, that should also be re-examined: Medicare, Medicaid, Disability Insurance, food stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, to name the most prominent. The political marketplace seems quite unable to take a comprehensive view.

JESSE BURKHEAD
Syracuse University

Rental Housing: Is There a Crisis? *edited by John C. Weicher, Kevin E. Villani, and Elizabeth A. Roistacher. Washington, D.C., Urban Institute Press, 1981. 113 pp. $16.50.*

The Future of Rental Housing *by George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes. New Brunswick, N.J., The Center for Urban Policy Research, 1981. 147 pp. $8.95.*

There is at least a cousinly relationship between these two books. The first is the edited version of papers delivered and discussed at a day-long conference sponsored by the Urban Institute. One of the participants, both as a preparer of a written paper and as speaker, was Sternlieb, the principal author of the second volume. The title of his prepared remarks, incidentally, is the same as the title of his book. So, risking some confusion, it nevertheless seems appropriate to review them in concert.

As the national economy continues to deteriorate—as measured by employment, factory utilization, and decline in the GNP—the crisis in rental housing that was in the forefront of housing discussions when these books were planned has become a more general crisis affecting housing altogether. Yet, as a crisis it seems remarkably muted. Angry crowds are not gathering in the streets to demand rental homes of decent quality at acceptable rents. This is surely not to say that everyone in the United States is satisfied with *his* or *her* or *their* home. But the frantic search for a place to live—though it exists in some parts of the nation—that was typical of the years immediately after World War II is not now part of the American social scene.

The supply of housing, nation-wide, is remarkably good, as all the discussants in both books agree. Not only are vacancy rates on the whole rather high except in areas where prices have been held down by rent control, but by and large, the space per occupant is

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high also, and the quality standards of American housing compare favorably with the standards of every other nation in the world except, perhaps, Abu Dhabi. The crisis, curiously, is on the supply side right now. Builders who have salable houses are having a difficult time getting rid of them because the monthly cost to the consumer, based on the very large amount of capital invested and then magnified by the very high rates of interest that must be paid to lenders, exceeds the capacity of households to pay. The cost is further amplified by the direct and indirect costs of fuel for heating and electric power. As Sternlieb points out in detail in his volume, the pinch was felt first by renters; the ratio of rent to income has climbed from somewhat below 20 percent to a figure much nearer 30, and in the ranks of those most likely to rent—female-headed, low-income urban households—the ratio soars above 30 percent.

Ira S. Lowry, one of the participants in the Urban Institute's symposium, takes the reader back a few years to the time when it was only renters who found housing costs exceeded their means. People who had thought they could afford to buy housing for their own use were, as Sternlieb and others have emphasized, willing to pay more of their income for housing because they regarded their housing expense as part living cost, part clever investment. Lowry sees clearly that the business people who invested in rental housing were the first to discover that the rents they could collect were too low to cover operating costs with enough left over to provide a reasonable return to the equity and debt capitalists who invested in it. This melancholy knowledge has spread now through the ranks of the home owners.

Several of the writers suggest that as home owners find themselves trapped with an investment that prevents them from spending a larger part of their income, there may be a rebirth of rental housing. But, they say, it will be different from the rental housing most students of the field picture when discussing it. The traditional rental housing of the housing specialist is the tenement house, the apartment house, and finally the rental project, owned or perhaps merely subsidized by a governmental agency. The rental housing of the future will increasingly consist of apartments in homes that were originally built to house a single household; or perhaps we shall see an increasing number of three- or four-family homes. One family will be the owner, and, particularly if its members are reasonably handy, they will perform maintenance work without considering that the time they spend is worth anything.

The rental housing industry that was operated by professionals required a combination of political and economic circumstances that seem unlikely to arise again. Thrift institutions were needed to coagulate individual savings; these institutions needed savers who were willing to leave deposits for long periods of time, even though they were not contractually bound to do so, because they expected the withdrawals in the future to have roughly the same purchasing power as the deposits they made. Then, as Frank de Leeuw points out in the Urban Institute volume, as government subsidized more and more housing in order to stimulate production, the mortgage money came from the same shrinking pool of savings as did the mortgage money for unsubsidized apartment houses. It was also important to have local governments very dependent on real property taxes, a dependency that militated against the demands of reformers and tenants for more expensive housing quality standards and laws that would have restricted the freedoms (and taxable returns) of apartment house owners. The freedoms that encourage such investment are

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not only the freedom to raise rents within the ambit of a market, but the freedom to refuse to rent to destructive and unruly tenants. As the national government sought to stimulate more and more housing production, as much to keep the industry working as to provide better quality housing for the people, local governments hurried to impose new restrictions and higher standards on apartment house owners. Some courts have declared them responsible for crimes committed on their premises by wholly unrelated third parties. The owner of a two-family home who rents out an apartment is free from most of this.

The suggestion occurs in a number of the Urban Institute papers, as well as in Sternlieb's book, that the nation has invested too much money in housing, while insisting on standards of space and amenity that the national economy can no longer afford. No one in this collection of economists raises the question of whether the investment was justified on societal grounds. Forty years ago, the housing movement promised the rest of America that a decent home was an essential part of good family life, and many heard its advocates saying that good homes would assure decent family life. As one reads the statistics in these two volumes, one must wonder what the connection is between the very high quality of American homes, judged by simple physical standards at any rate, and the low quality of family life about which so many sociologists complain. The books here throw no light on the ultimate political importance of government stimulation of the production of better housing. Yet it is interesting to read the remarks of thoughtful and sympathetic students of housing and ponder the results of the longest, most successful shelter effort ever put forward by any nation.

ROGER STARR
The New York Times

Joe McCarthy and the Press *by Edwin R. Bayley. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. 270 pp. $16.50.*

Bayley's timely experience as a journalist with the *Milwaukee Journal* enhances a broad survey of other newspapers and interviews with reporters to produce a careful and readable book on the relations between Senator Joe McCarthy and the press. Bayley is particularly effective in describing McCarthy's time in Appleton, Wisconsin, where the senator first learned to use the press, and in detailing his acquisition of strong supporters and detractors among the press in that state. Then, finding a national forum, McCarthy became a master at using the press to his advantage: making news, supplying stories, and claiming authority as the foremost expert on domestic communism.

At the Wheeling, West Virginia speech, generally acknowledged to have launched McCarthy's national career as a communist-fighter, only one reporter was present. That speech was full of ambiguities and no later checking was ever able to clarify what was actually said. Bayley's principal argument is that a more critical press, and one less eager to provide McCarthy with the coverage he craved, would have checked McCarthy's subsequent political impact. Bayley concludes that in the pivotal election of 1952, wherever the local press in Wisconsin opposed McCarthy, it led to a decline in popular vote from what

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it had been in 1946. One problem in accepting this conclusion relates to the comparability of the 1946 and 1952 elections. In the first election, McCarthy was a local political figure, not well known, but pitted against a relatively weak opponent. The 1952 presidential election was the first in two decades when the Republicans could smell success. Like other presidential elections, it attracted higher turnout and added new issues and personalities. At the same time, McCarthy's 1952 support was spotty, and he was by no means the ticket leader. In those areas where support declined, we have plenty of other evidence that urban and rural distinctions as well as factors of social class and ethnicity were crucial in turning voters away from McCarthy (assuming they would otherwise have voted Republican). The extent to which critical newspaper editorials may have activated anti-McCarthy feelings for such voters is simply unknown. It is extremely difficult to attribute causal effects to the mass media, particularly when the end results are expressed as aggregate votes. The most we can say to Bayley, then, is that his case is not proven.

In raising this argument about press effects—regardless of what they are judged to be—Bayley directs us to a basic dilemma inherent in the role of the mass media generally. It is tied to the definition of what is newsworthy and to the responsibility assumed by the media in controlling what some may feel to be the deleterious consequences of publicity given to people or events. Should the media wait for additional evidence of importance? Is editorializing about the news an answer? If the facts are left to speak for themselves, how complete must they be? Bayley disapproves of McCarthy's actions, and while he wishes the press had been more effective in stopping him, he is candid in admitting the ethical quandaries that any concerted effort at suppression of coverage would have represented. The dilemma is a genuine one and still has no easy solution.

If one is not convinced by Bayley's argument about press effects, his account of people and events is still fascinating. His book can be recommended as an important and basically non-polemical contribution to the literature on McCarthy and his time and provides a full picture of what all the political actors were actually doing.

MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections *by Larry J. Sabato. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 376 pp. $20.95.*

Sabato has produced a thorough and well-written book on the new ways in which American elections are won. He examines contemporary techniques such as direct mail, political polling, and spot advertising and also looks at the rapid growth of the political action committees (PACs) that fuel the use of personal rather than party campaign organizations. At the center of those candidate organizations is, of course, the political consultant who supposedly masterminds the linking of popular preferences to specific candidate choices through the use of the new technologies and who also helps raise the money to do it.

While seeing the rise of the political consultant as an important phenomenon—both as a result of weakened political parties and as a cause of their further decline—Sabato is

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able to put the new election "magicians" into a reasoned perspective. They are rarely strong on ideology, and if some stick to candidates of only one party, it is primarily because it is good business and not because of strong philosophical roots. In the 1978 election, one fabled expert, David Garth, was offered jobs by candidates from both parties in 12 different state-wide races. These consultants, the author reminds us, do not have the overwhelming winning records they claim, tending to forget their losers far more quickly than their winners and often improving their win/loss ratios by taking on candidates who are almost certain to win.

Although Sabato feels that these consultants can spell the difference in some campaigns, he feels that they are *perceived* by almost all the political players to be crucial to the winning of elections. The author attributes such perception not only to the consultants' superb sense of promotion but also to journalistic "hype" (p. 15). In a serious attack on the press, he questions the symbiotic relationship that has developed between reporters and political consultants. "In return for the contacts and information, the press treat their valued sources with kid gloves . . . Only the press is in a position to reduce consultants to human size and to examine the damaging effects they and their new campaign technologies are having on the American political system" (p. 310–11). The growth of "image politics," the cult of personality, and a variety of intentional media deceptions are among the list of recent ill effects which the author attributes, at least in part, to the rise of the political consultants.

Prior to forming his conclusions about this recent phenomenon, Sabato carefully describes the different aspects of campaigning that involve political consultants. Polling, advertising, time-buying, direct mail fund-raising, and other technical matters are described in detail, and for anyone not steeped in the mechanics of modern campaigning there is much to learn. For undergraduate and graduate students in American electoral politics this book provides valuable reading.

There are a few aspects of his analysis to which Sabato might have given more time. One area, for example, would be a deeper analysis of the role of primaries in fostering candidate organizations with each contender having personal consultants, which limits the ability of other party leaders to rejoin the inner circle of campaign advisors after the primaries are over. As a result, consultants rather than political leaders become disproportionately influential both during and after a successful campaign.

Aside from such minor criticisms, overall this is a solidly researched and well-written book on a topic that is easier to talk about than to write about.

RICHARD L. RUBIN
Swarthmore College

The Scientific Basis of Health and Safety Regulation *edited by Robert W. Crandall and Lester B. Lave. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1981. 309 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $10.95.*

This is a very useful, if somewhat disjointed, book. It contains case studies of five health and safety regulations that could give depth and concreteness to courses on public policy,

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bureaucracy, and regulation. The issues presented are all ones that have received widespread public attention: passive restraints in automobiles (airbags), cotton dust, saccharin, waterborne carcinogens, and sulfur dioxide. Thus, two of the studies deal with environmental issues, two with consumer protection, and one with worker health. Two involve cancer risks; two, other health effects; and the fifth deals with automobile safety. Each problem is discussed separately by a scientist, an economist, and a regulator. While the economists and regulators frequently use the scientists' data, each essay stands alone, and the reader sometimes has the sense of people talking past each other. Furthermore, the book suffers from the problem of all conference volumes: Except for a few pages in the introduction and in the short "general comments" at the end, there is no attempt to look across the five issues to find parallels or contrasts caused either by the type of problem or the nature of the available information. It is clear that science has not provided simple answers to any of these regulatory problems, but it would be interesting to know whether the contributions of science to policy are related in any *systematic* way to the field of science and the priorities of academic researchers.

The conference's attempt to obtain different perspectives on the same problems is worthwhile, but it runs the risk of suggesting that there is something like *the* scientific perspective or *the* economic point of view. Although most public policy economists share a concern for opportunity costs, for trade-offs among goals, and for the quantification and comparison of benefits and costs, they differ in the use they make of scientific evidence and in their understanding of and sympathy for regulators' problems. The application of economic methodology may not produce unambiguous answers if the data are imperfect and the causal model poorly understood. Thus, Sam Pelzman's work on automotive safety, which concludes that increased safety for drivers leads to reduced safety for pedestrians, has been controversial among economists. Similarly, Lester B. Lave, in reporting the Lave and Eugene B. Seskin results on the health effects of sulfates, cites other studies, some of which confirm while others deny his results. Only one economist, Oliver E. Williamson, tries to respond to other policymakers' impatience with economic methods. In his paper on saccharin, he attempts to establish a quasi-economic framework for choice that will be acceptable to scientists and regulators. The other papers by economists are more straightforward cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses.

A common thread running through the book is the tremendous uncertainty surrounding each regulatory problem. The uncertainty takes the form of poorly specified scientific models, poorly understood control technologies, poorly measured health benefits, and benefits and costs that are difficult to quantify. While these uncertainties mean that no single cost–benefit ratio is likely to be reliable, it does not imply that thinking systematically about a problem is a bad idea. The papers suggest that even where uncertainties are extremely serious, as in the case of waterborne carcinogens, it still helps to know something about the scientific basis of a problem. One should beware of the unfortunate, if understandable, position of most of the regulators who admit the uncertainties and then go on to say that existing policy is just fine.

One reason, however, that the problems with current policy are not brought out more clearly is the book's emphasis on substantive outcomes, rather than implementation. Here economists with their interest in market-like schemes and incentives might have differed more sharply with the scientists and the regulators. In the classroom, it would be

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enlightening to supplement this book with material on the legislative process and on the implementation of health and safety statutes through federal bureaucracies, state governments, and court orders.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Columbia University

George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness: The Wallace Campaigns for the Presidency, 1964–1976 *by Jody Carlson. New Brunswick, N.J. Transaction Books, 1981. 331 pp. $22.95.*

George Wallace launched in 1964 the political equivalent of J. E. B. Stuart's daring raids behind Northern lines a century earlier. Emboldened by the results, Wallace subsequently mounted frontal attacks on Northern liberalism, winning a number of battles above (and below) the Mason–Dixon line before suffering his own crippling Gettysburg in 1972. By the end of the 1976 presidential primaries it was all over, as voters North and South deserted Wallace in droves. These Wallace campaigns are surely among the most important *and* the least understood phenomena of the last quarter century of American politics.

Accordingly, I took up this book with high hopes. I put it down with a sense of dismay. Not to mince words, the analysis is superficial, the research pedestrian, the conceptualizations embarrassingly thin.

The book is organized along chronological lines. After a prologue, a chapter on powerlessness, a chapter reviewing other attempts to explain the Wallace vote, and a chapter on Wallace in Alabama politics prior to 1964—all in 26 pages—the author proceeds to look at each of Wallace's quadrennial forays into presidential politics from 1964 to 1976. Much of the discussion of each campaign is drawn from newspaper reports (about half the entries in the bibliography consist of stories from the *New York Times*) and other journalistic sources. These commentaries, which take up the greater part of the book, show a talent for description and summary, but seldom rise above the level of the sources employed and add little to what was already known. The author also provides for each campaign a short chapter (six to eight pages) purporting to offer a content analysis of Wallace's speeches but actually yielding nothing more than quotations from Wallace's speeches interlarded with paraphrases of them.

As serious as these shortcomings are, they could be forgiven if the author had succeeded in her objective of explaining the voting behavior of Wallace supporters. Unfortunately, she fails. Her problems begin with a sketchy and totally inadequate review of alternative explanations of the Wallace vote—authoritarian personality; status discrepancy; marginal voters. These theories are to be tested, along with the author's poorly developed "powerlessness" thesis, by examination of survey data, principally a June 1964 Gallup national poll, the 1968 Michigan Survey Research Center post-election survey, a 1972 Florida survey done for Knight Newspapers, and three nationwide polls and one Florida poll done by CBS and the *New York Times* in 1976.

Of course the items on these surveys seldom permit a fair test of the various theories. As a result, the author repeatedly makes items serve unintended and inappropriate pur-

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poses. For example, "hawkish" responses to a single question on Vietnam in 1968 are considered manifestations of an authoritarian personality. And when the data *are* applicable but do not support the author's thesis, she has a disconcerting way of minimizing their importance.

That behavioral research is not the author's forte is further evidenced by her creation of a measure of ascribed status which gives Black Protestants the same score as White Catholics or Jews. Her inclusion of this in an overall socio-economic status index results in all Catholics and Jews being assigned either to the "low" or "working" class categories, and all white Protestants to the "middle" or "high" categories. As a result of her mishandling of concepts and data, one has no confidence even in such innocuous and intuitively plausible conclusions as "Wallace supporters are distinguishable from others by their authoritarianism, feelings of political powerlessness, and racial prejudice" (p. 275).

CLIFTON MCCLESKEY
University of Virginia

Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism *by Valerie Bunce. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 296 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $6.95.*

The study of chief executives has, of late, been going through a revolution. As one of the last fields in political science to employ quantitative techniques, theory-building, and the like, this area of study has only recently begun to move beyond the traditional historical/legalistic method to become a more comprehensive and more methodologically sophisticated field of inquiry.

One neglected area which promises to be especially fruitful is the *comparative* study of chief executives. Bunce makes a much needed and very fine effort at remedying this deficiency. The author attempts to discern the policy consequences of leadership succession in capitalist and socialist states and finds that new leaders do make a difference in both capitalist and socialist regimes.

In examining the consequences of leadership change, Bunce looks at data from seven western nations with liberal democracies and twenty-three American states, and compares that data with similar data from the seven Soviet bloc countries and the Soviet Republics. Using a combination of the case study method and quantitative research, the author looks at leadership change in these systems to determine budgetary changes which resulted from the change. Changes in policy output as represented by shifts in budgetary allocation thereby serve as the "dependent" variable in this study.

Bunce wants to know if "new faces" do "new things". Yes, in both sets of states, new leaders do "affect public expenditure in a significant manner . . . ," and "succession does seem to correlate with budgetary innovation" (p. 62). This leads Bunce to conclude that, "A new leader in Moscow should make about as much difference as a new leader in Washington, D.C." (p. 141). Later, Bunce adds, "Clearly succession rites are very different, East and West, as is the structure of decision-making, the ideology of the elites,

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and their career background, yet in terms of the *policy impact* of succession, there is little to choose between socialism and Western democracy" (p. 233).

The similarities in policy change in socialist and capitalist states takes the form of a "cycle" of innovation, according to Bunce. This cycle goes through the following stages: leadership change, policy change, incrementalism, and then, the cycle repeats itself. In the period after succession and change, the policy system slows down. This leads to demands for leadership change, and the cycle begins anew. Bunce feels that the succession process works to "enhance the *incentives* and *capacity* of newly elected chief executives to innovate" (p. 20).

Overall, this book is a fine effort at looking at chief executives from a comparative perspective. Clearly written, it is, however, somewhat repetitive, and the case studies, while instructive, seem somewhat superfluous. These are minor criticisms in what is otherwise a very solid work.

Bunce's overall thesis is interesting to consider in light of recent leadership changes in the United States and France. In both countries, leadership change has led to abrupt policy changes—albeit in different directions in these countries—where the first year of new leadership encouraged and allowed policy innovation. From Bunce's study, one would expect change, in both systems, to slow down as tenure in office continues.

Certainly more work needs to be done in the area of the comparative study of chief executives. This book by Valerie Bunce should serve as an instructive and much needed early effort at improving our comparative knowledge of the behavior of executives in different political systems.

MICHAEL A. GENOVESE
Loyola Marymount University

Environment, Energy, Public Policy: Toward a Rational Future *edited by Regina S. Axelrod. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1981. 175 pp. $21.95.*

The difficulty of producing a book on highly volatile policy areas with publishers' lead-times of nearly two years could hardly be better illustrated than in this already outdated volume. The nine chapters here were evidently first developed as papers for presentation at the Conference on Energy and Environment at Adelphi University in June 1979. Occasional reference is made to events in the early months of 1980, but the situational context is largely that of the late Carter administration's fumbling efforts to wage the "moral equivalent to war" on the national energy blight, amidst endless lines of gas guzzlers and TV footage of smiling sheiks. Without exception the authors reflect both the dated view and the then-prevailing assumption that a dominant government planning role to "solve the national energy crisis" was inevitable. In the company of six political scientists, three planners and a lawyer, the importance of economic stimuli and the potential response of external markets is largely ignored.

In 1979, who would seriously have predicted that the highly touted Synthetic Fuels Corporation would be created, lavishly funded, then budgetarily decimated by Congress

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within the space of two years; that the newly formed Department of Energy would be severely threatened with death and dismemberment, its budget slashed; that "finite" natural gas reserves would be recalculated with revised estimates in the trillions of cubic feet—on a par with coal for the energy future and developable at far less environmental cost; that OPEC greed would result in an international oil glut as American consumers met higher prices with individual conservation measures, lowering American dependence on imported oil by 20 percent. Dankwart Rustow's chapter does look to "small cars" as "the big answer to American energy needs" (p. 13), anticipating the transition sooner, perhaps, than he knew. But who would really have supposed that a new presidential administration would abandon the energy convictions of its three predecessors and attempt seriously to cast off the national role for energy planning, putting its faith instead in the free market?

Withstanding the publisher's inability to print and bind more quickly than fast-breaking events, there are some nuggets of real worth in this volume. Michael E. Kraft's documentation of the Carter effort to legislate energy policy demonstrates convincingly that a "strong and persistent national constituency for the national energy plan" neither existed nor was developed and that "Congress defined energy problems differently (than Carter) and substituted its own judgments for the president's" (p. 53). Walter A. Rosenbaum's excellent chapter on "The Politics and Ecology of Energy Research and Development" effectively points out the parallels between federal policies to develop nuclear power and synthetic fuels—big, high-tech projects; high visibility and political impact; and the perception of important, short-run stimuli for local economies. In short, the federal efforts to prime both the nuclear and synfuel industries are aptly equated with other forms of transfer payments and public works pork barrels which act as "catalysts to the formation of economically dependent interest coalitions" (p. 71).

Unless we are prepared to credit national energy planners with far greater capacities and foresight than they have demonstrated over the past decade, the overriding shortcoming of contemporary energy-environment policy is not found in the absence of a "serious planning process" lamented by Gregory A. Daneke in the final chapter (p. 160). It lies rather in the Reagan administration's haste to lower or remove barriers to resource exploitation without careful calculation of resulting environmental costs and failing to require restitution for environmentally bad effects where some amount of environmental damage is judged acceptable. As at least one author has observed in this volume, "Energy R & D [research and development] is environmental policy by another name" (Rosenbaum, p. 62). Free market R and D makes its own environmental policy.

ROBERT S. GILMOUR
University of Connecticut

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Crisis in International News: Policies and Prospects *edited by Jim Richstad and Michael H. Anderson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 473 pp. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $12.50.*

International news is collected and distributed throughout the world by a small number of news agencies. The Associated Press, Reuters, United Press International, Agence France-Press, and TASS are the principal suppliers of the world's news. Visnews and United Press International Television News (UPITN) provide news film, and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service is a primary source of news for international radio listeners.

International news flows from the industrialized world to the Third World. This system is efficient, but unbalanced, and for Jim Richstad and Michael H. Anderson balance is fundamentally important. Their collection of essays concerns the debate over the flow of international news, and they have been very careful to balance the debate evenly, with every side heard, including the self-serving and the irrational. Balance appears to be as important to Richstad and Anderson as truth, and that is precisely what is wrong with this book, and what is wrong with the argument put forth by those who would like to see governments restrict the international flow of news in the name of balance.

There is also much that is right with this book. A number of the essays accurately describe how the international news agencies operate, thus providing the factual context necessary to analyze the so-called "crisis" in international news. The book also contains some hard research, including Wilbur Schramm's brilliant study proving that there really is no shortage of Third World wire news.

The debate concerning the current flow of news and the proposed New World Information Order essentially has revolved around the four major international wire services. TASS has somehow been ignored—which says a great deal about the sources of the criticism. The BBC World Service has also been omitted—probably because the very people who would restrict the wire services depend on the BBC every morning to find out what's really going on. Unfortunately, both TASS and the BBC are virtually ignored by this book.

The 23 readings are organized in four sections. Part 1, "Global Perspectives," establishes the battle lines between those who believe the media should serve the state and those who favor unrestricted communications systems under private control and responsibility. The former argue for a New World Information Order, while the latter hope to improve the existing systems.

Part 2, "News and Information," continues the debate between "balance" and "free flow," but also includes Schramm's seminal article, and an old but still useful study of the world's press by George Gerbner and George Marvanyi.

Part 3, "Transnational News Agencies," is the strongest section because it is devoted to information rather than rhetoric. The operations of the various news agencies are explained, and Jeremy Tunstall provides an enlightening examination of the economic realities of international news.

Part 4, "Evolving Directions in International Communication," is a summary section that does not achieve its purpose. Two of the articles are so self-serving that they provide no insight in terms of the evolving directions in international communication.

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All in all, Richstad and Anderson have performed a useful service. This book of essays accurately reflects the UNESCO debate concerning a New World Information Order. All parties are heard from, and there is information as well as argument. Although the issues are delineated, however, they are not put in perspective. The editors have chosen balance, and have left the discovery of truth to the reader.

DAVID B. SACHSMAN
Rutgers University

Anthony Eden: A Biography *by David Carlton. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1981. 528 pp. $35.00.*

Revisionist writing on British foreign policy in the 1930s is now a flourishing enterprise. Most scholars mark its beginning with A. J. P. Taylor's startling and controversial *Origins of the Second World War*, but the inspiration for Carlton's study of Anthony Eden seems to arise from a line initiated by Maurice Cowling in *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940*. Some revisionists ask us only to reconsider Neville Chamberlain's predicament in 1938, while others call into question the fateful decision to give Poland a security guarantee in 1939.

Carlton here announces his membership in the latter group. Because Eden's career continues on, so long indeed that one wonders if he will ever become prime minister, the work becomes a complete revisionist account of the decline and fall of the British Empire. Scattered throughout the book are plenty of hints, but in the concluding chapter Carlton makes sure we understand that the jury is still out on Eden. It may be, the author writes, that Eden's two sternest critics, Neville Chamberlain and John Foster Dulles, will have the last word.

Chamberlain and Dulles make an odd couple, but they are perfect for the purpose of demonstrating that in the 1930s and again in the 1950s, Eden allowed himself to be manipulated, most directly by members of his own party, who in turn were quavering before public pressure. Eden had plenty of other faults. Never a real "hardliner" about Hitler, the Foreign Secretary appeared to have developed a "thing" about Mussolini. Even after he resigned from Chamberlain's cabinet—thus weakening it to no good purpose—Eden played an ambiguous role until propelled into co-leadership of the anti-appeasement forces with Churchill. The toughness had gone out of the Empire's defenders.

To regain that toughness, or the semblance of big power status, Eden listened to foolish counselors who urged him toward the Suez debacle—and then deserted, leaving him to face the consequences alone. Not that the prime minister lacked reason to feel irritated by American sermonizing, especially that which emanated from the lips of that Presbyterian elder, John Foster Dulles. He had plenty of reason for wishing to take a strong stand somewhere, but outside the House of Commons was all "unfriendly" territory.

The author emphasizes Eden's "appeasement" attitude toward the Soviet Union and apparently believes that if the Conservatives had remained united behind Chamberlain, the guarantee to Poland would never have been given. Germany and Russia would then

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have been left to fight it out alone across what one British diplomat called the shifting sands of Eastern Europe.

The case against Eden is problematical, at least in regard to appeasement of Russia. Other members in the Foreign Office who were known for their strong anti-Communist views, Orme Sargent to name only one, cautioned Eden against the dangerous anti-Russian views held by the British military. Eden was among the first to propose a postwar Western security system to match the likely developing menace in the East even before 1943 when Russia became a threat.

Nevertheless, this is a "big" book, full of newly researched insights. The revelation of new materials about Churchill's willingness to see a Russian-dominated Romania in exchange for a free hand in Greece helps to clear up lingering mysteries for the specialist. The general reader interested in the reasons for Britain's decline will find much to chew on here.

LLOYD GARDNER
Rutgers University

The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation *by David Reynolds. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 294 pp. $28.00.*

Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America 1944–1947 *by Robert Hathaway. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 317 pp. $25.00.*

We are living in a time when even the most established alliances are shaken, if not broken, so it is natural that historians are reexamining the seemingly durable liaisons of the past. The accepted view has been that the United States and Great Britain grew ever closer in the years 1937–47 and that those years saw friendship ripen into a firm partnership. So edifying a tale invites reappraisal; these books provide it.

David Reynolds traces the vicissitudes of Anglo-American collaboration from 1937 to early 1942, while Robert Hathaway picks up the same story two years after Reynold's ends. Both men stress the problems of the developing alliance and the strains which the alliance produced in both countries. Hathaway's book is well written, but he is not as crisp or urbane as Reynolds, who makes better use of the British Foreign Office documents while Hathaway refers much more frequently to newspapers and magazines.

Yet the similarities between the two works are far more notable than the differences. In 1937, Britain faced the increasing threat of the Axis powers with only a disintegrating France as an ally, but it was still an unquestioned world power. America had come to the rescue in the crucial stage of the Great War, and almost all the English thought it would again, if worse came to worst, but they did not care to reflect on such dismal thoughts. The United States had been notoriously unreliable in 1919 and during the years thereafter. On the right there was a lingering distrust of American populism, anti-imperialism, and disorderly truculence in England. Reynolds, who strives to be exceptionally fair, admits that Neville Chamberlain held these beliefs: As late as January 1940, the latter wrote

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that "Heaven knows I don't want the Americans to fight for us—we should have to pay too dearly for that if they had a right to be in on the peace terms" (Reynolds, p. 63). On the left there was an equally strong distrust of American capitalism, together with a dislike of Yankee materialism closely shared by dukes and Marxists alike.

The traumatic crisis that Chamberlain so feared did come, and the United States came through as the critical ally. This was not, to be sure, solely the result of historical causes or the inevitable product of racial or linguistic ties. Winston Churchill had something, perhaps a great many things, to do with it; as both Reynolds and Hathaway point out, it was very apt and very fortunate that the brilliant British war chief was half-American in ancestry if not in emotion. Appearances to the contrary, the feelings and hard realities of close cooperation did not create a partnership. The alliance as it gathered shape was never on equal terms. Before Pearl Harbor the British were supplicants begging the richer, more powerful, and vastly more secure United States to come to their rescue. Perhaps England had never been in so humiliating a position, and such a role was as unwelcome as it was necessary. "The day after Pearl Harbor," Reynolds relates, "when one of his Chiefs of Staff advocated a deferential attitude towards the USA, Churchill answered with a wicked leer in his eye, 'Oh! that is the way we talked to her while we were wooing her; now that she is in the harem, we talk to her quite differently' " (p. 284). That was a splendid Churchillian *bon mot*, but of course things did not turn out that way.

Hathaway starts his book in 1944, and it is quite evident who is running the seraglio. Each year saw the relationship between Britain and America become more one-sided. Whereas before Pearl Harbor the British had to plead for support, afterward they usually had to do what they were told. After the war, the earlier relationship resumed, to some extent, as the formal alliance ended. The British once more found themselves beseeching financial assistance and discovered that this foreclosed substantially the exercise of an independent foreign policy.

The weaker Britain became, both books argue, the more a compensating sense of intellectual superiority developed. Reynolds quotes the acerbic comments of the Oxbridge trained diplomats and Tory political leaders who felt themselves Greek savants in an increasingly hard Roman world. Hathaway outlines the extent to which Labor party leaders manifested the same sense of impotent hauteur. This was often perceived in America, and it reinforced the old feelings of anger and contempt which these books demonstrate as ongoing and potent factors in Anglo-American relations throughout this period. The aging uncle grew more and more dependent on the brash, rich nephew, but that did not automatically produce love or friendship.

Neither Reynolds nor Hathaway ignores the overarching cooperation of the two nations and the two cultures, but by stressing the negatives they both tend to bring the problems to the fore and the successes to the rear. Each of these books could have been written with the same ingredients, with much the same structure, but with a very different flavor. There is an element of debunking, suavely presented by Reynolds, curtly emphasized by Hathaway, which does not distort this story but does shape it in somewhat arbitrary ways. We start with an America still angrily muttering about the war debts and end with the Marshall Plan; we see Britain opening its eyes to American culture and pluralist variety in a remarkable fashion. That process seems to be accepted but not appreciated in these books.

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Yet the reason for these histories is that one cannot judge the alliance, as both authors admit, without understanding the underside as well as the grander triumphs. In the last generation there was much talk of the obsolescence of diplomatic history, but the old genre has life yet. It is clearly possible to discuss a matter of state policy—the emergence of an alliance, seen largely from a formal viewpoint—and yet analyze large political and even social transformations in the same volume. In a broad sense, Britain and the United States have been coming together for a long time, certainly since the turn of the century "great rapprochement." The critical years were probably those covered by these volumes, and the manner in which the alliance took form and the obstacles overcome can be seen as well from this perspective as from any other vantage point. In August 1940 Churchill predicted that "the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up" (Reynolds, p. 169); the Empire has vanished, but the mixing up has not.

JOSEPH LOSOS
St. Louis, Missouri

The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: The Nineteenth Century *by Stephen Koss. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 455 pp. $29.00.*

Political scientists and historians who have taken the evolution of Victorian politics as their subject tend to place parties and party leaders like Gladstone and Disraeli in the foreground while relegating newspapers like the *Times*, the *Daily News*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and their kin to a hazy backdrop of opinion and citation. In a major venture into the slippery and erratically charted but immensely challenging arena of newspaper history, Stephen Koss largely redresses this imbalance. Drawing upon immense manuscript collections as well as on articles in Victorian monthlies and many of the newspapers themselves, he first surveys the journalistic world of the early nineteenth century and then devotes seven largely chronological chapters to the mid- and late-Victorian British press.

The author is concerned peripherally with technology, with circulation figures, with the rapidly expanding provincial press, and with the highly popular Sunday papers, which troubled Victorian sabbatarians and which anticipated many aspects of the "New Journalism" of the turn of the twentieth century. His focus rather is on the political press, those London dailies that came into their own between 1836 and 1861 with the end of taxes on newspapers, newpaper advertisements, and on the paper stock itself, and that concentrated on parliamentary politics to the exclusion of most other subjects. Their publishers and editors, their beginnings and endings, their amalgamations and permutations, *and* their political connections are Koss's central concern. A successor volume on the twentieth-century press is promised.

The author's method will frustrate social science model builders and disappoint those historians who discern in every Victorian institution one more example of upper-class "social control." Koss's approach is a skillful form of scholarly pointillism from which a highly convincing historical landscape emerges. The middle chapters may prove most

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helpful to those readers who already know a good deal about Victorian Britain, but even nonspecialists should find immense stimulation in the introduction and conclusion. Koss sees the relationship between politicians and journalists as symbiotic: the former sought to use the press to guide the public; the latter saw themselves both as reflectors of public opinion and as the conscience of the political party whose cause they extolled. Its status as "Fourth Estate" once accepted, "the political press held to its prerogatives as tenaciously as the Crown, the Church, or the House of Lords" (p. 412). Of Victorian leaders, Palmerston and Salisbury proved most adept at dealing with the press, Disraeli and Gladstone intermittently so, and Russell hardly at all.

The relationship between journalists and politicians was never harmonious for long. Even in the 1850s, "newspapers were unreliable servants that unpredictably showed too much devotion or too little, unable to judge which was appropriate until the damage was done" (p. 111). The same could be said about the 1890s even though by then London's Liberal press had become predominantly Conservative, its political ardor had waned, and its enthusiasm for printing lengthy transcripts of political speeches had faded. Koss does not believe in apocalyptic transformations, and he downplays the importance of the "New Journalism" embodied in Alfred Harmsworth, Britain's counterpart to Pulitzer and Hearst. "Whether or not he embodied the spirit of the new age," Koss concedes, he certainly packaged it for popular consumption" (p. 356). Not every such dictum may gain assent; thus it seems odd to be told that the one-sided election of 1886 "failed to produce a clear-cut result" (p. 286). Yet the overall impression conveyed by the book is one of enormous erudition, great wit, and enviable sanity. Columbia University's prolific specialist in modern British political history has established himself as one of a handful of giants in the field.

WALTER L. ARNSTEIN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

The People and the Party System: The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British Politics *by Vernon Bogdanor. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 285 pp. Cloth, $39.50; paper, $14.95.*

The last fifteen years have seen the development in Britain of a considerable and thoughtful literature advocating a wide range of diverse proposals for constitutional reform. Bogdanor in this book makes some valuable contributions to this literature.

His diagnosis of the British constitutional problem is correct. The parties have become too powerful. Parliamentary sovereignty has come to mean the sovereignty of the party in office. "The conventional limitations upon the power of party, which prevailed in earlier years, have gradually been whittled away. . . . The parties have themselves come to be the arbiters of what is constitutional and what is not" (p. 2). I would add that, to an increasing extent, political leaders have appealed to the activists of their own party rather than to the electorate at large. Unlike the party activists, voters are not much concerned with the proposals or programs of the rival parties but use their votes to record a verdict on the performance of the party in office. "As their support narrows, governments have become

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more insistent on implementing their programmes, drawn up by party activists whose enthusiasms are hardly shared by the ordinary voter" (p. 191).

Bogdanor also correctly identifies the main obstacle to reform. To be successful, reforms would require the parties to accept them; thus the parties would abdicate some of their power, and "like most sovereigns, they seem singularly unwilling to do so" (p. 2).

The reforms advocated are a greater use of the referendum and a switch from the present plurality system of voting to one form of proportional representation—the single transferable vote.

The approach of the book is basically historical. Bogdanor's treatment of the place of the referendum and of proportional representation in the history of British political debate and legislation is magisterial. Political rhetoric has portrayed both the referendum and proportional representation as utterly alien to British constitutional traditions. The author shows that, on the contrary, both have repeatedly been on the political agenda for well over a century. Britain came very close to adopting a form of proportional representation in 1918. There is piquant irony, nicely brought out with a light touch, in that what tipped the scales was Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George's aversion to any form of proportional representation. But for that historical accident, Britain, in common with the vast majority of Western European countries, would probably have held elections under a form of proportional representation.

Unfortunately, Bogdanor does not confine himself to the historical analysis; he also seeks to make a theoretical case. In this he fails to reach the same high standards. He not only ignores the problems of collective choice; indeed, his argument proceeds as if they did not exist. His text is innocent of any references to Borda, Condorcet, Arrow, or Duncan Black.

He attempts some international comparisons with sizeable sections on the West German and Irish systems and passing references to the systems employed in Israel, Australia, Malta, Tasmania, and Finland. But the level of analysis is simplistic and never achieves the standard of Douglas Rae's meticulous and scholarly analysis of the political consequences of the electoral laws of 20 democratic states. Bogdanor could hardly rest his case on his comparative material nor, to be fair, does he attempt to do so.

More serious is that neither of the reforms advocated seem to fit the problems Bogdanor himself has identified. Any form of proportional representation admittedly makes single party government more unlikely but does not necessarily reduce the power of the parties. On the contrary, in one respect the "parties" become more powerful since they rather than the electorate determine the choice of government. The French experience, particularly under the Third and Fourth Republics, shows that under these conditions the parties can become even more remote from the concerns of ordinary voters than British parties are today.

Because the parties would exchange one form of power for another, they might be willing to accept a switch to some form of proportional representation. As this book shows there has always been a significant minority of MPs in favor of electoral reform. On the other hand, there is little in Bogdanor's review of previous uses of the referendum to lead one to expect the parties to accept its use except under those conditions when they themselves are divided. The referendum could thus do little to make the parties more responsive to the electorate where the former are solid in their ideological convictions.

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It is to be hoped that before constitutional reforms are adopted in Britain a more thorough study, which could perhaps also cover other types of reforms, will be undertaken. This book will, however, provide a valuable historical prolegomenon to such a study.

JAMES DOUGLAS
Northwestern University

The Trouble With France *by Alain Peyrefitte. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1981. 198 pp. $18.50.*

Vichy France and the Jews *by Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 432 pp. $20.95.*

These two books have little in common besides the appearance of being indictments of France and of the French people. The Marrus and Paxton book is a carefully researched historical study of the Vichy regime's policies toward the Jews. It is a sorry story that the authors brilliantly recount, and one can easily understand why French historians have preferred to ignore this appalling episode in the history of their country. Peyrefitte's book, on the other hand, is more of a general essay that dips into history, sociology, and politics to explain "le mal Français" (which, incidentally, is the title of the original French edition). Although it cannot be compared with Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* or with the *L'Ancien régime et la révolution Française*, it does take these works as models.

The French disease, according to Peyrefitte, derives from the centralized structure of the French state and from the culture (*mentalité, esprit*) of its people who both accept and rebel against this form of authority. The consequence of administrative centralization, he argues, has been to sap all initiative from the French people and to deny them responsibility for making their own decisions. This creates a vicious circle: a people that is both passive and undisciplined recoils from making its own decisions and refers them to a higher authority; but a bureaucracy which discourages initiative and succeeds in making citizens even more passive cannot cope with all the decisions that are referred to it. Hence, society's periodic leaps from lethargy to insurrection.

Those familiar with the writings of Tocqueville, Laurence Wylie, Stanley Hoffmann, and Michel Crozier will find little new in all this. What Peyrefitte has skillfully done is to weave into this view of French society concrete examples of bureaucratic inertia, political impotence, as well as conversations with presidents, prime ministers, and politicians—all of which makes for rather effective writing.

Peyrefitte has a good deal to say about France's industrial backwardness and about the French people's resistance to innovations, their lack of entrepreneurial neutrality, and their reluctance to take risks. All these criticisms were made, with considerably greater justification, in the immediate post-war period. The trouble is that they are no longer applicable. In fact, it would have been more appropriate to explain how a country that had fallen so far behind some of its neighbors during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth could, within the space of less than three decades, become the fifth major

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industrial power in the world. The France of today is not the one that Peyrefitte describes in most of his book.

The Trouble With France is a highly political book, although this is artfully disguised. Peyrefitte attacks the centralized state, the caste system, the bureaucracy, the labor unions, and in the final part of the book, he tells us that the Sick Man is improving after all because of the regime of the Fifth Republic, and of De Gaulle in particular. It was De Gaulle, according to Peyrefitte, who was the great decentralizer. His own record, as well as that of his governments, in the area of decentralization, was an unmitigated failure; the people rejected him and his solutions. In fact, none of the reforms which Peyrefitte sees as necessary—the educational system, the caste system, the need for greater equality, local democracy—were even attempted by the governments that De Gaulle represented. Ironically, it is the left that now has to try to do what the right failed to carry out. Peyrefitte's view is that bureaucratic power renders politicians impotent. And yet, the many controversial measures which Peyrefitte took in his years as minister of justice (and many of which the present government has rescinded) suggest that Michel Debré was right when he told Peyrefitte that bureaucratic power makes itself felt only when political authority abdicates its responsibility (p. 173).

Political power certainly dominated French society under the Vichy regime. Marrus and Paxton, whose work is based on Vichy and German documents, tell the terrifying story of the anti-Semitic fervor of this period. Anti-Semitism was part of the National Revolution, which Paxton has dealt with in his earlier *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944*. Since anti-Semitism was part of a program for the transformation of the society, it needed little or no help from the Germans.

The anti-Jewish policies of Vichy were put into effect very soon after the German occupation. The first *Statut des Juifs* was promulgated in October 1940, and the second in June 1941. In his *Vichy France*, Paxton dealt a devastating blow to the "shield" theory, whereby Vichy collaboration with the occupiers supposedly saved French lives and saved France from an even worse fate. In this book, Marrus and Paxton, through their remarkable and relentless recounting of the anti-Semitic policies of Vichy, show that the "shield" theory is hardly more applicable to the Jewish question. Indeed, the Vichy regime hounded, rounded up, and deported Jews from the Occupied *and* Unoccupied Zones. "Vichy anti-Jewish policy was . . . not only autonomous from German policy; it was a rival to it" (p. 366). Vichy wished to secure the gratitude of the German authorities by going further than they had to in their anti-Jewish policies. Indeed, "Vichy's rival antisemitism offered [the German authorities] more substantial help [in deporting and exterminating Jews in 1942] than they received anywhere else in western Europe, and more even than they received from such allies as Hungary and Rumania" (p. 369).

If Vichy did more than merely carry out the orders of the German occupiers, Marrus and Paxton leave no doubt that the French people gave the kind of support to Vichy's anti-Jewish policies without which implementation would not have been possible. Support for Vichy's policies against the Jews (French and foreign) came from diverse groups in the society, and the policies were administered by the judiciary, the civil service, and the police. No one who reads the horrifying accounts of the monstrosities perpetrated against the Jews by the Vichy (French) authorities can doubt that the Nazi goal of the Fi-

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nal Solution was made easier to reach by the cooperation of the French people and the French authorities.

Marrus and Paxton avoid polemics, and their aim has not been to put a society on trial. This is why their story is not without its nuances. The violence of Vichy's anti-Jewish policies did stir the revulsion of segments of French society, particularly among the clergy. And there were many French men and women who were outraged by their government's actions. Protestants were in the forefront of those who refused to accept such barbaric behavior.

Despite the widespread collaboration of the French people in Vichy's anti-Jewish policies, the balanced account of Marrus and Paxton shows that many Jews were saved by French people who risked their own lives. One might have hoped that there would have been more such people. But as Marrus and Paxton say at the outset of their book, when referring to the wartime experience of Serge Dubrovsky, "while the measures of 1940–42 against Jews were the work of French people, every Jew who survived in France during 1942 to 1944 owed his or her life to some French man or woman who helped, or at least kept a secret" (p. xiv). Nonetheless, 75,000 French Jews were killed during this period.

EZRA N. SULEIMAN
Princeton University

Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies *by Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, with the collaboration of Samuel J. Eldersveld and Ronald Inglehart. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 308 pp. $29.50.*

This well-written book should be read more for the nuggets of imaginative insights it offers than for the empirical data it contains. Proceeding from Max Weber's typological distinction, the authors seek "to understand the generic behavior patterns of politicians and bureaucrats as policymakers" (p. 32) by exploring similarities and differences in the manifest backgrounds and beliefs of 1,400 senior parliamentarians and civil servants in seven Western democracies. In fact, their findings are based mostly on semi-structured interviews conducted over a four-year period in the early 1970s with a small number of respondents in Britain, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, enriched at times by data from similar interviews in Sweden, France, and the United States.

The quantitative data presented here almost entirely disregard national distinctions. Variations in the timing and coding of the interviews made the data not precisely comparable. Moreover, as in the other recent typological studies, the cross-national research design did not allow for careful consideration of structural and cultural differences between countries. There is no specific information on the study's questionnaire items, sampling procedures, nor on the size and response rate of the respective national samples of politicians and bureaucrats.

On the strength of their interview data, the authors delineate some rather unsurprising differences in the social backgrounds of their "typical" European parliamentarians and bureaucrats, such as in levels of education. The data evidently did not permit them to an-

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swer their questions about a possible relationship between variations in social origins and career patterns, on the one hand, and variations in attitudes and behavior on the other. There is some interesting information on differences in the way politicians and bureaucrats conceive their own policy-making roles, but unfortunately nothing on how they view each other's roles. Speculation on the implications of differences in styles of behavior involving the relationships between parliamentarians and civil servants is advanced, but the propositions remain untested in this study. More satisfactory is, for example, the finding that, at least in Europe, professional politicians tend to take a broad view of substantive policy issues along a left–right continuum, whereas the typical bureaucrat holds to a more centrist viewpoint. In terms of democratic beliefs, the bureaucrats interviewed were prone to be "conservative pluralists," attached to the prevailing order and emphasizing the importance of political liberty, while the politicians were more likely to be "reformist populists," stressing social equality and change.

The authors conclude that "the broad contrasts in background, in values, in outlook, and in behavior that emerge from our interviews with bureaucrats and politicians, particularly in Europe, are too consistent and coherent to be ignored" (p. 244). But they evidently knew better than to pursue this point and proceeded instead to some imaginative speculations beyond their empirical data. Few will dispute their claim that the "classical" distinction between the policy roles of senior politicians and civil servants no longer holds true. Perhaps it never really did (except in Weber's ideal types), in so far as policy-making takes in more than legislative output. Moreover, it will not be news to anyone familiar with patterns of functional representation in modern Europe that bureaucrats believe that they, as much or more so than politicians, are responsible for "brokering" interest claims upon the state. All in all, this reviewer found the authors' willingness to rise above their factual data stimulating and, therefore, welcome.

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939–1945

by Werner Rings, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., 1982. 351 pp. $17.95.

Over the past decade there has been an increasing tendency among historians to dispense with stock heroes and villains when examining everyday European responses to defeat and occupation in World War II. From this new perspective, Nazi administration of conquered territories seems less monolithic, efforts at resistance less widespread and more tentative, and the vast, gray area between rebellion and acquiescence to Hitler's rule more subject to infinite gradations of courage, opportunism, and fear. Hagiography and demonology alike have yielded to a tonic skepticism and a tolerance for complexity in a field where both were formerly in short supply.

Rings, a German journalist and historian, adopts the spirit of these agnostic researchers in his study of the occupation. His attempt to clarify the range of options open to those suddenly condemned to live under Nazi rule and his broadly comparative approach,

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treating occupied Europe as a whole, compose the book's major strengths. Rings distinguishes among four types of collaboration, ranging from "tactical" to "unconditional," and fully five varieties of resistance. Moreover, he insists, individuals were seldom wedded to a single attitude, but rather moved from one to another as circumstances or personal convictions shifted. The watchword was prudence. Rings convincingly argues that "the general tendency and readiness of the inhabitants of the occupied territories [was] to compromise with the enemy as long as humanly possible" (p. 81). He also succeeds in conveying the extreme disparity in the situations faced by the nations under Nazi control. While the Danes enjoyed a relatively benign occupation policy until 1943, the Poles and the Russians were subjected to measures of extreme brutality from the beginning. Little wonder, then, that outright "offensive" resistance flourished in the East at a time when attempts to find accommodation with Berlin continued to be made in the West.

Despite these virtues, however, Rings's book remains disappointing in its failure to do more than simply restate the now familiar themes of Robert Paxton, David Littlejohn, and others concerning the widespread desire for collaboration, and to note once again that the resistance contributed little of significance to the war's military outcome. Rings, in fact, seems most at home with the "scissors and paste history" so well described by the late R. G. Collingwood. While he shows undoubted good taste in his choice of secondary sources and displays a dramatist's eye for the telling anecdote, he is too often content to forego any effort at analysis. Nor is he well served by a disjointed, telegraphic style, which overdramatizes events the true impact of which is better conveyed through understatement. His desire for a quick-paced narrative leads him to focus primarily on political and military matters, leaving such important topics as the ubiquitous black market and fraternization with the occupier virtually untouched. And what of the resistance contribution to morale? "Even in its organized form," Rings himself finally concludes, "the resistance was more an attitude of mind and a profession of faith than an armed force" (p. 280). If that is so, then we surely need to know more about what this "attitude of mind" meant to those who shared it.

As as introduction to a complex topic, Rings's study is serviceable but limited. Readers wishing a rapid digest of events and willing to dispense with more than a modest effort at their interpretation will find the book of some value. Others would do better to consult the works cited in Rings's bibliography directly.

JAMES D. WILKINSON
Harvard University

Soviet Military Thinking *edited by Derek Leebaert. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1981. 300 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $14.95.*

This volume of essays—several of which are revised and updated versions of articles that appeared in *International Security*—focuses on both Soviet strategic and non-strategic doctrine as well as the relationship between Soviet doctrine and technology. In addition to the editor, contributors include Robert Bathurst, Fritz W. Ermarth, Stanley Sienkie-

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wicz, Raymond L. Garthoff, Michael MccGwire, Nathan Leites, Christopher Jones, and David Holloway.

The introductory essay by Leebaert is the least satisfying in the book, being somewhat alarmist and stressing a Soviet advantage in hardware without considering the significant vulnerabilities facing the USSR. Bathurst's essay stresses the importance of the Bolshevik experience in the formation of Soviet strategic doctrine as well as the importance of the "rear" in the Soviet language of war. The contrasts with U.S. doctrine are duly noted.

Ermarth's contribution also focuses on contrasts between U.S. and Soviet doctrine—specifically, strategic doctrine. This chapter probably best represents the strengths and weaknesses of most of the essays. It is a clearly written and highly informative paper but does not consider the implications of Soviet military thinking and differences between U.S. and Soviet doctrine in terms of U.S.–Soviet arms control, weapons procurement policies, or prospects for global stability.

This flaw is least notable in the middle chapters. Sienkiewicz discusses the relationship between Soviet nuclear doctrine and arms control and offers some not very comforting conclusions, namely, that Soviet agreement on particular arms control measures is more likely to be based on a desire to forestall U.S. technological edges (for example, antiballistic missiles) than on any commitment to arms limitation and reduction as a means of achieving strategic stability. On this basis he makes some recommendations concerning U.S. participation in future arms limitation negotiations. MccGwire's essay on Soviet naval doctrine and strategy focuses not only on the basic premises of Soviet naval doctrine and assigned missions but also on their effects concerning actual Soviet strategic behavior.

In his essay on "Mutual Deterrence, Parity and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," Garthoff argues that while the Soviet leadership believes that nuclear war, if it occurs, should be fought to attain victory, they also accept the basic notions of mutual assured destruction as a means of achieving strategic stability. This claim is rather difficult to accept. While the Soviets undoubtedly consider deterrence their prime objective, there is very little evidence to support the view that they are concerned with mutual deterence and stability in the sense that Robert McNamara was.

The final portion of the book on non-strategic issues covers a wide range of topics. Leites's essay on the Soviet style of war covers Soviet doctrine for conventional war and focuses on such topics as seizing the initiative, disorganization and destruction of the enemy, and the importance of the rear. While this essay is concerned with conventional doctrine, the similarities to Soviet strategic doctrine are quite apparent.

Jones's essay on Soviet military doctrine and Warsaw Pact exercises suggest that Soviet doctrine is used as a political weapon. The joint exercises dictated by the doctrine prevent Warsaw Pact nations from developing a capability for territorial defense similar to that possessed by Yugoslavia and Romania—a capability that could be turned against the Soviet Union.

In the final chapter, Holloway examines the link between technology and Soviet doctrine and suggests that the common belief that doctrine drives technology is incorrect. According to Holloway, while Soviet history shows some influence of doctrine on technology, it shows even greater influence of technology on doctrine.

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Although over-priced, this is a well-written and stimulating collection of essays. While it does not, in many instances, go as far as it might, it still makes a significant contribution.

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON
University of California, Los Angeles

Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53 *by Werner G. Hahn. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982. 243 pp. $22.50.*

We are usually told that at the end of World War II, Stalin determined on a hard, left Communist policy, thereby starting the Cold War with the West, crushing all political dissent and civilized culture at home, reducing even his most powerful subordinates to fearful creatures who tattled on each other to Stalin, but who didn't dare discuss real issues. Stalin's tool for that policy, we are told, was the sinister Andrei Zhdanov, ideologist supreme, brutal suppressor of Russian literature and music, organizer of the Cominform to harry Eastern Europe into toeing the Party line and heir-apparent to Stalin until the paranoid tyrant became suspicious of him, too, and in 1948, cast him away like so many others.

Werner G. Hahn gives us a dramatically different picture of a Stalin who did not decide on a hard left line until 1947, and a political world in which high Communist bureaucrats and diverse intellectuals carried on vigorous debates for months and years until Stalin chose to settle them. He depicts an ideological but moderate Zhdanov whom Stalin promoted to triumph over hard-liners through 1946 and who backed moderate intellectuals in the "great debates" of 1947. According to Hahn's portrayal, Zhdanov finally lost power when Stalin turned decisively against him and moderation as late as May 1948.

Zhdanov, says Hahn, returned to Moscow in 1945, eminent after three years of leading the defense of Leningrad, to find Stalin's chief agents—Malenkov, Beria and Molotov—pushing for a hard militaristic foreign policy and consequent tough economic and cultural policies at home, issues on which Stalin had not yet revealed his mind. Zhdanov disapproved of the carelessness of their ideology regarding policies and administration. Zhdanov's disapproval appealed to Stalin, who supported and promoted him in his campaign to re-ideologize the USSR after wartime laxity. But an ideological bent was not by definition a hard left line. Zhdanov, Hahn maintains, pushed for a variety of optimistic views—peace would be possible; the economy would revive—and moderate policies—diplomatic dialogue with the West, serious attention to Western thought and science, significant production of consumer goods at home.

Stalin, apparently pleased, raised Zhdanov to a level with Malenkov by March 1946. He then demoted Malenkov by steps in May-August 1946 and finally banished him from Moscow. Zhdanov was treated as Number Two and as heir-apparent for most of the following year. Stalin assented to Zhdanov's implementation of most of the Party policy and planting his men in control organs; he even let Zhdanov get his hooks into Beria's security forces. Zhdanov landed ideologically on the composers Prokofiev, Shostakovich

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and Khachaturian, on the humorist Zoshchenko and the poet Akhmatova, in ways that shocked the West (he called Akhmatova a whore), but he never killed or even imprisoned any cultural figure, whereas his successors murdered many. During 1947 Zhdanov backed the scientists, including his own son, Yuri, in their battle on behalf of Western genetics against Lysenko. He aided European-minded, "liberal" philosophers such as B. M. Kedrov in struggles against dogmatic colleagues, and was, less directly, on the side of the meliorist economist, Evgenii Varga, against the intransigents.

But Zhdanov drank too much. Economic setbacks, American hostility, and Tito's rebellion belied his optimism. Stalin really minded the assault on Lysenko. He did finally turn hard left in 1947–48. Zhdanov fell in May-July 1948 and died in August (naturally?). His following was bloodily purged by resurging Malenkov and Beria. The survivors later joined Khrushchev to purge the latter.

An astonishing story! Not political science but history, not graceful or witty, this is a convincing, important book.

FRANCIS B. RANDALL
Sarah Lawrence College

Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970s *by Blair A. Ruble. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 190 pp. $29.50.*

Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe *edited by Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1981. 302 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $12.95.*

One of the primary purposes of Soviet trade unions is to mobilize workers toward the achievement of production goals. Current slumping productivity in the USSR, together with labor shortages, absenteeism, and job turnover, make Ruble's book particularly timely. This is a book on structure and process. Following a brief history of Soviet unions since Lenin, Ruble discusses the contemporary relationship between union, management, and party in Soviet enterprise. In addressing the issue of the legal and social rights of the Soviet worker, the author describes the manner in which the unions defend those rights, particularly with regard to the arbitrary dismissal or transfer of workers. The chapter on worker participation in management arrives at a familiar conclusion: blue-collar workers are less likely to be active participants than are white-collar or technical personnel.

Not all unions fulfill their obligations toward workers with equal vigor. Unions in heavy industry, located in traditionally industrialized areas, appear to be more dutiful in this respect than unions in light industry, situated in more recently developed regions. The final chapter is a brief history of the checkered participation of Soviet unions in international labor organizations.

This is not an "A to Z" handbook on the workings of Soviet trade unions. To the extent that topics such as union benefits and recreational and health-care facilities are mentioned at all, they are used as examples to clarify the issues and dilemmas facing these unions today.

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This book is brief. The five-page conclusion may, indeed, be too brief, as the text brings to mind numerous interesting questions that beg to be raised, if not discussed. Nevertheless, if there is a preference for drawing one's own conclusions, this book certainly provides that opportunity. It should be of interest not only to students of the Soviet system, but also to those concerned with labor, industrial relations, and complex organization.

The timeliness of Triska and Gati's edited volume is clear. Labor unrest and failing economies currently characterize some, though not all, East European states. This volume is divided into three parts. The first section begins with a critique by Seymour Martin Lipset of Marx's sociological forecast concerning the industrial proletariat, and continues with the theoretical and analytical issues concerning East European workers in particular. The topics covered include: changing social structure (Paul Johnson), political and social activism (Alex Pravda), mass participation (Jack Bielasiak), workers and power (Walter D. Connor), and a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between nine cases of worker disturbances in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (J. M. Montias). In addition, this section includes discussions on economic difficulties and options in Hungary and Poland (Laura D'Andrea Tyson), workers' unrest in Poland, 1980 as a "moral revolt" (George Kolankiewicz), and a discussion of conditions that discourage blue-collar workers from joining the Yugoslav League of Communists (Ellen Turkish Comisso).

The second section is a collection of nation-specific studies. The chapter on Poland by Jan B. de Weydenthal addresses the issue of worker strategies in the absence of adequate channels for the articulation of interest. The question of links between the workers and intelligentsia in Czechoslovakia is raised by Jiri Valenta, while Ivan Volgyes focuses on the old and the new working class in Hungary and their different relationships to the Hungarian elite. The central theme of Daniel Nelson's chapter on Romania is the dilemma faced under "developed socialism" between the increasing need for participation among blue-collar workers and the government's unwillingness to decentralize authority. The section's final chapter by Bogdan Denitch concerns Yugoslavia as the East European exception, with emphasis placed on its self-management scheme and increasing strike activity.

The last two chapters of the book form the third section and address the issues of Soviet policy (Jan F. Triska) and Western dilemmas (Charles Gati) regarding East European workers.

Unlike many edited volumes, the contributions here are varied, yet complementary. The reader is provided with a solid introduction to the problems and issues facing the working classes of Eastern Europe, as well as to the similarities and differences between them.

One of the book's themes is that the dramatic upward mobility which transformed peasants into workers immediately after World War II is now basically over in most of Eastern Europe. Then, too, while blue-collar workers are developing a class consciousness and are articulating more demands, their governments are running out of concessions with which to appease them. A third theme that comes through clearly is the increasing assertiveness of East European workers and their governments' unwillingness to share power, reluctance to use force, and faltering ability to meet worker demands.

By far, most of the contributions to this volume are well researched and well argued.

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The book is both a fine resource and an excellent starting point for further investigations. Nevertheless, several contributors to the volume simply did not do their homework, and their presentations are confusing, sketchy, and unconvincing.

On the whole, both books reviewed here fill a gap in the literature on workers and their unions in these societies. Both are excellent in establishing issues and providing new ideas, and are likely to generate more extensive research in the future.

CHRISTINE M. SADOWSKI
Hoover Institution

The Soviet Economy: Continuity and Change *edited by Morris Bornstein. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1981. 381 pp. $12.95.*

This volume reprints sixteen topical articles that elaborate postwar trends in Soviet labor policy, consumption, foreign trade, agriculture, natural resources and technology. Eight of the essays are taken from the Joint Economic Committee of Congress volumes, *The Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* and *The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*; three from *Problems of Communism*; and the rest from sundry sources. The essays are nontechnical and largely descriptive.

The authors generally paint a gloomy picture of Soviet economic prospects. The list of Soviet woes includes unfavorable demographic trends, growing socioeconomic tensions (rural exodus, women's liberation, "second economy" crime, excessive labor turnover), flagging productivity, declining growth, rising natural resource costs, agricultural stagnation, and deteriorating East-West commercial relations. Although precise forecasts are not provided, the impression conveyed by these essays is broadly consistent with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) forecasts which predict real Soviet growth during the eighties in a range between 0–2 percent per annum.

Nonspecialists will find this volume surprisingly readable and should obtain a better understanding of why so many Western scholars of Soviet political economy believe that the Soviet experiment in administrative planning has been and will continue to be an irredeemable failure. After a quarter of a century of reform and counterreform, the Soviets seem incapable of creating a viable, socialist mass consumption society and of pursuing their military ambitions without causing a significant, and perhaps unacceptable, decline in per capita consumption.

Like all primers, however, this volume conceals profound controversies that divide the profession, thereby making it appear as if the outlook for the Soviet economy is clearer than it actually is. No warning, for example, is given that Western estimates of Soviet performance underlying many of these essays (for example, M. Elizabeth Denton's) are not only significantly lower than those claimed officially by the Soviets, but are themselves methodologically suspect. Nor are readers told that the Soviets, who are fully cognizant of the problems besetting their economy, including natural resource depletion, predict that the gross national product for 1980–85 will grow much faster than the rate forecast by the CIA, just as it has in the past (on this, see Abalkin, "Khoziaistvennyi mekhanizm razvitogo sotsializma," *Voprosy Ekonomiki* 9 [1980]: 129–40). The lack of balance

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caused by this one-sided presentation of the "facts" greatly detracts from the value of the volume for informing nonspecialist opinion. Even if the authors, individually and collectively, are correct in their assessments, which they well may be (recall Brezhnev's remarks on the underfulfillment of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan), the reader is not given an opportunity to learn the boundaries between theory and fact in the discipline and therefore will not be able to appraise independently the evidence in a complete and impartial way.

This shortcoming aside, the volume does efficiently summarize a dominant paradigm of Soviet economic behavior, which although familiar in its broadest outline is not frequently brought together in one comprehensive, easily accessible rubric. These essays thus may be usefully employed as supplementary readings in an undergraduate Soviet economics course, or serve more generally as an introduction to the prevailing interpretation of the Soviet economy currently preferred in Washington.

STEVEN ROSEFIELDE
University of North Carolina

Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism *by T. J. Pempel. Philadelphia, Pa., Temple University Press, 1982. 330 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $10.95.*

Pempel, who has written extensively on public policy in Japan, has now produced a new book that examines the subject in the context of a cross-national perspective. It is a pioneering study and a welcome addition to the growing literature on public policy.

The heart of the book is a fairly detailed examination of six policy areas or issues: economic policy, labor-management relations, social welfare, higher education, environmental protection, and administrative reform. After each section the author has included a series of readings, mostly drawn from official policy statements. In addition, there is an introduction briefly describing the political setting and a conclusion tracing the relationship between public policy and politics in Japan.

One observation that this reviewer would make after reading the volume is that it is difficult to generalize about public policy. For instance, in economic policy, the Japanese government has promoted a high level of economic growth, but in social welfare programs and higher education, it has been relatively inactive. Similarly, by adopting a series of reform measures, the government leveled off the growth of the bureaucracy. When environmental pollution became a problem as a result of industrialization, the government, at first somewhat reluctant to act, eventually responded to pressures from the media, citizens groups, and court decisions and enacted legislation designed to curb pollution. Finally, with regard to organized labor, the government has managed to keep it from becoming powerful.

How can this mixed pattern of public policy positions be explained? Pempel argues that it stems from the "conservative nature of the social support-base of government in Japan" plus the "relative strength and cohesiveness of the Japanese state apparatus" (p. 11). Both of these factors originated from Japan's late development. Whereas "most early industrializers were divided along religious, economic, geographic, ethnic or cul-

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tural lines" (p. 297) and this diversity led to a demand for a pluralist state, Japan was more socially homogeneous so that neither "social heterogeneity nor vigorous democratic inclinations pressed for limits on state power" (p. 298). Moreover, the trend toward strong state power was reinforced by Japan's international vulnerability.

The author notes that "the Japanese state and the conservative coalition have shown a high degree of autonomy in choosing the issues to which they devote attention and resources" (p. 302). Among the issues to which the author pays considerable attention is labor. He characterizes Japanese unions as relatively weak. "The most striking consequence of policies in the area of labor-management relations is the limited rights, privileges, and benefits which labor has managed to secure" (p. 107).

In a formal sense, what the author says is right. Yet in another sense this may be misleading. I would argue that organized labor has more influence than it would seem at first glance. For instance, in the 1980 lower house election, 90 out of 511 who won had the support of labor. It is true that the number is not enough to control legislation, but it is sufficient to prevent blatantly anti-labor laws from being passed. The reason is that since the 1960s, the ruling and opposition parties have come to an accommodation involving behind-the-scenes bargaining. As the author himself notes, in 1977 "over two-thirds of all cabinet legislation was passed without opposition. When Communist party opposition is excluded, this figure rises to about 80 percent" (p. 17).

Moreover, Japan's economic success has raised the living standards of the people, including workers. It is true that workers in the public sector have not won the legal right to strike, but even without it they have done well in terms of pay.

Thus, a more probing analysis might have led to a somewhat different appraisal of the power of labor. This case illustrates the kind of problems that are likely to beset students of public policy.

NOBUTAKA IKE
Stanford University

The Modernization of China *edited by Gilbert Rozman. New York, Free Press, 1981. 551 pp. $22.50.*

This volume is a welcome addition to the study of China's modernization story. The authors trace the trials and tribulations of Chinese resistance to and efforts at modernization. They examine the obstacles and the supportive preconditions inherent in the Chinese tradition as well as the modernizing efforts of the past several hundred years. One enormous strength of this volume is the integration of several historic periods to give one perspective on the entire experience. By not separating pre-Ch'ing, Ch'ing, Republican, and Communist periods, the authors are able to depict the continuity of problems, as well as the successes of the Communist regime in dealing with some of them.

Each time period is evaluated with regard to its international context, political structure, economic system, social integration, and educational system to establish the contributions and obstacles to modernization. The authors break very little new ground but systematically cull the literature to provide a thorough survey of each facet. We already

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know a great deal about Chinese modernization and the authors do us a real service by making that information accessible in a single volume. In addition, the authors make highly useful comparisons of the Chinese data with the Russian and Japanese experiences.

Two issues are particularly well treated in the study. The first is the role of government in directing socioeconomic change. The traditions of strong central authority and a unified state are identified as a Chinese asset. The decline of Ch'ing power and the inability of the many Republican governments to restore that power are compared with Communist success in this dimension. The role of the Communist party and state in the mobilization of skills and resources is well documented.

A second issue that is well developed is the important role of a dynamic elite in fostering social change. The inertia of the Ch'ing elites and the roots of that behavior in Manchu racialism is detailed. A related matter is the need to provide individuals with an incentive system to make modernization a self-sustaining process. The authors appropriately question the success of the Communist regime in developing a motivation system that will sustain the modernization process.

The book is very well organized, a particular tribute in a case of joint authorship. We are all familiar with collections of scholarly essays, each often a gem in its own right, with only the binding tying the essays together. Rozman clearly demanded more of himself and his contributors. He focused their contributions, forced each author to address the same set of questions, and even homogenized their writing styles. This is a joint effort in the truest sense of the term.

Unfortunately, the careful integration of the contributions to this volume also is one of its more annoying shortcomings. It often reads like a textbook, with more attention to comprehensiveness than insightfulness. I found myself laboring through sections that were included for the sake of inclusiveness rather than because of their centrality to any theme or perspective. Perhaps Rozman could have used his editor's pen more deftly to accomplish brevity along with the impressive integration.

Finally, I was distressed by the failure of the authors to consider possibilities for modernization beyond the Western or Soviet success models already in place. Admittedly the current authorities in the People's Republic of China are equally short of imagination. Not too many years ago, however, the Chinese did experiment with alternate models and visions of the future. These efforts are too quickly dismissed as deviations and digressions from orderly progress towards the goal of modernization. In spite of the failures of the Cultural Revolution era, important issues raised during these years should not be dismissed as the rantings of an aging leader and the connivances of his camp followers. The so-called utopianism of the Cultural Revolution was in large measure a response to the problems China faced in following the existing models. Those Maoist alternatives probably remain an integral part of China's modernization drive, much as the problems in both the Western and Russian models that originally gave rise to them.

JOEL GLASSMAN
University of Missouri, St. Louis

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Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework *by Joseph Rothschild. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 290 pp. $22.50.*

In the post-World War II era, the domestic politics of many states have been characterized by two developments. First, as the scope and scale of state responsibilities have increased, political authority has weakened. The legitimation crisis has affected states with differing political and economic systems, from democratic capitalist states to socialist and directed-development regimes. Second, in many ethnically heterogeneous societies there has been a halt and even a reversal of the erosion of ethnic loyalties by socioeconomic forces. Ethnic politics increasingly serves as the major axis of domestic conflict.

Is there a causal relationship between these two developments? Some analysts have seen ethnic political resurgence as an explanation of the contemporary state's legitimation crisis. As Rothschild observes, "approximately half the world's states have recently been plagued by ethnic strife, and it has tended to be more violent than class or doctrinal conflict" (p. 20). Yet Rothschild in his book suggests a more complex relationship between ethnic politics and the legitimation crisis. He argues that the two phenomena spring from similar sources: the economic, political, and psychological disruptions accompanying modernization. Modernization proceeds unevenly, generally reducing the status and influence of groups and elites at the periphery with respect to those at the core. Threatened ethnic elites at the periphery develop an interest in politically mobilizing group members in order to restore their wealth, status, and power. Modernization also ultimately weakens core political elites and structures. The central state is called upon to perform ever-increasing economic and social responsibilities. The bureaucratic means employed, however, are increasingly distant from popular control. With the growing political dominance of bureaucratic institutions, the expanding state is weakened by the erosion of mass loyalty and support. Other group loyalties become politically salient for threatened core elites. Thus, state and party officials turn to ethnic loyalties in order to rebuild their weakened political structures. Ethnic politics may help resolve, rather than merely fuel, the legitimation crisis. The interests of both state and ethnic elites encourage the transformation of ethnic loyalties into a form of interest group politics in the contest over wealth, status, and power.

Aspects of Rothschild's analysis are troubling. The author argues that much of ethnicity's political significance derives from the hardy psychological and cultural functions it performs. The corrosive effects of modernization least (or last) touch this form of identity. Yet on the ground of keeping the study's scope and length manageable, the author omits an analysis of ethnicity's psychological and cultural bases and functions. Moreover, he is critical of modernization theorists who overstress functional equilibrium and the capacity of national political elites to mold and shape mass opinions and allegiances in the service of national goals. Yet he ultimately offers a functional and elite analysis as well; in his version, ethnic elites play leading functional roles.

The book's greatest drawback, however, lies in the confusion of taxonomic manipulation with political analysis. While the reader is furnished some sense of the theoretical range of potential relationships between ethnic groups and government, regime and soci-

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ety, there are few clues regarding *which* ethnic ties might be politically activated by *whom* and with *what* consequences for both the state and members of the affected groups.

STEVEN P. ERIE
University of California, San Diego

The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World *by Anthony D. Smith. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 240 pp. Cloth, $29.50; paper $9.95.*

In many ways, this is a welcome book, containing much that needs to be said about ethnic conflict in the contemporary world. Smith rightly argues that the revival of ethnicity cannot be understood simply as a manifestation of economic grievances, notwithstanding the rhetoric of ethnic groups' advocates. He provides a cogent explanation of Western European ethnic movements grounded in the declining prestige of European states and has some trenchant remarks about the interrelations of ethnic and class conflict. His discussion of the role of intellectuals in reviving their ethnic communities is sensitive and convincing.

These points, however, are buried in a bed of theoretical and historical discourse that includes a tedious review of theories, some of which do not deserve the care lavished on them, and some rather tiresome digressions (for example, pp. 108–18). The difficulty lies mainly in Smith's attempt to cast ethnicity as a problem for analysis in terms of global historical trends. Careful historical study is surely warranted, but broad-brush macro-history leads Smith into some serious problems, as when he conceptualizes ethnic conflict in a way that assumes it inevitably involves attempts at secession from a great empire (chapter 6) or when he devotes considerable energy in relating the emergence of ethnic sentiment to the overproduction of the professional intelligentsia (also chapter 6), a doubtful relationship in comparative perspective.

In the midst of Smith's considerable learning, there is an array of unsupportable, if glittering, generalities ("Given the chance, most ethnic movements in Africa and Asia would opt for outright separatism, p. 138) and unexplained concepts ("latent ethnic antagonism" p. 149). On the other hand, some important generalizations that might emerge from a sweeping assessment of history are suppressed. In one of the most disappointing passages of the book, Smith asks whether, in view of the historical recurrence of ethnic ties and sentiments, ethnicity might in some sense be a "natural" phenomenon (pp. 85–86). On the verge of answering, he then draws back, offering only the observation that the current revival is based on a long cycle of the emergence and decline of ethnic feeling.

There are some excellent sections in this book. The material on ethnicity in the contemporary Western world is particularly good (chapter 9). (The discussion of Asia and Africa, typical of the author's attempt to be comprehensive, is less satisfying.) Yet this good material is offset by Smith's affinity for glib categorical generalizations that do not withstand analysis so that the good is seriously undercut. In the concluding chapter, for example, he states that "the inveterate opponents of ethnic nationalism and its chief representatives, the professional intelligentsia, are the governmental bureaucrats, who control much decision-making in the centralised poly-ethnic state" (p. 186). One would never

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guess from this that the civil service is typically an object of ethnic conflict and that civil servants are frequently ardent partisans in that conflict. The volume is a mine of small jewels, burdened, however, by the high cost of extracting them.

DONALD L. HOROWITZ
Duke University

Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America *by Lars Schoultz. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 412 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $7.95.*

By mid-afternoon of 4 November 1980, as it became clear that Ronald Reagan was going to be the next President of the United States, champagne started to flow in many officers' clubs in Latin America. For the ruling *juntas*, the end of the Carter years and the advent of a conservative Republican administration in Washington promised to put to rest, once and for all, U.S. pressures to curtail the widespread abuses of human rights that characterize military rule in so many Latin American countries. As friendly, merely "authoritarian" regimes, they would no longer be singled out for public criticism or aid cutoffs—measures to be reserved, so the reasoning went, to the unfriendly "totalitarian" governments of socialist or communist persuasion.

No doubt, there has been some rapprochement between the United States and some of the more repressive Latin American governments since Ronald Reagan moved to Washington. But, by and large, human rights concerns continue to be at the center of the debate on U.S. policy toward Central America, and, to a lesser degree, toward the Southern Cone countries. Far from being a temporary issue related to the personal preferences of one man who happened to become president of the United States, human rights as an important component of U.S. policy toward Latin America is here to stay. The story of how and why this has come to be so is the story that Schoultz tells.

Schoultz moves carefully but comprehensively from a survey of Latin American political developments in the late sixties and early seventies to a review of the opportunities and constraints that U.S. public opinion on Latin American issues placed upon American foreign policy-makers. It is a fascinating account of human rights development from a non-issue to a point where Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the State Department came to exercise virtual veto power over almost any sort of aid going to Latin America ("Never have so few filled so large a space in so short a time," in the words of one interviewee, p. 331). A detailed and thorough inventory of the governmental and non-governmental players—significant organizations like the Washington Office on Latin America or the Council of the Americas are so often overlooked—is followed by a rigorous analysis of the diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions of U.S.-Latin American relations and how they were affected by the growing significance of human rights as a criterion for providing or denying assistance to any given country.

The richest and most rewarding chapters of the book are those describing in remarkable detail the vicissitudes of the various human rights amendments on Capitol Hill. They provide strong evidence that the Executive's gross disregard for Congressional directives

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on aid for countries with significant human rights violations brought upon itself more and more highly restrictive legislation. Whatever the subject—discussions of bureaucratic infighting, analyses of aid flows, or accounts of organizational dynamics—it is difficult to find any significant proposition that is not meticulously documented and supported by the impressive amount of data collected by the author.

Schoultz concludes that although the factors behind the rise of human rights to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns were the product of an extraordinary conjunction of events unlikely to come together again, other, structural changes have occurred in the American foreign policy apparatus that will give human rights considerable staying power.

Well-grounded in a theoretical framework—Schoultz makes very good use of the bureaucratic politics model—showing an impressive command of historical detail and rigorous to a fault, this is a major work in Inter-American relations. It will be impossible to discuss U.S.-Latin American relations in the seventies without referring to it.

JORGE HEINE
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Somoza: And the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America *by Bernard Diederich. New York, E.P. Dutton, 1981. 352 pp. $19.75.*

Diederich has been *Time* magazine's Mexico City bureau chief for a decade. That fact is reflected on almost every page of his book, full of detail and anecdote, and written in the breezy style that the news magazines have taught us to expect if not always appreciate. Not surprisingly, the book is also at times maddeningly discontinuous, a dab of this and a dab of that, a 350-page *Time* article.

Diederich begins his story with the origins of the Somoza family, intermixing fragments of nineteenth-century Nicaraguan history. He then follows the fortunes (literally and figuratively) of the dynasty from its formal installation by the U.S. Marines in 1933 until its overthrow by the Sandinists in 1979. All but about 60 pages of the book are devoted to the life and times of Anastasio (Tacho) Somoza Debayle, the son of the founder of the dynasty, a graduate of West Point, and—in the eyes of many Nicaraguans—"the last Marine."

As Diederich presents the Nicaraguan drama of the 1970s, we meet most of the important characters and are introduced to most of the key elements of that period: First the earthquake of 1972, in which Tacho was thoroughly discredited after he appropriated and squandered abundant international aid—and then had Managua rebuilt on lands controlled by his family and friends. This is followed by an account of the mounting attempts of the Sandinists to rally opposition to the dictator through audacious armed actions. Next comes a chapter on Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the long-time Somoza antagonist and editor of *La Prensa*, who was gunned down in the streets of the capital. Finally, more than half the book is devoted to the heroic and tragic years of 1978 and 1979 when the Nicaraguan people, under the guidance of the Sandinists, rose up and crushed Somoza's National Guard, sending the dictator fleeing first to his exile in the United States,

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and then to his death in Paraguay while in his Mercedes Benz that was destroyed by rifle and bazooka fire in the streets of Ascunción.

To his credit, Diederich understands that the dynasty and the dictatorship deserved no better fate. He closes his final chapter on Tacho's fall with the following: ". . . the avenging spirit of the legendary Augusto César Sandino had indeed arisen to haunt the Somozas and finally topple their arrogant, bloodstained dynasty into the rubble of history" (p. 328). Nor does he spare the United States—from the initial interventions of the Marines to the eleventh-hour attempts by the Carter administration to ease Tacho out while at the same time preventing a real victory by the Sandinists.

On the other hand, the promise implied by the subtitle, "The Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America," is nowhere met—or even approached. Perhaps the author never had any intention of dealing with this topic, and the unfulfilled subtitle was simply added by an editor after the manuscript was completed. But I suspect the problem is deeper. Since mainstream American journalism cannot deal with—in fact usually does not recognize—the historical context and consequences of U.S. policies, it is really too much to expect one of its practitioners to do so when he is writing a book instead of a dispatch. At least Diederich, unlike many of his colleagues, knows a bad guy when he sees one and is not afraid to say so. But if we are ever going to achieve a more profound understanding of the relationship between underdevelopment, imperialism, and revolution, we need analyses that bite deeper than this sometimes well-told tale of the rise and fall of Nicaragua's last Marine.

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

The Endangered Sex: Neglect of Female Children In Rural North India *by Barbara D. Miller. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1981. 201 pp. $17.50.*

The degradation of women is nowhere more starkly evident than in regions where fewer women than men survive. Barbara Miller dispenses with the notion that sex ratios are biologically determined. Higher mortality rates among girls than boys—the main reason for imbalanced sex ratios—are culturally patterned.

In India the preponderance of men over women originated in the northwest in the nineteenth century with the upper castes practicing female infanticide. It is perpetuated today through discrimination against female children who are given less food, medical attention, and love than boys.

Miller employs a holistic anthropological approach which analyzes the interaction between forces of production, property, and population. She argues that women's role in production is a crucial determinant of the character of inheritance laws, marriage systems, women's social status, and ultimately of sex ratios.

This ingenious study rests on a comparison between northern and southern regions and propertied and unpropertied groups. Women play a much smaller role in dry field plough cultivation in the northern plains than in wet rice cultivation in most of the southern and eastern states. Among northern propertied groups, sons are more highly valued than daughters because they transmit the family property, support their families in old age, perform ancestral rites, and represent an economic asset rather than a liability at marriage.

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By analyzing the underlying structural causes of the imbalances in sex ratios, Miller makes an outstanding contribution to understanding the impact of cultural practices on demographic patterns, thus making this study not only of great academic interest but also relevant to the concerns of demographers and development planners.

Yet Miller's fine study could be further refined through greater attention to both micro- and macro-level questions. Although the book makes excellent use of a wealth of ethnographic sources and census data, it would have benefited enormously from interviews and field work. Many of the questions Miller raises cannot be fully answered because of the dearth of studies on rural Indian women. Furthermore, while the range of issues examined often adds to the richness and complexity of the study, it also detracts from its coherence. Much of the chapter on "Marriage Costs and Sex Ratios," for example, is unnecessary. A concluding chapter tying together the various strands of the analysis would have been extremely useful.

Finally, by focusing exclusively on variations within India, Miller neglects to make any generalizations about the national and international contexts. She dismisses India as being one of the few countries in the world where men outnumber women as "neither surprising nor perplexing" compared to "regional variations that are more interesting" (p. 71). She does not adequately employ historical perspective to explain the continuous decline in the proportion of women to men as shown by census reports between 1901–1971 and in what ways changing socioeconomic conditions are associated with the devaluation of women.

Miller's emphasis on regional variations is also misleading for she implies that boys are only favored over girls in northern regions. In fact, men outnumber women in every state in India with the exception of Kerala. The imbalance in sex ratios is simply more extreme in the north than in the south.

Miller's analysis of regional variations could be extended to compare India with other countries. It is likely, for example, that the smaller role women play in production is responsible for more imbalanced sex ratios in India than is the case in Southeast Asia. The important findings of this book encourage further reflections on its national and international implications.

AMRITA BASU
Amherst College

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American Politics Yearbook, 1982–83 *prepared by Jarol B. Manheim. New York, Longman, 1982. 242 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $7.95.*

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Canadian Defence Policy: Selected Documents, 1964–1981 *edited by Larry R. Stewart. Kingston, Ontario, The Centre for International Relations, 1982. 336 pp. $8.50.*

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Census of Population, Supplementary Reports: Age, Sex, Race, and Spanish Origin of the Population by Regions, Divisions, and States: 1980 *prepared by the Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce, 1981. 6 pp. $1.75.*

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

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

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

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

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

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